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Abstract
This thesis consists of two self-contained studies on the implications of lump sum
costs for empirical design in the context of corporate finance. The first study analyzes
the dynamics of cash holding management and empirically determines the optimal
policy for cash reserves. The framework stipulates that cash management is associated
with the following actions: 1) allow cash level to freely float within the range bounded
by two barriers; 2) refinance back to the target value immediately when cash level
hits either barrier. The endogenous pattern identified under this framework facilitates
understanding of the dynamics of cash holdings since it allows to estimate both the
triggers of cash adjustments, as well as the target of each component of the policy.
Further, this empirical application emphasizes the importance of the adjustment cost
Abstract ii
setting which refers to the interpretation of cost types for cash refinancing (fixed or
fractional). In our model, we allow both fixed and fractional cash adjustment cost,
which allows to identify a number of dynamic aspects such as target and thresholds in
liquidity management. Also, this study enriches the existing studies of determinants
of cash holdings by demonstrating novel effects of covariates on target cash holdings
such as the negative impact of cash flow (profitability) much larger than previously
estimated effects of industry risk. These findings differ from those in existing studies,
either in signs or in magnitude, but are fully consistent with the underlying theory.
Overall, the presented research quantifies cash holding management in a dynamic
double-barrier model, allows to estimate the trigger of cash refinancing, and hence
enhances our understanding of determinants of cash holding policy.
The second study investigates the stickiness in credit rating. The existing lit-
erature on credit ratings typically assumes on accurate match between credit quality
and agency ratings. This assumption ignores the agencies’ trade-off between the rep-
utation among investors and the revenue from issuers when updating credit ratings.
Our model controls for the adjustment cost for rating agencies, and hence explains the
stickiness embedded in rating assignments. Presented tests empirically demonstrate
the existence of the stickiness and its significant impact. This is the first study to
explicitly model decision (partial) irreversibility in credit rating research. This paper
offers therefore a different explanation of the observed rating deterioration to the up-
grades becoming increasingly difficult. Lastly, this study personalizes the standard
ordered-probit estimation to allow for stickiness (path-dependence). Our estimation
identifies upper and lower threshold groups in which the credit quality does not match
assigned ratings, and calculates the likelihood specifically based on their features.
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Many activities in the broad area of corporate finance are associated with some kinds
of adjustment costs. Specific assumptions regarding the nature of adjustment costs
lead to particular predictions about corporate behavior and the way it can be mod-
eled. A double-barrier model typically arises in the presence of lumpy (non-convex)
adjustment costs and exploits the upper and lower thresholds to quantify dynamic de-
cision making. The model predicts that a variable freely floats within range bounded
by the two thresholds, and is adjusted back to target level once the variable hits
either threshold. This infrequent adjustment pattern is therefore optimal as a result
of lumpy adjustment costs. Applications of the double-barrier model allows to study
several interesting phenomena such as the trigger of adjustment. Each of the two
following chapters of this thesis investigates a separate area of corporate finance with
a focus on adjustment dynamics. Chapter 2 is an empirical application of the double-
barrier model to the optimal cash holding management. Chapter 3 investigates the
existence and effects of stickiness in credit ratings. The dynamic adjustment cost
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setting in the credit rating area is reflected as the tolerance of deviation from the
”target”, which results in delayed rating migrations.
In Chapter 2 we develop an empirical double-barrier model to show that mod-
eling infrequent refinancing explicitly leads to new results that complement those in
empirical cash management literature. As opposed to the empirical findings based
on a static model, we find that cash flow (profitability) reduces the cash distribution
target, and that firms retain cash for future cash outflows such as capital expenditure
and acquisition. Further, our double-barrier model also focuses on the trigger of re-
financing by estimating the upper and lower thresholds. It suggests that a complete
policy considers multiple channels that firms can exploit to adjust cash holdings.
Moreover, our work reconciles the part of the puzzles in cash holding area caused
by infrequent refinancing. Our empirical findings complement the existing studies
of determinants of cash holdings by investigating the effects of inertia. Refinancing
decisions appear therefore key understand the motive of cash management policy.
Early cash policy studies concentrate on either finding the optimal cash level by
weighting the costs and benefits or identifying determinants of actual cash balances.
Previous literature identified the positive effect of cash flow (profitability) on cash
holdings (Opler et al. 1999, Han & Qiu 2007, Chen et al. 2012), which is inconsistent
with the precautionary motive for holding cash. Moreover, empirical studies (Opler
et al. 1999, Qiu & Wan 2015, Subramaniam et al. 2011, Chen et al. 2012, Yan 2006)
typically estimate the model using observed cash holdings by treating deviations from
the true target as a simple error term. However, we show that the deviation may also
contain information about firms cash policy since it is a strategic choice rather than
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a simple residual component. In general, trade-off model studied in the literature
focuses on the benefits and costs of cash level itself but ignores the cost of cash
refinancing. It is the presence of costs that leads to infrequent refinancing, which we
attempt to model empirically in this thesis.
Theoretical developments in cash policy models demonstrate the potential of
the double-barrier setting to study the dynamic aspects in cash management under
lumpy refinancing costs. The existing literature generally focuses on two aspects of
cash policy. It either looks at the value of cash holdings (Nikolov & Whited 2014,
Chi & Su 2015) and derives the optimal policy based on the value of marginal cash
holdings. Alternatively, it explicitly derives the double-barrier policy as the optimal
one given the costly external financing (Whited 2006, Riddick & Whited 2009, Bolton
et al. 2011, 2013). For example, Bolton et al. (2011) derive the optimal inaction,
payout, and liquidation regions in a frictional market, which results in obtaining
the boundaries between adjacent regions that determine triggers of refinancing. In
Chapter 2, we also investigate the dynamic cash management policy, which is closely
related to the second strand of the theoretical studies mentioned above. The inaction
range between barriers captures the effect of inertia, and hence leads to optimal
refinancing decisions.
In the model, we allow firms to have some tolerance of a deviation of cash hold-
ings from the optimal level, so that they refinance only when their cash holding level
reaches either an upper or a lower threshold. The rationale behind this behavior is
that a large amount of refinancing enjoys the economies of scale, which spreads out
the fixed component of the refinancing cost. Thresholds serve as refinancing triggers
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because they are the boundaries beyond which the benefits of refinancing exceed the
costs. Moreover, the infrequent refinancing results in only a fraction of observations
to lie near the target cash balance. We therefore also identify observations that are
likely to lie near (endogenous) triggers, those correspond to observations for which
variations in cash balances next period are large enough. We assume large refinanc-
ing to be deliberate because it is less likely that managers implement such influential
adjustments without careful consideration. Similarly, Hovakimian et al. (2001) and
Danis et al. (2014) state that large changes in variables of inherent seem to be delib-
erate actions. Although these studies focus on capital structure, this view can also
apply to the cash holding area due to the similar nature of its dynamics.
Our work contributes to the existing literature by providing a direct comparison
between the static and dynamic models. Static models suggest a positive correlation
between cash flow (profitability) and cash holdings, while our results argue that this
observed positive correlation actually confounds the effect on targets and other ob-
servations, and that the correlation between cash flow and cash target is actually
negative. This negative correlation is consistent with predictions from dynamic the-
oretical models (Whited 2006, Riddick & Whited 2009). Moreover, we find that cash
holdings targets increase with future cash outflows but decrease with current outflows.
Future cash outflows represent extra demand for cash, and hence firms stockpile cash
to meet this expected demand. Inversely, current cash outflows reduce anticipated
cash demand since it has already been met. Further, compared to other dynamic
studies such as Bolton et al. (2011), we provide a more detailed model by relaxing
the assumption of fixed threshold, and by controlling for macro economic variables
(e.g. GDP growth, recession, cost of carry).
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Chapter 3 proposes a stickiness-based model that attempts to explain the ob-
served deterioration in credit ratings. The model focuses on the mechanism of rating
process behind the behavior of rating agencies. The results demonstrate the existence
of stickiness in credit ratings, and its significant impact on rating migrations. Our re-
sults shed light on the debate on whether the downward trend in credit ratings is due
to the deteriorating credit quality or to tightening of the rating standards. Control-
ling for the stickiness, we observe that firms’ credit quality actually improves during
that period. We also document asymmetry in rating migrations. Upgrades become
increasingly difficult while the downgrade standard remains largely unchanged. This
mechanism offsets the improvement in credit quality, and hence leads to the perceived
”deterioration”.
The phenomenon of perceived rating deterioration triggered a recent wave of
research (Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013). The rating event involves
two main participants; firms that are rated and rating agencies. Hence, possible
causes of the deterioration may come from either of the two sides, which are the
quality of the borrowing and the stringency of rating standard. Studies such as
Blume et al. (1998) analyze the causes of deterioration by matching ratings to firm
characteristics. They construct an empirical model attempting to control for all other
covariates and isolate the effect of rating standards by focusing on year dummies. The
study claims that the continuously strengthened standard indeed contributes to the
observed deterioration. This finding leads to a number of following questions since it
remains silent on how the other source of the observed deterioration, the quality of
firms’ borrowing, changes.
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High persistence of credit ratings implies certain tolerance for the deviation
of the actual credit quality from the nominal rating range, and empirical evidence
prove the correlation between the magnitude of this deviation and rating migrations
(Altman & Rijken 2004, Mora 2006, Posch 2011). Empirical results indicate that
rating migrations are triggered when the borrowers’ actual credit quality exceeds the
nominal quality of their current ratings by 1.25 notches.1 Mora (2006) provides more
direct evidence about the rating drifts mechanism, and states that rating changes
when the divergence between actual quality and assigned ratings is sufficiently large.
Posch (2011) further measures the amount of tolerance by extending the frictionless
model to allow non-constant thresholds, and shows that default probability has to
change by at least two notches before rating agencies react.
The stickiness framework proposed in this research also receives theoretical sup-
port from the structure of the agency rating market. Cheng & Neamtiu (2009) em-
phasize the lack of timeliness and increasing regulatory pressure in agency ratings.
There is evidence in the existing literature explaining the origin of stickiness (Altman
& Rijken 2004, Posch 2011, Lo¨ﬄer 2004, Altman & Kao 1992, Lando & Skødeberg
2002, Lo¨ﬄer 2005). In general, agencies have incentives to make credit ratings sticky.
Lo¨ﬄer (2005) documents that agencies attempt to avoid rating reversal after a mi-
gration, and hence contributes to the stability (stickiness). Moreover, Jeon & Lovo
(2013) introduce the notion of ’reputation build-up’, which suggests that frequent rat-
ing adjustments harm the profitability of the agencies by weakening their reputation.
More precisely, Bolton et al. (2012) elaborate on the ”rating shopping” phenomenon
1Notch refers to the minimum rating category in agency rating system. For example, in S&P
rating, rating AAA is one notch above rating AA+.
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according to which agencies attract business by enhancing the stability, because is-
suers can shop in the market for the best ratings they can get. The issuer-paid pattern
indeed results in extra prudence for agencies in updating ratings, which is detrimental
to rating accuracy (Xia 2014, Xia & Strobl 2012). Xia (2014) finds that introduc-
ing investor-paid rating agencies (e.g. Egan-Jones Rating Company) improves the
accuracy and timeliness above most of the tradition issuer-paid ratings (e.g. S&P’s
rating).
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 empirically an-
alyzes the optimal cash management policy considering adjustment costs. Chapter
3 investigates the existence and impact of the stickiness in credit ratings, and hence
proposes the new explanation of the observed rating deterioration. Chapter 4 presents
the main conclusions of the thesis.
Chapter 2
An (S, s) Model of Corporate Cash
Holdings
2.1 Introduction
Cash, as the most liquid asset, has been attracting considerable attention from the
academia. Cash (or, more generally, liquid assets) management serves firm opera-
tions as a core activity intertwining with investing and financing decisions (Graham
& Harvey 2001, Lins et al. 2010, Campello et al. 2011). Much effort has been al-
located so far to the understanding of cash levels. However, the mechanism behind
the decision process of cash holding management has been largely unexplained, at
least empirically. Our study attempts to contribute to the literature by analyzing
the dynamic cash policy in the double-barrier framework. This framework takes into
account two aspects of cash management: 1) allowing cash level to freely float within
the range bounded by the upper and lower thresholds; 2) refinancing back to the
8
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target value immediately when the cash level hits either barrier. A more traditional
view of cash policy is that cash management involves a series of discrete decisions,
which assume some optimal level and result in firms remaining around that level.
Although conceptually straightforward, this static framework leads to a mixed em-
pirical evidence, which creates some puzzles. For instance, the positive effect of cash
flow on cash holdings documented in empirical studies (Opler et al. 1999, Han & Qiu
2007, Chen et al. 2012) contradicts with the precautionary motive to hold cash.1 The
positive correlation between risk measures (e.g. cash flow sensitivity, R&D invest-
ment) and cash holdings (Kaplan & Zingales 1997, Bates et al. 2009, Kusnadi & Wei
2011) is often cited as the evidence supporting the argument that cash holding is
the reserve prepared for future uncertainty. However, the dynamic theoretical cash
model predicts negative sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow controlling for exter-
nal financing cost (Riddick & Whited 2009). Many empirical findings contradict this
theory by suggesting that cash flow level, which secures firm operation and reduces
risk, increases cash holdings.
Early cash policy studies concentrate on identifying determinants of corporate
cash holdings. The determinant studies based on trade-off model (Opler et al. 1999,
Qiu & Wan 2015, Subramaniam et al. 2011, Chen et al. 2012, Yan 2006) estimate
the model based on observed cash holdings by treating deviations from the true
target as simple error term. However, we show that the deviation may contain some
information about firms’ cash policy since its is a strategic choice rather than the
residual component. Consequently, the trade-off model focuses on the benefits and
1Firms hold cash to prepare for future adverse shocks. Precautionary motive is summarized in
Bates et al. (2009) in great detail.
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costs of liquidity but ignore the cost of cash refinancing. It is the lumpiness in
refinancing decisions that reveal the presence of those (fixed) costs and lead to a
number of dynamic aspects in corporate cash management.
The speed of adjustment studies attempt to overcome the issues caused by the
inertia in adjusting cash levels to the target. As previously discussed, the adjust-
ment speed studies employ the partial adjustment model (Dittmar & Duchin 2010,
Gao et al. 2013, Graham & Leary 2015) and reveal firms’ willingness to eliminate
the deviation from the optimal level. Although these studies capture some dynamic
aspects such as that the refinancing policy aims at offsetting the deviation, the un-
derlying assumption of the static trade-off framework as the infrequent refinancing
phenomenon is not explained.
The theoretical developments in cash policy models demonstrate the potential
of the double-barrier setting to capture dynamic aspects of cash management includ-
ing infrequent adjustments. Existing literature can be divided into two strands of
theoretical cash policy studies. The first group focuses on the value of cash holdings
(Nikolov & Whited 2014, Chi & Su 2015) and derives the optimal policy based on
the variations in the marginal cash value. The second group explicitly derives the
double-barrier policy as the optimal one, given the costly external financing (Whited
2006, Riddick & Whited 2009, Cunha et al. 2011, Bolton et al. 2011, 2013). For
example, Bolton et al. (2011) derive the optimal inaction, payout, and liquidation
regions in frictional market, and predict that the boundaries between adjacent re-
gions triggers refinancing. This second strand of studies form our theoretical basis.
The inaction range between barriers captures the effect of inertia, and hence, leads
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to optimal refinancing decisions.
A number of studies theoretically demonstrate the intertwining relationships
between cash policy and other policies (Gamba & Triantis 2008, Belhaj 2010, Bolton
et al. 2011, 2013, Mahmudi & Pavlin 2013, Nikolov & Whited 2014). Nikolov &
Whited (2014) develop a dynamic model of firm investment and financing to inter-
pret the way agency problems affect corporate cash holdings. Bolton et al. (2013)
predict that firms cut investment and payout in bad times and issue equity in good
times even without urgent demand for funds. These findings underpin the point that
investment and financing activities are possible channels of cash refinancing. Further,
the close link between cash holding refinancing and other policy decisions predicted
by dynamic theoretical models also receives empirical support from a number of stud-
ies (Denis & Sibilkov 2009, McLean 2011, Lee & Suh 2011, Brown & Petersen 2011,
Brisker et al. 2013, Gao et al. 2013, Harford et al. 2014). Denis & Sibilkov (2009)
find that both the cash level and value increase with investment level, especially for
financially constrained firms. Harford et al. (2014) indicate that cash holdings relax
firms’ financial policy by mitigating the debt refinancing risk caused by the shorter
maturity debt. The empirical findings further confirm the existence of an interaction
between cash management, investment, and financing policy. All in all, both theoret-
ical and empirical evidence imply that there is scope on investigation of cash policy
by focusing on refinancing events related to investment and financing activities.
Our work is also related to studies of determinants of cash holdings that also
focus on cash value. Papers that attempt to identify the determinants of cash holdings
(Opler et al. 1999, Yan 2006, Bates et al. 2009, Subramaniam et al. 2011, Chen et al.
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2012, Qiu & Wan 2015) provide us with inspiration in terms of model specification.
We follow the basic empirical specification in Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al.
(2009) but further control for macro-economic effects. Furthermore, our paper differs
from these studies because the double-barrier model captures the endogenous pattern
of cash management. Moreover, our study reveals the real effect of cash management
(e.g. cash demand, financial flexibility, financing friction), and hence complements the
cash value studies (Jensen 1986, Dittmar et al. 2003, Pinkowitz et al. 2006, Dittmar &
Mahrt-Smith 2007, Tong 2011) in terms of understanding the channels through which
cash policy affects cash value. Lastly, although our model captures certain dynamic
aspects of cash refinancing, we cannot reconcile all puzzles in the area of cash holdings.
For example, our model cannot explain the high cash holdings puzzle (Pinkowitz et al.
2012) because it is more likely to be caused by parallel shift in demand expectation
instead of cash management inertia.2 In other words, our study attempts to reconcile
the puzzles brought only by ignoring lumpiness in cash refinancing.
As indicated by Bolton et al. (2011), empirical studies on cash policy are based
on continuous adjustment assumption. In contrast, we move one step further to
formulate the dynamic cash policy under infrequent refinancing framework. The
static trade-off model ignores that costly cash refinancing defers firms’ cash injection
and payout decisions, and hence the observed cash level may deviate from the target.
The presence of the lump sum costs leads to infrequent refinancing, which allows
the cash level to deviate from the optimal one. It challenges the assumption in
the static trade-off model that all cash holding observations come from the same
2Pinkowitz et al. (2012) observe the phenomenon that the cash holdings in US firms is significantly
higher during the post-crisis period than other time, and summarize it as high cash holding puzzle.
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distribution. To tackle this ambiguity caused by the specific refinancing pattern, we
address the question ”how does infrequent refinancing affect cash policy”, rather than
studying the optimality based on cash holding targets as in static trade-off studies.
The perspective of refinancing leads to the dynamic double-barrier model, and the
theoretical development (Baumol 1952, Miller & Orr 1966, Bolton et al. 2011, 2013)
has derived the endogenous refinancing decisions based on this double-barrier policy.
In a double-barrier model, firms choose discrete and lumpy cash refinancing
policy due to the fixed (lumpy) cost. In other words, firms have some tolerance of
the deviation of cash level from the optimum of each adjustment, and refinance only
when cash balance hits either the upper or lower threshold. The rationale behind
such a pattern is that lumpy refinancing enjoys the economies of scale, reducing the
associated fixed cost. Thresholds serve as refinancing triggers because they are the
boundaries beyond which the benefits of refinancing exceed the costs. Moreover,
the infrequent refinancing makes only part of the observed cash levels satisfy the
conditions of targets. More precisely, we isolate those cash holding variations due
to firms’ deliberate adjustment from those natural variations due to firm operation.
The basic principle of the isolation is to set certain cut-off levels in order to filter
out variations which are large enough. We assume large refinancing to be deliberate
because it is less likely that managers implement such influential adjustments without
careful consideration. Similarly, Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Danis et al. (2014) state
that large deviations seem to be deliberate actions because managers will not tolerate
such a dominant change being suboptimal. Although these studies are about capital
structure, such statements can also apply to the cash holding area due to a similar
dynamics.
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We need to clarify that our model is not specified to measure the exogenous
variations in cash holdings explained by independent variables, let alone to find a
causal effect. We aim at testing the existence of the endogenous pattern predicted by
double-barrier model in cash holding management, that is, cash refinancing is trig-
gered by cash holding level being too high or too low. Empirical evidence consistent
with the model prediction supports the double-barrier policy as a suitable choice for
cash refinancing behavior (Bolton et al. 2011, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007, Tong
2011). The existence of refinancing cost (e.g. debt or equity issuance cost, adverse
selection cost) further strengthens the link between theory and empirical test in our
analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate the
endogenous patterns in cash holding management. Furthermore, we use a different
estimation strategy compared to existing cash policy studies (Dittmar & Duchin
2010, Gao et al. 2013, Graham & Leary 2015). For example, Graham & Leary (2015)
tests the possible cash policy shift based on variations in determinant coefficients,
while, we attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the policy itself. Also, all of the
three studies above referred to employ the partial adjustment model, which ignores
refinancing triggers. We estimate the dynamic double-barrier policy model, which
contains a complete set of cash dynamic aspects including targets and thresholds.
Our work contribute to the existing literature by providing a direct compari-
son between the static and dynamic models. The static model suggests a positive
correlation between cash flow and cash holdings, while our results indicate that this
observed positive correlation actually mixes the effects of targets and thresholds, and
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that the correlation between cash flow and cash target is actually negative. This nega-
tive correlation is consistent with the predictions from the dynamic theoretical model
(Whited 2006, Riddick & Whited 2009, Korteweg & Strebulaev 2013). Moreover, we
find that cash holdings targets increase with future cash outflows but decrease with
current cash outflows. Further, compared to other dynamic studies such as Bolton
et al. (2011), we provide a more detailed model by relaxing the fixed thresholds as-
sumption and controlling for macro economic variables (e.g. GDP growth, recession,
cost of carry). Lastly, our model quantitatively defines the high and low of cash hold-
ing levels from the perspective of firms’ perception by estimating thresholds based on
covariates.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops and
explains the empirical model setting. Section 2.3 discusses the sample and identifi-
cation strategy. Section 2.4 provides an analysis of the empirical results. Section 2.6
concludes the main findings. The discussion of more technical aspects is relegated to
appendices.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we first discuss the assumptions regarding the firms and the financial
market. Then, we describe the model setup and explain the origin of the model
features. Finally, we explain the empirical setting.
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2.2.1 Model Assumptions
The theoretical model is based on the following four assumptions:
1. Going Concern : The firm continues to operate for a non-predefined period.
2. Brownian Motion : Cash holding ratio (ct =
Ct
K
, ct denotes the cash ratio, Ct
represents cash holding value, and K refers to the value of total assets) of the
firm, follows an arithmetic Brownian motion:
dct = µdt+ σdz, (2.1)
in which µ and σ are the exogenous drift rate and the standard deviation of the
stochastic process, respectively, and dz is an increment of the standard Wiener
process.
3. Market Frictions : Any deliberate attempts to change cash level (upward or
downward) incur transaction costs including both fixed (ku for the upward and
kd for the downward) and proportional (depending on the amount of adjust-
ment) components.
4. Interest Rate : The exogenously determined interest rate r is the same for bor-
rowing and lending in the capital market. Besides, investors have a subjective
discount rate, denoted by δ.
The market assumptions are the ones that distinguish our work from the static
trade-off model studies. The static trade-off model assumes a frictionless market, and
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the benefits and costs of cash holding itself determine the optimal level. However,
we argue that firms’ behavior is determined by the benefits and costs of refinancing,
and the cash level is the cumulative result of a series of refinancing decisions. If the
frictionless market assumption holds, any deviation from the optimal cash holding
level will reduce the benefits and increase the costs of cash holdings and hence a
continuous adjustment will be the best policy. Our model would lead to the same
conclusion in the frictionless market. This assumption would suggest zero cost of
refinancing, and hence any deviation from the optimal level would trigger adjustment.
The benefits of going back to the optimal level must exceed the cost, and this is the
theoretical basis of the partial adjustment model (Dittmar & Duchin 2010, Gao et al.
2013, Graham & Leary 2015). However, financial markets in the real world are not
frictionless. Refinancing frictions make continuous adjustment suboptimal, because
only the deviations which are large enough can be associated with benefits that offset
and even exceed the cost of refinancing under this circumstances. Also, the fixed cost
component in cash refinancing would lead to an infinite cost following a continuous
adjustment policy. In other words, firms must wait until the deviation from the
optimal level of ash balance becomes large enough to refinance. This behavior pattern
naturally leads to an inaction range around the optimal cash level within which
deviation will not be eliminated instantaneously. The double-barrier model attempts
to capture this pattern.
The presented model assumes that cash refinancing involves both a fixed and
a proportional cost. This assumption attempts to mimic the cost structure of cash
injection or distribution faced by firms in the real world. For example, firms need to
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Figure 2.1: Simulated Cash Ratio Path
This figure illustrates the double barrier cash management policy. Cash
ratio, denoted by ct, itself follows Geometric Brownian Motion with drift
rate 0.05 and standard deviation 0.1 (dct = 0.05 ∗ ct ∗ dt+ 0.1 ∗ ct ∗ dWt).
The upper and lower thresholds are set at 0.75 and 0.35, respectively. Once
reaching the upper threshold as marked by red circles or lower threshold
marked by black circles, cash ratio will be reset to optimal distribution
target (0.55) next period as denoted by green crosses.
pay fixed brokerage fees in raising money and accessing capital market (Opler et al.
1999), the proportional cost is also possible when firms liquidate assets, cut divi-
dends, or give up investment opportunities. Barclay & Smith (1988) discuss the
components of the cost of cash payout, which also includes a fixed part (e.g. hiring
investment banks, paying legal and accounting fees of repurchase registration) and a
proportional part (e.g. underwriting expenses). This cost structure makes it worth
not to immediately eliminate any deviation from the target so that infrequent and
lump-sum refinancing becomes the optimal choice.
Figure 2.1 intuitively illustrates the simulated path of cash holdings within the
cost structure framework discussed above. The double-barrier policy sets upper and
lower thresholds, denoted by red and black circles, respectively. Cash holding itself
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follows the geometric Brownian motion. The impulse control implied by this policy
resets cash holding level to targets once the cash balance hits either threshold. As
discussed in Dixit (1993), the resetting threshold is associated with a cash holding
level where marginal benefits equals marginal costs.
2.2.2 Empirical Setting
It is assumed that investors decide to establish a firm by providing initial funds with
a cash ratio c0 at t = 0. Cash ratio ct follows the arithmetic Brownian motion as in
equation (2.1). The firm is never liquidated, as it is always sufficiently profitable in
expectation terms, but requires injection of additional funds if the cash level is too
low (hits the lower threshold Cl). Similarly, it distributes extra cash if the level is
sufficiently high (hits the upper threshold Cu). Net cash distribution is the source
of value that investors derive from owing the firm. This double-barrier setting is
commonly seen in existing literature (Bolton et al. 2011, Cunha et al. 2011). When
cash ratio hits either threshold level, the firm refinances and sets cash to the target
level (C∗).
Our theoretical setting categorizes cash ratio observations into four groups. The
first three are upper threshold Cu, distribution target C
∗, and lower threshold Cl. If
an observation does not belong to any of the three groups, it means that it lies in the
inaction range. We specify the following empirical model to suit the dynamic feature
following Korteweg & Strebulaev (2013):
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Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.2)
in which X is the vector of explanatory variables, β is the coefficient vector for the
target equation, and ε∗ is the error term in target. We use the exponential term to
capture the gap between thresholds and targets. Parameters θu and θl are coefficients
determining the upper and lower exponential terms, respectively. Parameters εu and
εl are the error terms in the upper and lower exponential gaps, respectively. Our
setting enables the estimation under dynamic framework and allows different error
terms for each group.
Our model relies on the accurate identification of cash refinancing events. Ex-
isting literature suggest external financing as the possible channel of cash injection or
distribution (Nikolov & Whited 2014, Chi & Su 2015, Denis & Sibilkov 2009, McLean
2011, Lee & Suh 2011, Brown & Petersen 2011, Brisker et al. 2013, Gao et al. 2013,
Harford et al. 2014) . Hence, we use net financing cash flow to indicate refinancing
events. More precisely, we set cut-off levels of −10% and 10% to isolate refinancing
which is large enough.3 This kind of identification has already been applied in em-
pirical estimation of double-barrier mode (Korteweg & Strebulaev 2013, Danis et al.
2014).
3Our robustness tests have also estimated the model based on 5% and 15% cut-offs, and the
results are consistent.
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Table 2.1: Categorization by Year
Year Thre-U Target-U Target-L Thre-L Ordinary Sum
1987 32 44 133 37 299 545
1988 151 307 522 241 1527 2748
1989 186 301 568 190 1619 2864
1990 165 354 450 184 1687 2840
1991 158 308 504 212 1780 2962
1992 143 278 634 272 1808 3135
1993 144 269 826 280 1815 3334
1994 138 269 829 366 1796 3398
1995 167 267 1031 359 1811 3635
1996 164 335 1145 303 1840 3787
1997 168 322 1045 338 1820 3693
1998 156 313 958 274 1737 3438
1999 154 311 797 256 1733 3251
2000 214 299 735 175 1666 3089
2001 200 383 484 149 1821 3037
2002 128 379 345 219 1849 2920
2003 156 277 480 237 1731 2881
2004 162 247 540 198 1643 2790
2005 140 292 531 212 1540 2715
2006 166 261 543 202 1451 2623
2007 176 302 481 155 1390 2504
2008 206 345 329 94 1464 2438
2009 148 355 216 123 1485 2327
2010 127 265 273 164 1405 2234
2011 139 230 330 140 1329 2168
2012 118 253 339 126 1307 2143
2013 110 231 334 170 1282 2127
2014 122 216 413 122 1206 2079
2015 0 239 323 0 1307 1869
Sum 4238 8252 16138 5798 45148 79574
Note: This table presents our categorization by year. Our categorization method defines
fcf as the amount of adjustment. We identify cash distribution when fcf exceed 10%
and cash injection when fcf is below -10%. The cash holding observation at the year end
when there is injection or distribution is target. Then, the remaining observations which
are not targets are categorized into thresholds and ordinary group. We define upper
(lower) threshold as those ones before distribution (injection), and the non-identified
ones belongs to the ordinary group.
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The last step in order to apply empirical double-barrier model is to correctly
categorize observations into the four groups, namely, upper threshold, target, lower
threshold, and ordinary observations. Our categorization strategy is based on the
identification of refinancing events. We regard pre-refinancing observations as the
basis of thresholds, and treat post-refinancing observations as targets. More precisely,
suppose endogenous cash distribution happens in period t, the observed cash ratio
at the end of this period (ct, post-refinancing) will enter the target group (C
∗). The
sum of last period observation and operating cash flow (ct−1 + ocft, pre-refinancing)
forms the upper threshold (Cu), because this is the amount which invokes refinancing.
Similarly, the cash observation after cash injection belongs to the lower threshold
group (Cl). All other observations are categorized as the observations falling within
the inaction range (”ordinary observations”). This categorization strategy is intuitive
because it directly tracks cash refinancing by answering ”what is the exact level that
invokes refinancing”. Other empirical studies on dynamic policy have already applied
this strategy in capital structure area Korteweg & Strebulaev (2013), Danis et al.
(2014) and durable goods area (Eberly 1994, Attanasio 2000).
2.3 Data
Our sample is based on COMPUSTAT annual fundamental data covering the period
from 1988 to 2016. We delete non-US firms to form the sample focusing on the US
market. Then, we exclude utility firms (SIC codes from 4900 to 4999) and financial
institutions (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999) since they are subject to specific regulation.
Furthermore, we ensure that firms in our sample are active observations by excluding
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firm-year with total assets less than or equal to zero. We also delete observations
which have negative or zero sales, because such abnormal situations may distort their
financing policies. Our final dataset contains 79,574 observations from 9,883 unique
firms. Table 2.1 lists the number of observations in each group by year following our
categorization strategy.
We measure cash holding levels by the standard cash ratio defined as cash
and marketable securities divided by total assets. Other main alternative measures
of cash holdings include cash to non-cash assets (book value of total asset minus
cash), logarithm of cash to non-cash assets, and cash to sales (Bates et al. 2009).
Bates, Kahle & Stulz (2009) correctly point out that the cash to non-cash asset ratio
used by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson (1999) leads to the outliers problem
resulting from firms which allocate most of their assets in cash account. These firms
are important to our model since they represents a specific case in cash management.
For example, if a firm allocate 95% of asset in cash, it will be regarded as an outlier
measured by cash to non-cash asset ratio. However, there may be some reason for
the firm to do so. Further, the logarithm measure used by Foley, Hartzell, Titman
& Twite (2007) cannot thoroughly eliminate the outliers problem because the firm
recognized as an outlier in cash to non-cash ratio measurement will still be an outlier
measured by the logarithm of this ratio, and the cash to sale measure introduces the
effect of firm operation and industry environment, which are not the focus of our
study.
The selection and construction of explanatory variables in this chapter follow
Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) and also incorporates new developments
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from recent literature. We add the future capital expenditure and acquisition spend-
ing to reflect their effect on budget. To control the risk of adding these forward-looking
variables, we have also estimated our model without them. Moreover, our robustness
tests also considers lagged capital expenditure and lagged acquisitions to control for
long lasting effects (McConnell & Muscarella 1985) and deviations of large cash out-
flows on cash account. The industry standard deviation reflects the variation of cash
flows at an industry level, and all other variables are at firm-level. The definitions of
explanatory variables are as follows (the number in bracket represents COMPUSTAT
item):
1. Chrt: Cash ratio, defined as cash and marketable securities (#1) divided by
book value of total assets (#6).
2. Chfl: Cash flow divided by book value of total assets (#6). The cash flow is
defined as earnings before depreciation (#13) minus interest (#15), tax (#16),
and common dividend (#21) (Cash flow = EBITDA − Interest − Taxes −
common dividends) (Bates et al. 2009). The pecking order theory suggests
that firms prefer internal cash flow to outside financing, and hence firms with
a higher cash flow generating ability accumulate cash more easily.
3. Mtb: Market to book ratio captures investment opportunities. It is defined as
the sum of book value of total liabilities (#6−#60) and market value of equity
(#199 ∗#25) divided by book value of total assets (#6) ((BV of Liability +
MV of equity)/BV of total assets). It is costly for firms to miss investment
opportunities by having insufficient liquidity, and hence we expect firms with
better investment opportunities to hold more cash.
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4. Size: Firm size, defined as the logarithm of book value of total assets (#6).
Large firms usually have better access to financial markets (precautionary), and
hence we expect firm size to have negative effect on cash holdings.
5. Nwc: Net working capital (#179) minus cash and marketable securities (#1)
divided by total assets (#6). Net working capital serves as substitute of cash
holdings, and hence we expect it to negatively affect the cash ratio.
6. Capex: capital expenditure (#128) divided by total assets (#6). Capital expen-
diture represents a considerable cash outflow. From the dynamic perspective,
we expect current capital expenditure to reduce the (actual) cash ratio, since it
is associated with a cash disbursement.
7. F capex: future capital expenditure, defined the same as Capex but it is one
period leading to the dependent variable. We expect future capital expenditure
to increase the target cash ratio, because it represents cash outflows to be
satisfied.
8. Acqui: expenditure on acquisitions (#129) divided by total assets (#6). Similar
to capital expenditure, we expect current acquisitions to reduce the cash ratio.
9. F acqui: future expenditure on acquisitions, defined the same as Acqui but it
is one period leading to the dependent variable. We expect future acquisitions
to increase the target cash ratio for the same reason as F capex.
10. Rd: Research and development expense (#46) divided by sales (#12). As
common in the literature, if the R&D expense is missing, we replace it with
zero. R&D expenditure represents future growth opportunities, and it also
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increases financial distress risk. Hence, we expect this variable to be positively
related to the level of cash.
11. Lev: the sum of long-term debt (#9) and current debt (#34) divided by total
assets (#6). Cash and leverage are complementary in financing investment
opportunities, and hence we expect negative impact of leverage on cash holdings.
12. Dummy div: Dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm pays com-
mon dividend in that year. Paying dividends demonstrates a healthy financial
position and access to capital markets, which reduces the demand for cash. We
expect this dummy to negatively affect the cash ratio.
13. Dummy1990: Dummy variable indicates the period of observation. If the obser-
vation is within the period from 1990 to 1999 (inclusive), this dummy variable
equals one; otherwise it equals zero. We expect it to have a negative effect
because the observed cash ratio should be lower than the ratio resulting from
changes in firm characteristics (Opler et al. 1999).4
14. Dummy2000: Dummy variable equals one if the observation is within the period
after 2000 (inclusive) and zero otherwise. We expect a negative effect for the
same reason as above.
15. Indstd: The standard deviation of cash flow at the industry level, which mea-
sures industry risk. The first step is to calculate the standard deviation of cash
flow at the firm level. For each observation, we take the standard deviation of
4We exploit the decades dummies instead of year dummies in this study, because these dummy
variables are to detect whether or not there exists shifts in characteristics rather than trend in cash
ratio. Decades dummies are more appropriate since the shifts accumulated in ten years are more
clear to be spotted. In comparison, year dummies dilute the possible variations in characteristics.
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cash flows in previous ten years, and we ensure that there are at least three
cash flow observations in the ten-year period. Secondly, for each year, we take
the average of the firm-level standard deviation within each industry (indicated
by two-digit SIC code). We use this industry level mean standard deviation
to indicate the industry risk level. Previous literature treats risk as the main
motive to hold cash (Opler et al. 1999, Almeida et al. 2004, Han & Qiu 2007),
and hence we expect this industry risk variable to increase cash holdings.
16. Interest: The three-month treasure yield from the Federal Reserve. The inter-
est rate represents an opportunity cost of holding cash, and hence we expect it
to reduce the cash reserve.
17. dGDP : The real GDP growth rate from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Similar to interest rate, we expect the real GDP growth to reduce cash holding
level.
18. RECE: A dummy variable indicating a recession period. It equals one if the
period of an observation is within the recession stage, and equals zero other-
wise. The definition of a recession period comes from the National Bureau of
Economic Research. We expect that recessions reduce cash holding levels since
they weaken the whole economy and reduce the demand for cash.
Table 2.2 describes the basic statistics of the variables, and Table 2.3 presents corre-
lations among the covariates.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. Min Max Prc 1 Prc 99
CHS 0.176 0.089 0.209 0.000 0.869 0.000 0.869
Chfl 0.024 0.067 0.175 -0.820 0.269 -0.820 0.269
qrate 0.034 0.039 0.024 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.081
dGDP 0.027 0.027 0.016 -0.028 0.047 -0.028 0.047
RESS 0.135 0.000 0.342 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Indstd 0.074 0.076 0.025 0.023 0.121 0.025 0.121
Mtb 1.943 1.438 1.541 0.552 9.798 0.552 9.798
Size 5.068 4.976 2.154 0.406 10.187 0.630 10.187
Nwc 0.109 0.093 0.185 -0.355 0.583 -0.355 0.581
Rd 0.152 0.000 0.645 0.000 4.924 0.000 4.924
Lev 0.205 0.178 0.182 0.000 0.695 0.000 0.694
Dvc 0.008 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.120
F capex 0.058 0.038 0.063 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.345
F acqui 0.023 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.340 0.000 0.340
Capex 0.061 0.039 0.066 0.001 0.386 0.001 0.358
Acqui 0.024 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.345
D90 0.420 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
D00 0.344 0.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
D10 0.159 0.000 0.366 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of cash holding ratio and covariates.
The values in this table are based on the sample with both cash ratio and covariates
winsorized at top and bottom 1 percentile. CHS refers to the dependent variable
cash holding, which is the ratio of cash and short-term investment above total asset.
Chfl represents cash flow, and it is calculated as subtracting interest expense, tax
payments, and common dividend from ebitda, and then divided by total asset. qrate is
the quarterly interest rate. dGDP refers to GDP growth rate based on amount in 2009
value. RESS is a dummy variable indicating recession period (defined by NBER) when
it equals 1. Indstd is industry cash flow volatility, which is the industry-wide average
of firm volatility of previous 10 years cash flows. Mtb is market to book ratio and it is
calculated as the sum of book liability and market equity divided by total asset. Size
is the logarithm of total asset. Nwc refers to net working capital defined as cash and
marketable securities divided by total asset. Rd is the research and development expense
divided by sale. Lev measures leverage calculated as the sum of long-term and current
debt divided by total asset. Dvc the amount of common dividend payment divided
by total asset. Capex is capital expenditure divided by total asset. Acqui represents
acquisition expenditure divided by total asset. Fcapex and Facqui are forward capital
expenditure and acquisition, which are Capex and Acqui in next period, respectively.
D90 is the dummy variable indicating 1990s. Similarly, D00 and D10 are dummy
variables indicating 2000s and 2010s, respectively.
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2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Cross-category Difference
As we discussed previously, there are differences between predictions of dynamic cash
holding models (Gamba & Triantis 2008, Riddick & Whited 2009, Belhaj 2010, Bolton
et al. 2011, 2013, Mahmudi & Pavlin 2013, Nikolov & Whited 2014) and the findings
of static empirical studies (Opler et al. 1999, Qiu & Wan 2015, Subramaniam et al.
2011, Chen et al. 2012, Yan 2006). Before discussing the main findings from dynamic
model, we firstly demonstrate the difference between the static and dynamic models
in an intuitive way. We show the regression results for each of the target group, and
discuss the differences. More precisely, if cash holdings observations come from the
same distribution as argued by the static model, regression results for each group will
be very similar. In other words, the static model methodology will lead to a poor de-
scription of the determinants of cash holding if the regressions results between groups
differ significantly. It is worth noting that the results of the regression by groups
are not necessarily identical to the main model predictions (dynamic double-barrier
model). Although these regressions in subsamples capture the effect of infrequent
cash refinancing, they do not estimate the model simultaneously and, therefore, rely
on incomplete information.
Table 2.4 reports the regression results by groups. The first two columns report
the regression results for the whole sample, and this replicates the static studies
and, in addition, controls for macroeconomic variables (Interest, RECE, dGDP ).
Column 1 reports the results based on the entire sample. In comparison, results in
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Table 2.4: OLS by Category
Whole1 Whole2 Target Upper Lower Ordinary
Inter 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.176*** 0.369*** 0.182*** 0.306***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.006)
Chfl -0.039*** -0.049*** -0.037*** -0.030 -0.096*** -0.108***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007)
qrate -0.064** -0.111** 0.148 -0.039 -0.299* -0.233***
(0.026) (0.046) (0.093) (0.172) (0.160) (0.056)
dGDP 0.048 -0.004 0.004 -1.244*** 0.157 0.026
(0.043) (0.063) (0.128) (0.235) (0.228) (0.076)
RESS 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.042*** -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003)
Indstd 0.856*** 0.968*** 1.198*** 0.462*** 0.952*** 0.768***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.047) (0.087) (0.085) (0.028)
Mtb 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.001** -0.009*** 0.004*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Nwc -0.276*** -0.280*** -0.263*** -0.308*** -0.265*** -0.284***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.004)
Rd 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.132*** 0.080*** 0.107***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
Lev -0.387*** -0.397*** -0.365*** -0.459*** -0.335*** -0.423***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
Dvc -0.337*** -0.335*** -0.321*** -0.340*** -0.663*** -0.538***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.042) (0.103) (0.130) (0.045)
F capex 0.020** 0.030** 0.171*** 0.050 -0.016 -0.059***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.020) (0.064) (0.031) (0.019)
F acqui 0.064*** 0.049*** 0.086*** 0.393*** -0.016 0.147***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.074) (0.019) (0.016)
Capex -0.458*** -0.494*** -0.507*** -0.622*** -0.436*** -0.535***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.057) (0.035) (0.018)
Acqui -0.227*** -0.245*** -0.300*** -0.444*** -0.409*** -0.370***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.053) (0.041) (0.017)
D90 -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.021** -0.027*** -0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003)
D00 -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.008 -0.011 -0.029*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
D10 -0.009*** -0.004 0.010 -0.011 -0.030** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Obs. 102741 79243 24599 4219 5812 44613
Adj. R 0.490 0.508 0.539 0.482 0.578 0.494
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Note: This table presents the OLS regression results by category, and the regressions are
based on the sample with both cash ratio and covariates winsorized at top and bottom
1 percentile. The Whole1 column reports regression results based on the entire sample.
The Whole 2 column presents results based on whole sample but dropping observations
with missing financing cash flow values. Financing cash flow is cash adjustment defined
in this research. It is not necessary for traditional OLS analysis but essential in (S, s)
estimation. In other words, column Whole 2 is based on the same sample as (S, s)
estimation. Column Target is based on the target category only. The following two
columns are OLS results based on upper and lower thresholds, respectively. The last
column reports the regression in Ordinary group. Standard errors are in brackets, and
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
column 2 are based on the sample after dropping observations with missing fcf , and
hence this is the sample used in the subsequent (S, s) estimation. The third column
contains the regression results for the target group only. Differing from the whole
sample result, we find that the interest rate positively affects the cash holding target.
This suggests that the higher financing cost reduces the magnitude of cash refinanc-
ing. Further, we document an inverse size effect to that reported in the literature,
indicating that large firms hold less cash in general but have higher targets. The
forth column shows regression results for the upper threshold group. Also, there is a
set of evidence in contrary to that of the full sample regression. For example, Chfl
is insignificant for upper threshold observations, dGDP demonstrates a considerably
negative effect, and the impact of Indstd dramatically reduces to almost half of the
level of the whole sample results. The next column reports the results for the lower
threshold group regression. The size effect here differs from that in the first two
columns. The last group summarizes the regression in the group of ordinary observa-
tions. The comparison between these categorized regression reveals the specificity of
correlations in different groups, and hence it justifies designing on estimation strategy
that simultaneously considers the relations in each of the four groups.
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2.4.2 Dynamic Targets
Table 2.5 reports the estimation of the (S, s) model for cash holding covariates. Com-
pared to standard regressions, this model introduces the upper and lower boundary
which fits our theoretical setting of infrequent refinancing. More precisely, the ex-
istence of the fixed refinancing cost postpones cash injections and distributions for
economic benefits. In other words, firms choose to refinance only when the devi-
ation between the actual cash level and the target becomes sufficiently large, and
the boundaries of (S, s) model quantify the upper and lower limits of this devia-
tion. Secondly, the target identified in (S, s) model, as discussed before, attempts
to capture the optimal level of cash that firms try to achieve. In contrast, the de-
pendent variable in a standard regression is simply the observed cash level without
categorization, which captures the average cash level instead of the target. Thirdly,
standard regressions assume a simple mechanism in cash management that any ex-
ogenous variation in covariates leads to a corresponding change of the cash level. This
continuously adjustment mechanism ignores the endogenous pattern introduced by
infrequent refinancing reflecting the fact that firms have the flexibility to wait or to
make deliberate adjustments. Our estimation of the (S, s) takes into account the
above considerations.
The first column in Table 2.5 presents the estimation for the target. The most
striking evidence occurs in the effect of Chfl. In our dynamic model, Chfl has a
negative effect on the target (-0.060) which is significant at the 1% level. This finding
is very different from the predictions’ and evidence in the existing literature, which
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Table 2.5: (S, s) Model Estimates
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.217*** - -0.271*** - -0.974*** -
(0.010) (0.055) (0.039)
Chfl -0.060*** -0.060 -0.697*** -0.385 -0.380*** 0.073
(0.006) (0.058) (0.026)
qrate -0.140 -0.140 -0.699 -0.466 0.072 -0.165
(0.091) (0.532) (0.365)
dGDP -0.167 -0.167 -0.262 -0.289 -0.412 -0.022
(0.126) (0.717) (0.509)
RESS -0.012** -0.012 -0.029 -0.025 0.001 -0.012
(0.005) (0.031) (0.022)
Indstd 1.098*** 1.098 -0.734*** 0.756 0.344* 0.977
(0.047) (0.270) (0.190)
Mtb 0.020*** 0.020 0.004 0.022 0.020*** 0.013
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
Size -0.002*** -0.002 -0.037*** -0.020 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Nwc -0.236*** -0.236 -0.306*** -0.378 -0.203*** -0.164
(0.006) (0.036) (0.025)
Rd 0.079*** 0.079 0.124*** 0.137 0.043*** 0.064
(0.001) (0.020) (0.005)
Lev -0.371*** -0.371 -0.619*** -0.660 -0.396*** -0.232
(0.006) (0.037) (0.027)
Dvc -0.471*** -0.471 -2.702*** -1.731 0.856*** -0.772
(0.043) (0.340) (0.248)
F capex 0.294*** 0.294 -0.704*** -0.034 0.950*** -0.040
(0.020) (0.184) (0.073)
F acqui 0.342*** 0.342 0.415** 0.535 1.348*** -0.132
(0.016) (0.173) (0.051)
Capex -0.487*** -0.487 -0.148 -0.556 -0.631*** -0.265
(0.018) (0.167) (0.079)
Acqui -0.290*** -0.290 -0.487*** -0.517 -0.549*** -0.097
(0.013) (0.157) (0.086)
D90 -0.011** -0.011 -0.049* 0.000 -0.028 0.000
(0.005) (0.027) (0.019)
D00 -0.029*** -0.029 -0.018 0.000 -0.079*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.034) (0.024)














Note: This table reports the main estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.3)
There are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms. The coefficients β, θu, and θl
estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this empirical model. The marginal effect
is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates demonstrated on thresholds. Besides,
our maximum likelihood method allows the flexibility to measure the standard deviation
(σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl). Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the
correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures the correlation between ε∗ and εl.
Our estimation has transformed the standard deviation and correlation variables to
ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are positive, and correlation variables
are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter column report the estimation of
the transformed variables, and numbers in the value column present the value of the
variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
predicts a positive correlation between cash flow and cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999,
Han & Qiu 2007, Chen et al. 2012). For example, Opler et al. (1999) find that cash
holdings increase by 0.162 for each unit of cash flow increment.5 Bates et al. (2009)
find positive and significant correlation between changes in cash flow and in cash
holdings. The logic suggested by this paper is simple: since cash flow is as inflow to
cash reserves, higher cash flow leads to higher cash holdings. However, our finding of
a negative effect of cash flow is consistent with the prediction of a dynamic theoretical
5Opler et al. (1999) define cash holding as the natural log of cash over assets. Although different
from our setting, the natural logarithm will not affect the interpretation of the positive sign.
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model (Riddick & Whited 2009). While the documented positive effect in a standard
regression actually says that the observed cash holdings increase along with cash flow,
the negative effect in the (S, s) model reflects the correlation with the cash holding
target. The key difference is that observed cash level is not necessary the optimal
level (target) for firms. The negative effect predicted by our (S, s) model supports
the view that cash flow reduces the need to hold cash, which is also consistent with
the precaution motive, since cash flow makes the firm more safe.
As the counter-party of the inflow effect (represented by possible cash flow), the
outflow effect under the dynamic framework also provides contradictory evidence to
the results prevalent in static studies. Since an immediate variation in cash holdings
is the only channel responding to covariate changes in the simple cash management
mechanism implied by a standard regression, this mechanism naturally predicts that
outflows reduce cash holdings, and findings in the empirical work that uses static mod-
els support this prediction. Capex and Acqui are the main proxies of cash outflows
in Bates et al. (2009), and both the covariates demonstrate considerable negative ef-
fect on observed cash holdings (-0.308 and -0.170, respectively). Capital expenditure
effect in (Opler et al. 1999) is positive (0.485), but Bates et al. (2009) criticize that
this positive sign is sensitive to their definition of cash holding.6 Riddick & Whited
(2009) alternatively explain that productivity shocks make firms invest more and save
less cash, but either this interpretation or the previous one (outflows consume cash
holdings) confirms the assumption that outflows directly reduce cash holdings.
6Opler et al. (1999) use the logarithm of cash over assets as the proxy of cash holdings. Table
3 in Bates et al. (2009) clearly presents that the sign of capital expenditure turns from positive to
negative as shifting the definition of cash holding from logarithm to ratio.
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However, from the perspective of dynamic cash management, we argue that the
exact demand for cash holdings captured by cash target should increase with higher
cash outflows. The positive influence of future capital expenditure F capex (0.294)
and future acquisitions F acqui (0.342) supports out argument. Our model uses cap-
ital expenditure and acquisitions in next year as a proxy of future values. Strategical
decisions, as budgets of capital expenditure and acquisition spending, are made after
careful consideration. The implementation is not immediate but lasts for a period
as a process. Hence, the effect of these outflows on cash holding takes place at the
time when decisions are made but before the implementation process begins. In other
words, we match dependent variable in period t with covariates capital expenditure
and acquisitions in period t + 1 (F capex and F acqui). Observations of the two
covariates (at then end of year t + 1) summarize the implementation process, and
observation of the dependent variable (at the beginning of year t + 1) has absorbed
the variation of cash demand before the implementation process.7 The positive coeffi-
cients reveal the expansion of cash demand brought by future outflows. Moreover, we
also include simultaneous outflows (capext and acquit) in control variables, and doc-
ument the significantly negative impact (-0.487 and -0.290, respectively). Although
the signs are negative, the interpretation is totally different under the framework of
dynamic setting due to the dependent variable. These negative impact suggests that
the completed implementation process of capital expenditure and acquisition releases
the need of cash holdings. Overall, firms need to prepare cash holdings for future
outflows, and this extra cash demand disappears when the outflows take place.
7The subscript t means the end of year t by definition, which is also the beginning of year t+ 1.
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Another result of the dynamic model worth reflecting on is the correlation be-
tween cash holdings and Indstd. Although it has the same positive sign as in the
standard regression results (Opler et al. 1999, Bates et al. 2009), the magnitude of the
impact is much larger than that in standard models. As shown in Table 2.5, the dy-
namic model predicts that the real target of cash holdings soars 110% for each unit of
additional industry volatility, but the magnitude of this impact in Bates et al. (2009)
is less that 50%. This striking magnitude difference is likely to be driven by the use of
cash holding target as dependent variable in the dynamic refinancing setting. More
precisely, the large volatility impact in dynamic model concerns the exact demand
for cash holdings rather than the observed levels, and it suggests that the cash hold-
ing demand is very sensitive to the industry risk level. According to our theoretical
setting, refinancing happens only when cash holding level hits either boundary. For
observations whose cash holding level have been moved out of the inaction range by
variations in industry cash flow volatility,8 refinancing happens and results in the
observed cash holding reflect the target. However, for the remaining observations, for
which it still stays within the inaction range,9 the observed cash holding levels cannot
mirror the real target, since industry volatility is insufficient to trigger refinancing.
The second group of observations is likely to drive down the magnitude of the effect
if the analysis is based on the static model (that pools all observations into a single
category). This is indeed the case as shown in Table 2.4. The impact of industry risk
in the whole sample is 0.856, but the magnitude dramatically increases to 1.198 once
8The inaction range refers to the area between the upper and lower boundaries. In our setting,
firms allow cash holdings level freely float in this range without intervention. Hence, refinancing will
not happen when cash holding locates within this range, and occurs immediately once it leaves the
inaction range.
9The inaction range is not fixed since thresholds are also affected by covariates as discussed in
next section. The inaction range here naturally refers to the one after shocks in industry volatility.
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we use only the target group. Although regressions by group ignore the interaction,
this magnitude jump confirms our interpretation and emphasizes the importance of
infrequent refinancing.
The first column in Table 2.5 reports a number of control variables whose signs
and magnitude are consistent with the standard regression results as in Bates et al.
(2009). For example, the dynamic model results also shows positive effect of Mtb
on cash target (0.020). Existing literature interprets the positive effect of Mtb on
cash holdings as cash is worth more in firms with better investment opportunities
(Bates et al. 2009, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007). We interpret that as investment
opportunities increasing the demand for cash in order to avoid missing projects.
Moreover, we also find that Nwc negatively affects cash target (-0.236), because Nwc
serves as a substitute of cash holdings, reducing cash demand (Opler et al. 1999, Bates
et al. 2009, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007). Furthermore, our results document the
negative coefficient for leverage (-0.371), which suggests that the tax saving invoked
by interest payments reduces the demand for cash holdings. Debt financing has the
tax shield advantage, which reduces possible cash outflow and hence decreases the
demand for cash.
2.4.3 Refinancing Thresholds
The trigger of refinancing is another important component in the double-barrier pol-
icy, and we model it by quantifying firms’ perception of cash holding levels (too high
or too low) through thresholds. According to our empirical setting, the double-barrier
policy measures the upper (lower) threshold by adding (subtracting) an exponential
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term to (from) the target. Our analysis is based on the estimation of coefficient vectors
θk, k ∈ {u, l} within the exponential terms (θu and θl). The sign of a coefficient in θk
directly affects the width of the zone between target and the corresponding thresh-
old. A positive sign indicates the increment of the width. However, the exponential
transition does not make the level of the threshold immediately known. Therefore,
we calculate the marginal effects (ME columns in Table 2.5). The marginal effect is
formed as the exact amount of effect covariates demonstrated on thresholds.10
Our previous analysis of the target cash levels reveals the variation in real
demand of cash holdings. In comparison, the discussion of thresholds concentrates
on firms’ tolerance of the deviation of cash holdings from the target. The real demand
and thresholds jointly offer a complete dynamic policy of cash holding management
under the infrequent refinancing framework. We quantify the tolerance for deviation
by the width between target and thresholds captured by the exponential term in
the empirical setting. In general, low tolerance (narrow zone) implies more active
management represented by more frequent refinancing and implies a lower perceived
fixed cost of refinancing.
Chfl considerably reduces the deviation tolerance for both upper zone and
the lower zone.11 As shown in Table 2.5, Chfl has a significant negative effect
on both exponential terms. It suggests that firms with higher cash flow will make
10The precise calculation of a marginal effect is based on the prediction in the empirical setting.
Firstly, set all dummy variables at 0, and fix the remaining covariates at their median values. Take
cash flow (Chfl) as an example, which is an non-dummy variable. Then, calculate the thresholds
thre+ from the empirical model by adding 1% to Chfl median value and keep the other variables
at 0 or median values. Similarly, calculate thre− based on covariates set with Chfl at median value
minus 1% and the other covariate values unchanged. The marginal effect of cash flow is thre+−thre−2% .
The marginal effect of dummy variables follows the same method but simple measures the change
from 0 to 1 while keeping the other covariates fixed.
11We define the area between target and upper threshold as the upper zone, and the area between
target and lower threshold as lower zone.
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more frequent distributions and injections. The narrowing zones are not surprising
because higher cash flow makes the firm ”more safe”, and hence reduces its refinancing
cost. As predicted by our theoretical setting, reducing refinancing cost pulls cash
management mechanism closer to the continuously refinancing policy.12 However, we
need to mention that the zones affect future refinancing frequency because current
deviation cannot be restricted by the new zones. What determines whether or not
there is refinancing are the levels of thresholds after variation, as reflected in the
marginal effect. The marginal effects in Table 2.5 indicate that the upper threshold
declines by 38.5% for each unit increment in cash flow, which suggests that cash
distribution becomes more likely as cash flow (profitability) increases. Further, the
lower threshold increases by 7.3% which suggests that the cash injections become more
likely as well. However, this is a joint effect of reducing the target and shrinking the
lower inaction zone. The narrowing width suggests that future cash injections are
generally smaller in magnitude due to the reduced financing cost that results from
strong profitability.
Unsurprisingly, the cash outflow covariates affect the policy in an inverse way
compared to that of cash inflow. The width of both upper and lower zones enlarges
when there will be acquisition spending in future. The refinancing cost increases
under the pressure of planned cash outflows,13 which reduces the frequency of future
distributions and injections. In other words, firms with an acquisition plan wait
longer to adjust cash holdings. The higher refinancing cost makes small adjustment
suboptimal, and hence these firms tolerate larger deviation to realize the economies
12When the cost decreases to zero, continuous adjustment becomes optimal.
13This is because certain future cash outflows increases the probability to drain cash, and hence
reduces firms’ credit quality.
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of scale. Moreover, the upper threshold increases by 53.5% for each additional unit
of F acqui. This increment makes conditions that lead to cash distributions more
frequent, and hence complements the firms’ strategy to stockpile cash holding for
future acquisitions. The lower threshold decreases by 13.2%. This is because the
enlargement of lower zone dominates the demand increment. In other words, although
the firm needs to accumulate cash holdings, investors refuse to inject cash due to their
concern about future acquisitions. The widening lower zone and decreasing lower
threshold indicated by future capital expenditure support our argument.
Another significant covariate in a cash holding policy is industry risk level,
denoted by Indstd. Unlike the patterns exhibited by cash inflow and outflow, which
simultaneously enlarge or shrink both zones together, industry volatility reduces the
upper zone but increases the lower zone. However, this is not unexpected considering
the extensive impact of industry risk on cash policy. The widening lower zone reflects
the frequency of cash injection drops. The risk level increases firms’ refinancing cost
and makes the firm less attractive. In contrast, the reduction in the upper zone
suggests investors’ tolerance of firms’ extra cash cash holding reduces. Although
upper and lower zones evolve in opposite directions, both movements are in line with
the argument that firms speed up cash holding accumulation in risky environment.
Moreover, industry volatility demonstrates the strongest impact on thresholds levels.
Each additional unit of industry volatility causes the upper and lower thresholds to
increase by 75.6% and 97.7%, respectively.
In addition to the existing literature, we include macro-economic covariates
such as quarterly interest rate, GDP growth rate, and economy recession indicator
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defined by NBER (represented by covariates qrate, dGDP, and RESS in Table 2.5,
respectively). Although the correlation between observed cash holdings and macro
economic variables may be relatively weak, we study the macro variables since our
research focuses on the complete cash management policy. The policy our model
attempts to establish considers the endogenous pattern of firms’ choice. In other
words, firms’ optimal actions related to cash management depend on their perception
whether or not current cash holdings are too high or too low. It is therefore necessary
to consider the impact of a broader economy on this perception. The interest rate
measures the cost of holding cash, which reduces incentives to hold cash in hand.
Accordingly, firms choose to make frequent cash injections instead of keeping cash
reserves. The GDP growth rate measures the opportunity cost of holding cash, and
hence, it has a similar impact to the interest rate in both the sign and magnitude.
2.5 Robustness Analysis
This section tests the robustness of our main results from four perspectives; the lumpy
refinancing framework, the definition of refinancing events, the sensitivity with respect
to the cut-off selection, and the definition of variables. Research argues that introduc-
ing lumpy refinancing depicts an accurate picture of firms’ refinancing behavior (e.g.
firms reduce the cash target when inflow is strong and store more cash for possible
cash outflows). This differs from the lessons based on the traditional model (Riddick
& Whited 2009). However, our estimation is based on a specifically prepared dataset.
More precisely, our method categorizes observations into four groups, among which,
only the target group can be directly compared to the traditional OLS estimation.
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It is naturally to question whether or not our main findings are based on the way
our dataset is prepared rather than the lumpy refinancing framework the firms are
postulated to operate within. Hence, we implement the first alternative estimation
to check the robustness of our results by reducing the difference in dataset between
our model and the standard ones. Specifically, we apply the same categorizing pro-
cedure as previously but reduce the cut-off level to 1%. It is worth noting that this
estimation is not going to test the effect of varying cut-off level but to enlarge the
sample size of the target group, which makes the dataset in our model as close to
the one in OLS regressions as possible. Based on this setting, the target group now
contains 67,398 observations outside of the entire sample size 79,243. Hence, the
dataset under 1% cut-off overlaps in 85% with the one in OLS. Therefore,the major
difference between the two models is explicitly incorporating refinancing infrequency
or not. As reported in Table 2.6, the signs are consistent with the ones in our model,
and hence our previous arguments are supported.
The definition of our refinancing is a sufficient magnitude of net financing cash
flow (one exceeds the cut-off level). It is also possible that our main findings are driven
by this definition. In order to check the robustness of our results, we firstly extract
the core deliberate components from fcf , and define refinancing as the sum of net
debt issuance (#111−#114) and net equity issuance (#108−#115) minus common
dividend payment (#21). Results based on this definition and the same cut-off level
(10%) are presented in Table 2.7, which reports evidence largely consistent with
our main results. Moreover, the adopted definition of cash adjustment ignores the
investing cash flow, denoted by icf . One might argue that investing cash flow should
also be included, because it also provides an opportunity to adjust the cash balance.
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For example, firms may choose to liquidate assets to inject cash, or spend more to
reduce cash holdings. In response, we argue that only some parts of the entire icf can
constitute channels to deliberately adjust cash holdings, since the major components
Capex and Acqui are previously determined in our setting. These latter components
are deducted to simulate relevant components of icf . We therefore re-estimate our
model based on refinancing definitions including the observed investing cash flow
(fcf+icf) or including the simulated investing cash flow (fcf+icf+Capex+Acqui)
and 10% cut-off level. The results of the former estimation are reported in Table 2.8,
in which one of our main findings, the positive effect of outflows, disappears. This
is not surprising since this refinancing definition includes not necessarily deliberate
components. In comparison, the results of an estimation after excluding the effect of
those components (fcf + icf + Capex+Acqui) in Table 2.9 are consistent with our
main results.
Next, we check the robustness of our results to the level in defining refinancing
events. Firstly, we decrease the cut-off level to 5% and present results in Table 2.10.
The results are consistent with our main findings in terms of signs, but the magnitude
of regression coefficients is generally smaller in this 5% cut-off setting. For example,
the effect of Indstd in the target group decreases to 0.798 from 1.098, and the effect
of F capex and F acqui decrease to 0.142 (from 0.294) and 0.162 (from 0.342),
respectively. The small cut-off level allows for a more minor adjustment to cash
holdings, which drives down the impact magnitude. Furthermore, we increase the
cut-off to 15%, and present the results in Table 2.11. The results are still consistent
in terms of signs, but the magnitude now enlarges. These evidence clearly indicates
that our main findings are not driven by the cut-off level.
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Researchers may criticize that our argument about the large effect of industry
cash flow volatility is due to the noisy proxy of average standard deviation. To re-
lease this concern, we estimate our model using the predicted industry-wide cash flow
standard deviation, denoted by IndstdGARCH , as the new proxy. The prediction of
this proxy is based on Pooled Panel GARCH(1,1) model following Cermen˜o & Grier
(2006) and Drakos & Goulas (2006).14 The magnitude of industry risk effect dra-
matically decreases after exploiting this new proxy as in Table (2.12). The effect on
target decreases from 1.098 from our main model to 0.179. However, the industry risk
effect in OLS decreases from around 50% to 0.045 after shifting to this new proxy.
Our argument that OLS method underestimate the effect of industry risk still holds.
Secondly, we estimate our model using market-based cash ratio (cash and marketable
securities divided by the sum of book value liability and market value equity) as the
dependent variable, and report the results in Table (2.13). The magnitude of coef-
ficients decreases in general, but the main findings (e.g. negative cash flow, positive
future outflows, and influential industry risk) do not change. Thirdly, we have added
a dummy variable indicating missing R&D in Table (2.14), which does not change
our estimation significantly. Lastly, we estimate our main without forward-looking
variables (F capex and F acqui) in Table (2.15), and our main findings still hold. w-
14There are two steps to construct the variable IndstdGARCH . Firstly, estimate the Pooled Panel
GARCH model
yi,t = µi + b1yi,t−1 + εi,t,





in which subscript i indicate a specific section (industry), yi,t represent the average cash flow (defined
as before) in year t for industry i, σi,t is the standard deviation of error term εi,t, µi and αi are
industry fixed effects for average cash flow and variance. Coefficients b1, c2, c3, and the industry fixed
effects are parameters to be estimated. There are 1,653 observations from 57 industries (categorized
by two-digit SIC code) for the sample period 1988 to 2016. The GMM estimation gives the results:
b1 = 0.580, c2 = 0.002, c3 = 0.002. Secondly, predict σi,t and merge it back to our main dataset as
IndstdGARCH .
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Table 2.6: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: 1% Cut-off
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.174*** - -0.081 - -1.279*** -
(0.007) (0.126) (0.086)
Chfl -0.056*** -0.056 -0.824*** -0.323 -0.326*** 0.032
(0.006) (0.122) (0.059)
qrate 0.374*** 0.374 -1.182 -0.008 -0.302 0.456
(0.065) (1.132) (0.796)
dGDP 0.257*** 0.257 0.113 0.293 -1.076 0.549
(0.090) (1.502) (1.077)
RESS 0.016*** 0.016 -0.034 0.005 -0.005 0.017
(0.004) (0.063) (0.047)
Indstd 0.508*** 0.508 -2.758*** -0.384 5.026*** -0.857
(0.033) (0.631) (0.506)
Mtb 0.026*** 0.026 -0.013 0.022 0.007 0.024
(0.001) (0.014) (0.006)
Size -0.005*** -0.005 -0.137*** -0.049 -0.027*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.008) (0.006)
Nwc -0.239*** -0.239 -0.253*** -0.321 -0.327*** -0.151
(0.005) (0.082) (0.056)
Rd 0.086*** 0.086 0.172*** 0.142 -0.009 0.089
(0.001) (0.042) (0.013)
Lev -0.342*** -0.342 -0.349*** -0.455 -0.678*** -0.158
(0.005) (0.085) (0.072)
Dvc -0.238*** -0.238 -1.312 -0.663 -1.436 0.151
(0.038) (1.199) (1.300)
F capex 0.022 0.022 -0.521 -0.147 0.577*** -0.135
(0.017) (0.414) (0.181)
F acqui 0.066*** 0.066 0.800** 0.324 0.998*** -0.205
(0.013) (0.406) (0.134)
Capex -0.374*** -0.374 0.263 -0.289 -0.821*** -0.151
(0.016) (0.411) (0.210)
Acqui -0.211*** -0.211 -0.519 -0.379 -0.577*** -0.055
(0.012) (0.371) (0.213)
D90 0.011*** 0.011 -0.238*** 0.000 -0.098** 0.000
(0.003) (0.060) (0.041)
D00 0.027*** 0.027 -0.017 0.000 -0.202*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.076) (0.055)














Note: This robustness test is to verify that the findings in Table 2.5 are driven by
introducing infrequency rather than a dataset customized by our categorization. There
are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms. Again, the traditional OLS models
assume immediate refinancing for any cash holding deviation from the target. This
test set the low cut-off of refinancing definition (1%) under the infrequent adjustment
framework, which is as close as possible to continuously refinancing setting. In simple
words, when the amount of fcf (either positive or negative) exceeds 1% of total assets, it
is regarded as refinancing. This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model previously
specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.4)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
e further decompose cash outflow variables into lagged component and annual change
component (∆Capex and ∆Acqui), and both component negatively affect cash hold-
ing target as in Table (2.16).
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Table 2.7: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: Net Cash Injection
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.255*** - -0.354*** - -0.906*** -
(0.008) (0.047) (0.033)
Chfl -0.042*** -0.042 -0.718*** -0.368 -0.351*** 0.084
(0.007) (0.057) (0.025)
qrate 0.130** 0.130 -0.472 -0.084 0.304 0.021
(0.060) (0.347) (0.229)
dGDP 0.108 0.108 -0.306 -0.031 0.371 -0.024
(0.101) (0.571) (0.378)
RESS 0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.002 0.011 0.001
(0.005) (0.028) (0.020)
Indstd 0.787*** 0.787 -0.256 0.671 0.057 0.766
(0.049) (0.272) (0.188)
Mtb 0.019*** 0.019 0.003 0.020 0.019*** 0.012
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Size -0.006*** -0.006 -0.037*** -0.022 -0.012*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Nwc -0.237*** -0.237 -0.282*** -0.364 -0.270*** -0.140
(0.006) (0.035) (0.024)
Rd 0.082*** 0.082 0.170*** 0.159 0.036*** 0.070
(0.002) (0.015) (0.006)
Lev -0.359*** -0.359 -0.560*** -0.613 -0.360*** -0.230
(0.006) (0.036) (0.025)
Dvc -0.513*** -0.513 -2.863*** -1.813 0.794*** -0.797
(0.043) (0.319) (0.259)
F capex 0.225*** 0.225 -0.520*** -0.011 0.698*** -0.025
(0.018) (0.158) (0.064)
F acqui 0.344*** 0.344 0.056 0.370 1.226*** -0.095
(0.017) (0.162) (0.051)
Capex -0.474*** -0.474 -0.318** -0.619 -0.672*** -0.234
(0.016) (0.145) (0.069)
Acqui -0.312*** -0.312 -0.314** -0.455 -0.589*** -0.101
(0.013) (0.152) (0.085)
D90 -0.025*** -0.025 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 0.000
(0.004) (0.021) (0.013)
D00 -0.032*** -0.032 0.001 0.000 -0.034* 0.000
(0.005) (0.027) (0.018)














Note: This robustness test alternates the definition of cash refinancing from fcf as
in main model (Table 2.5) to net cash injection. Net cash injection is defined as the
sum of debt issuance and equity issuance minuses the sum of debt reduction, equity
repurchase, and common dividend payment. There are 79,574 observations from 9883
unique firms. The cut-off level is still 10%. This table reports the estimation of (S, s)
model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.5)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.8: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: Net Financing and Investing
Cash Flows
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.223*** - -0.614*** - -0.929*** -
(0.008) (0.043) (0.062)
Chfl -0.098*** -0.098 -0.450*** -0.276 -0.296*** 0.019
(0.006) (0.047) (0.044)
qrate 0.098 0.098 -2.540*** -0.907 1.204** -0.378
(0.080) (0.385) (0.584)
dGDP 0.213* 0.213 -0.443 0.038 1.874** -0.528
(0.109) (0.522) (0.823)
RESS 0.005 0.005 -0.027 -0.005 0.138*** -0.053
(0.005) (0.022) (0.035)
Indstd 1.135*** 1.135 -0.616*** 0.891 -0.601* 1.372
(0.040) (0.190) (0.309)
Mtb 0.018*** 0.018 0.025*** 0.028 -0.005 0.020
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Size -0.010*** -0.010 -0.020*** -0.018 0.004 -0.011
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Nwc -0.322*** -0.322 0.003 -0.321 -0.270*** -0.216
(0.006) (0.027) (0.037)
Rd 0.070*** 0.070 0.051*** 0.090 -0.012 0.075
(0.001) (0.016) (0.010)
Lev -0.433*** -0.433 -0.029 -0.444 -0.080* -0.402
(0.006) (0.029) (0.043)
Dvc -0.384*** -0.384 -0.918*** -0.747 2.483*** -1.366
(0.041) (0.274) (0.661)
F capex -0.045** -0.045 -0.967*** -0.427 0.421*** -0.211
(0.019) (0.114) (0.157)
F acqui -0.019 -0.019 -0.959*** -0.398 0.569*** -0.244
(0.015) (0.082) (0.149)
Capex -0.476*** -0.476 0.018 -0.469 -0.835*** -0.146
(0.018) (0.111) (0.151)
Acqui -0.300*** -0.300 0.355*** -0.160 -0.475*** -0.112
(0.016) (0.072) (0.142)
D90 0.013*** 0.013 -0.185*** 0.000 0.109*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.019) (0.032)
D00 0.014*** 0.014 -0.209*** 0.000 0.101** 0.000
(0.005) (0.024) (0.040)
D10 0.034*** 0.034 -0.283*** 0.000 0.253*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.033) (0.054)
Parameter Value











Note: This robustness check tests the suspicion that investment activity also serves as
a channel of cash refinancing, and hence defines cash refinancing as the sum of fcf
and icf . The cut-off level is still 10%. There are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique
firms. This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.6)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.9: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: Net Financing and Investing
Cash Flows without Capex and Acqui
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.299*** - -0.600*** - -0.497*** -
(0.010) (0.054) (0.037)
Chfl -0.060*** -0.060 -0.631*** -0.300 -0.228*** 0.041
(0.006) (0.059) (0.032)
qrate -0.099 -0.099 -1.847*** -0.801 -1.649*** 0.630
(0.096) (0.501) (0.340)
dGDP 0.079 0.079 -0.661 -0.173 -0.997** 0.520
(0.132) (0.690) (0.472)
RESS -0.008 -0.008 -0.031 -0.020 -0.049** 0.013
(0.006) (0.029) (0.021)
Indstd 0.717*** 0.717 -0.098 0.680 -1.768*** 1.498
(0.050) (0.265) (0.177)
Mtb 0.012*** 0.012 0.013*** 0.017 -0.003 0.014
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Size 0.000 0.000 -0.033*** -0.013 0.008*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Nwc -0.306*** -0.306 -0.050 -0.325 -0.302*** -0.172
(0.007) (0.035) (0.024)
Rd 0.072*** 0.072 0.105*** 0.113 0.004 0.071
(0.001) (0.020) (0.009)
Lev -0.434*** -0.434 -0.315*** -0.554 -0.380*** -0.266
(0.007) (0.038) (0.025)
Dvc -0.714*** -0.714 -0.979*** -1.086 -0.033 -0.699
(0.048) (0.295) (0.218)
F capex 0.231*** 0.231 -0.044 0.214 0.562*** -0.017
(0.021) (0.195) (0.079)
F acqui 0.361*** 0.361 0.478*** 0.542 1.029*** -0.094
(0.018) (0.182) (0.054)
Capex -0.592*** -0.592 -0.110 -0.633 -0.623*** -0.316
(0.019) (0.176) (0.085)
Acqui -0.425*** -0.425 -0.242 -0.517 -0.481*** -0.212
(0.014) (0.157) (0.091)
D90 -0.013** -0.013 -0.042 0.000 -0.075*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.027) (0.017)
D00 -0.016** -0.016 -0.080** 0.000 -0.129*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.034) (0.022)
D10 -0.015* -0.015 -0.069 0.000 -0.167*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.045) (0.030)
Parameter Value











Note: Based on the results in last robustness check (Table 2.8), this test further considers
the deliberate component in icf . More precise, since Capex and Acqui are strategic
decisions, they are previously determined components in icf . Hence, it is not possible
to liquidate or invest in these terms to adjust cash holdings. This test exclude their
effect by defining cash refinancing and the sum of fcf , icf , Capex, and Acqui. The icf
is the net amount after deducting Capex and Acqui, and hence the sum of three terms
is the part of investing cash flow which can be adjusted for cash holding purpose. The
cut-off level is still 10%. There are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms. This
table reports the estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.7)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.10: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: 5% Cut-off
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.200*** - -0.201*** - -0.213*** -
(0.008) (0.056) (0.048)
Chfl -0.052*** -0.052 -0.501*** -0.260 -0.470*** 0.141
(0.006) (0.060) (0.031)
qrate 0.178** 0.178 -1.894*** -0.606 -1.527*** 0.805
(0.077) (0.546) (0.420)
dGDP 0.066 0.066 0.927 0.450 -3.126*** 1.351
(0.106) (0.711) (0.572)
RESS 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.012 -0.086*** 0.040
(0.005) (0.030) (0.025)
Indstd 0.798*** 0.798 -1.773*** 0.064 -2.477*** 1.816
(0.039) (0.269) (0.217)
Mtb 0.023*** 0.023 0.001 0.023 -0.006 0.025
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Size -0.006*** -0.006 -0.070*** -0.035 -0.032*** 0.007
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Nwc -0.242*** -0.242 -0.345*** -0.385 -0.359*** -0.094
(0.005) (0.037) (0.029)
Rd 0.082*** 0.082 0.366*** 0.234 0.031*** 0.069
(0.001) (0.025) (0.007)
Lev -0.368*** -0.368 -0.292*** -0.489 -0.581*** -0.130
(0.005) (0.038) (0.033)
Dvc -0.338*** -0.338 -0.919** -0.718 1.006*** -0.751
(0.040) (0.408) (0.380)
F capex 0.142*** 0.142 -0.666*** -0.134 -0.101 0.183
(0.019) (0.195) (0.102)
F acqui 0.162*** 0.162 0.637*** 0.425 0.957*** -0.232
(0.015) (0.172) (0.064)
Capex -0.430*** -0.430 -0.431** -0.608 -0.134 -0.375
(0.017) (0.179) (0.101)
Acqui -0.220*** -0.220 -0.311* -0.349 -0.406*** -0.053
(0.013) (0.166) (0.117)
D90 0.000 0.000 -0.268*** 0.000 -0.177*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.027) (0.021)
D00 -0.002 -0.002 -0.197*** 0.000 -0.242*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.035) (0.027)














Note: This robustness estimation tests whether or not the findings of main model in
Table 2.5 are due to a selective cut-off level. This test keeps the refinancing definition
of fcf as in the main model, but reduces the cut-off level to 5%. There are 79,574
observations from 9883 unique firms. This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model
previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.8)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.11: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: 15% Cut-off
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.202*** - -0.337*** - -0.941*** -
(0.013) (0.065) (0.041)
Chfl -0.040*** -0.040 -0.607*** -0.322 -0.297*** 0.081
(0.008) (0.063) (0.026)
qrate 0.218* 0.218 -0.705 -0.109 1.169*** -0.261
(0.124) (0.626) (0.377)
dGDP 0.070 0.070 -1.146 -0.461 0.326 -0.064
(0.173) (0.844) (0.524)
RESS 0.003 0.003 -0.063* -0.025 0.046** -0.016
(0.008) (0.036) (0.023)
Indstd 1.134*** 1.134 0.020 1.143 0.155 1.070
(0.064) (0.319) (0.197)
Mtb 0.018*** 0.018 -0.005 0.016 0.012*** 0.013
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
Size 0.004*** 0.004 -0.040*** -0.015 0.015*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Nwc -0.260*** -0.260 -0.232*** -0.368 -0.232*** -0.165
(0.008) (0.042) (0.026)
Rd 0.075*** 0.075 0.130*** 0.135 0.026*** 0.064
(0.002) (0.023) (0.005)
Lev -0.402*** -0.402 -0.441*** -0.607 -0.370*** -0.250
(0.008) (0.042) (0.027)
Dvc -0.750*** -0.750 -1.373*** -1.386 -0.015 -0.744
(0.057) (0.315) (0.237)
F capex 0.315*** 0.315 -0.806*** -0.058 0.886*** -0.048
(0.025) (0.195) (0.071)
F acqui 0.410*** 0.410 0.079 0.447 1.143*** -0.058
(0.021) (0.200) (0.051)
Capex -0.573*** -0.573 0.190 -0.485 -0.847*** -0.227
(0.022) (0.177) (0.076)
Acqui -0.415*** -0.415 0.027 -0.402 -0.717*** -0.121
(0.016) (0.163) (0.079)
D90 0.002 0.002 -0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000
(0.007) (0.032) (0.020)
D00 -0.013 -0.013 0.018 0.000 -0.013 0.000
(0.008) (0.040) (0.025)














Note: This robustness estimation tests whether or not the findings of main model in
Table 2.5 are due to a selective cut-off level. This test keeps the refinancing definition
of fcf as in the main model, but increases the cut-off level to 15%. There are 79,574
observations from 9883 unique firms. This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model
previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.9)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.12: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: GARCH Indstd
OLS β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.348*** 0.134*** - 0.140*** - -0.402*** -
(0.005) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035)
Chfl -0.274*** -0.421*** -0.421 0.105*** -0.344 -0.005 -0.418
(0.004) (0.021) (0.034) (0.023)
qrate -0.130*** -0.054 -0.054 -0.844** -0.671 0.061 -0.090
(0.049) (0.290) (0.345) (0.287)
dGDP 0.192*** 0.031 0.031 2.173*** 1.618 0.529 -0.288
(0.068) (0.402) (0.504) (0.400)
RESS 0.003 -0.027 -0.027 0.087*** 0.039 -0.004 -0.025
(0.003) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017)
IndstdGARCH 0.045*** 0.179*** 0.179 -0.601*** -0.260 -0.015 0.188
(0.005) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029)
Mtb 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015 -0.026*** -0.004 -0.036*** 0.037
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Size -0.008*** 0.004** 0.004 -0.035*** -0.021 -0.008*** 0.009
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Nwc -0.304*** -0.099*** -0.099 -0.369*** -0.368 -0.051* -0.068
(0.003) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027)
Rd 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.046*** 0.034 -0.007*** 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Lev -0.463*** -0.366*** -0.366 -0.519*** -0.745 -0.143*** -0.280
(0.003) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020)
Dvc 0.063*** -0.213*** -0.213 -0.605*** -0.655 0.436*** -0.476
(0.016) (0.067) (0.160) (0.096)
F capex 0.023** 0.363*** 0.363 -0.287*** 0.154 0.231*** 0.224
(0.011) (0.058) (0.098) (0.066)
F acqui 0.054*** 0.857*** 0.857 -0.301** 0.637 0.714*** 0.426
(0.008) (0.089) (0.121) (0.104)
Capex -0.445*** -0.167*** -0.167 -0.374*** -0.440 -0.201*** -0.046
(0.011) (0.050) (0.086) (0.063)
Acqui -0.185*** -0.301*** -0.301 0.073 -0.248 -0.121*** -0.228
(0.008) (0.037) (0.070) (0.046)
D90 -0.007*** 0.116*** 0.116 -0.268*** 0.000 0.006 0.000
(0.003) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020)
D00 0.003 0.069*** 0.069 -0.221*** 0.000 -0.040* 0.000
(0.003) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024)
D10 0.007 0.077*** 0.077 -0.201*** 0.000 -0.006 0.000
(0.004) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Parameter Value
σ∗ -0.565*** 0.569










Note: This robustness estimation tests whether or not the argument of industry volatil-
ity from main model in Table 2.5 is due to a noisy proxy (industry average standard
deviation of cash flow). The IndstdGARCH variable in this estimation is the predicted
industry cash flow volatility by GARCH(1,1) model. There are 79,360 observations from
9865 unique firms. The fist column presents the OLS results based on the whole sample,
and the rest columns report the estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.10)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.13: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: Market-based Cash Ratio
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.132*** - -0.247*** - -1.370*** -
(0.014) (0.083) (0.036)
Chfl -0.143*** -0.143 -1.018*** -0.542 -0.115*** -0.112
(0.010) (0.092) (0.027)
qrate 0.008 0.008 -0.902 -0.346 0.509 -0.127
(0.165) (0.791) (0.368)
dGDP -0.144 -0.144 0.488 0.048 0.672 -0.323
(0.204) (1.563) (0.478)
RESS -0.011 -0.011 0.049 0.008 0.021 -0.017
(0.008) (0.040) (0.020)
Indstd 0.421*** 0.421 0.156 0.482 -0.534*** 0.563
(0.080) (0.225) (0.184)
Mtb -0.004*** -0.004 -0.162*** -0.067 -0.007*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.019) (0.002)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.035*** -0.014 0.007*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002)
Nwc -0.044*** -0.044 -0.361*** -0.186 0.127*** -0.078
(0.009) (0.075) (0.023)
Rd 0.000 0.000 0.065*** 0.026 -0.007*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Lev -0.182*** -0.182 -0.863*** -0.520 -0.073** -0.162
(0.018) (0.033) (0.037)
Dvc -0.053* -0.053 -1.079*** -0.476 0.166 -0.097
(0.032) (0.314) (0.106)
F capex 0.263*** 0.263 -0.080 0.232 0.750*** 0.063
(0.026) (0.848) (0.062)
F acqui 0.587*** 0.587 -0.370* 0.442 1.384*** 0.219
(0.020) (0.218) (0.038)
Capex -0.118*** -0.118 -0.276 -0.227 -0.187*** -0.068
(0.022) (0.697) (0.063)
Acqui -0.153*** -0.153 -0.135 -0.206 -0.273*** -0.081
(0.019) (0.116) (0.057)
D90 -0.009 -0.009 0.020 0.000 0.005 0.000
(0.007) (0.033) (0.017)
D00 -0.014 -0.014 0.015 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.009) (0.031) (0.022)














Note: This robustness estimation tests the definition of cash, the dependent variable
in estimation. Our main model (Table 2.5) and all other tests define cash as cash and
marketable securities divided by book value of total asset. This robustness test define
cash as cash and marketable securities divided by market value of total asset. There are
79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms. This table reports the estimation of (S, s)
model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.11)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Chapter 2. An (S, s) Model of Corporate Cash Holdings 63
Table 2.14: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: Missing RD
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.297*** - -0.306*** - 0.049 -
(0.015) (0.053) (0.132)
Chfl -0.248*** -0.248 -0.552*** -0.481 0.124* -0.328
(0.010) (0.052) (0.065)
qrate 0.168 0.168 -0.389 0.004 -0.498 0.489
(0.138) (0.469) (0.385)
dGDP 0.076 0.076 -0.608 -0.181 -2.033*** 1.389
(0.194) (0.671) (0.645)
RESS 0.001 0.001 -0.094*** -0.037 -0.095*** 0.059
(0.009) (0.030) (0.035)
Indstd 0.630*** 0.630 -0.053 0.608 -1.254*** 1.440
(0.075) (0.258) (0.235)
Mtb 0.008*** 0.008 -0.037*** -0.008 -0.053*** 0.042
(0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Size 0.001 0.001 -0.084*** -0.034 -0.018*** 0.013
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Nwc -0.295*** -0.295 -0.111*** -0.342 -0.438*** -0.012
(0.009) (0.032) (0.043)
Rd 0.000* 0.000 0.051*** 0.021 -0.007*** 0.005
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Drd -0.077*** 0.077 -0.061*** 0.090 -0.140*** 0.276
(0.004) (0.013) (0.015)
Lev -0.408*** -0.408 -0.264*** -0.520 -0.473*** -0.103
(0.010) (0.035) (0.029)
Dvc 0.097*** 0.097 -0.838*** -0.257 0.856*** -0.456
(0.031) (0.284) (0.175)
F capex 0.195*** 0.195 -0.069 0.166 0.026 0.178
(0.026) (0.140) (0.125)
F acqui 0.201*** 0.201 0.766*** 0.525 0.255 0.037
(0.036) (0.142) (0.209)
Capex -0.350*** -0.350 0.532*** -0.126 -0.845*** 0.195
(0.028) (0.128) (0.147)
Acqui -0.253*** -0.253 -0.311** -0.384 -0.232*** -0.103
(0.017) (0.129) (0.080)
D90 0.008 0.008 -0.038 0.000 -0.258*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.025) (0.035)
D00 0.005 0.005 0.094*** 0.000 -0.288*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.031) (0.041)
D10 0.021 0.021 0.161*** 0.000 -0.261*** 0.000
(0.013) (0.043) (0.048)












Note: This robustness estimation add a dummy variable, Drd, to indicate missing RD
observations to release the concern of the RD setting of main model in Table 2.5, which
replace RD value as 0 if missing. There are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms.
This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.12)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.15: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: No Future Outflows
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.229*** - -0.187*** - -0.801*** -
(0.010) (0.053) (0.037)
Chfl -0.271*** -0.271 -0.490*** -0.495 -0.115*** -0.223
(0.006) (0.056) (0.024)
qrate -0.133 -0.133 -0.543 -0.381 -0.013 -0.128
(0.101) (0.501) (0.348)
dGDP -0.020 -0.020 -1.786*** -0.838 0.207 -0.106
(0.141) (0.689) (0.495)
RESS -0.012** -0.012 -0.077*** -0.046 0.022 -0.021
(0.006) (0.029) (0.020)
Indstd 1.609*** 1.609 -2.498*** 0.466 0.591*** 1.363
(0.050) (0.258) (0.180)
Mtb 0.009*** 0.009 0.029*** 0.022 -0.012*** 0.014
(0.000) (0.004) (0.003)
Size 0.003*** 0.003 -0.051*** -0.021 0.006*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Nwc -0.264*** -0.264 -0.237*** -0.373 -0.237*** -0.166
(0.007) (0.033) (0.023)
Rd 0.000*** 0.000 0.069*** 0.032 -0.002*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Lev -0.439*** -0.439 -0.432*** -0.637 -0.452*** -0.251
(0.006) (0.035) (0.025)
Dvc 0.096*** 0.096 -0.712*** -0.230 1.173*** -0.393
(0.022) (0.273) (0.141)
Capex -0.320*** -0.320 -0.317*** -0.465 -0.275*** -0.205
(0.013) (0.122) (0.054)
Acqui -0.227*** -0.227 -0.349** -0.387 -0.187** -0.149
(0.012) (0.144) (0.077)
D90 -0.011** -0.011 -0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.026) (0.018)
D00 -0.034*** -0.034 0.041 0.000 -0.050** 0.000
(0.007) (0.033) (0.024)














Note: This robustness estimation drops the forward-looking variables F capex and F
acqui of main model in Table 2.5. There are 79,574 observations from 9883 unique firms.
This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.13)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.16: Robustness for (S, s) Model Estimates: ∆ Outflows
β θu θl
Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E. Parameter M.E.
Inter 0.278*** - -0.502*** - -0.450*** -
(0.011) (0.052) (0.040)
Chfl -0.276*** -0.276 -0.342*** -0.423 -0.218*** -0.175
(0.007) (0.054) (0.028)
qrate -0.436*** -0.436 -0.571 -0.680 -4.627*** 1.718
(0.111) (0.498) (0.389)
dGDP 0.094 0.094 -0.651 -0.185 0.561 -0.168
(0.153) (0.686) (0.523)
RESS -0.017*** -0.017 -0.026 -0.028 -0.056** 0.008
(0.007) (0.029) (0.023)
Indstd 1.250*** 1.250 0.510** 1.468 -0.046 1.271
(0.055) (0.252) (0.188)
Mtb 0.009*** 0.009 0.016*** 0.016 -0.004 0.011
(0.000) (0.004) (0.003)
Size 0.002** 0.002 -0.049*** -0.019 0.007*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Nwc -0.280*** -0.280 -0.226*** -0.377 -0.217*** -0.179
(0.007) (0.033) (0.024)
Rd 0.000*** 0.000 0.079*** 0.034 -0.003*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Lev -0.450*** -0.450 -0.338*** -0.594 -0.418*** -0.255
(0.007) (0.035) (0.026)
Dvc 0.048* 0.048 -0.313 -0.087 1.194*** -0.508
(0.025) (0.272) (0.155)
Lag capex -0.344*** -0.344 -0.420*** -0.523 -0.205*** -0.248
(0.016) (0.120) (0.068)
Lag acqui -0.316*** -0.316 -0.506*** -0.533 -0.146 -0.248
(0.018) (0.159) (0.090)
∆Capex -0.286*** -0.286 0.094 -0.245 -0.277*** -0.156
(0.019) (0.137) (0.079)
∆Acqui -0.204*** -0.204 -0.487*** -0.412 -0.113 -0.151
(0.013) (0.139) (0.078)
D90 -0.009 -0.009 -0.040 0.000 -0.133*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.026) (0.020)
D00 -0.036*** -0.036 0.006 0.000 -0.268*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.033) (0.026)














Note: This robustness estimation decomposes outflow variables Capex and Acqui of
main model in Table 2.5 into a lagged componenet and a change component. The
change component, denoted by ∆Capex or ∆Acqui, is defined as the difference between
the outflow variable values in current year and in previous year.There are 79,574 ob-
servations from 9883 unique firms. This table reports the estimation of (S, s) model
previously specified:
Cu = Xβ + ε
∗ + eXθu+εu ,
C∗ = Xβ + ε∗,
Cl = Xβ + ε
∗ − eXθl+εl .
(2.14)
The coefficients β, θu, and θl estimated in table corresponds to the ones in this em-
pirical model. The marginal effect is formed as the exact amount of effect covariates
demonstrated on thresholds. Besides, our maximum likelihood method allows the flexi-
bility to measure the standard deviation (σ∗, σu, and σl) of error terms (ε∗, εu, and εl).
Moreover, parameter ρ∗u measures the correlation between ε∗ and εu, and ρ∗l measures
the correlation between ε∗ and εl. Our estimation has transformed the standard devi-
ation and correlation variables to ensure they suit constraints (standard deviation are
positive, and correlation variables are between -1 and 1). Numbers in the parameter
column report the estimation of the transformed variables, and numbers in the value
column present the value of the variables (σ· = exp(·) and ρ· = erf(·)). Standard errors
are in brackets, and ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we develop and estimate a double-barrier policy model of corporate
cash holdings. This dynamic policy incorporates firms’ flexibility to decide whether
or not respond to shocks in covariates, as well as to the shocks to the cash balance
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itself. The main difference between our model and traditional studies is the following
key assumption. We assume the existence of a lumpy cost of cash refinancing, which
makes continuous adjustment suboptimal. Existing empirical work implicitly assumes
continuous refinancing pattern by exploiting a static OLS regression. In contrast,
refinancing is infrequent which is caused by the assumption of refinancing costs. This
means that firms allow cash holding levels to freely evolve within a specific range and
refinance only when the cash balance hits an upper or a lower threshold. From this
perspective, observed cash levels belong to one of four groups, the upper threshold,
the lower threshold, the target, and ordinary observations. The dynamic model we
propose clearly categorizes these groups, and the simultaneous estimation takes into
account the interaction between these aspects.
This model provides new evidence beyond that possible with more standard,
static models. Our results indicate that cash inflows (profitability) reduces corporate
demand for cash, which is contrary to the positive correlation between cash holdings
and profitability reported in other studies. The observed cash holdings may be af-
fected by the direct injection from cash flow, but the target shows an inverse impact
if it is clearly isolated. Accordingly, future outflows (lower profitability) positively af-
fect cash holding demand, since firms prepare funds for future expenditure. Although
the sign of the industry risk in our model is the same as in standard regression re-
sults, its magnitude is considerably larger. The demand variation is not fully reflected
in realized cash holdings due to the infrequency of refinancing choice. The double
barrier model further allows us to study refinancing triggers. We find that inflows
reduce the width of the inaction range, which implies more frequent refinancing. This
is because cash inflows indicates healthy financial position (profitability) as well as
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credit quality, which reduces the cost of refinancing. Inversely, future outflows reduce
refinancing frequency. Industry risk enlarges the lower zone but shrinks the upper
zone. This suggests less frequent injection but more often distribution in future.
Chapter 2. An (S, s) Model of Corporate Cash Holdings 71
Appendix 2.1 Theoretical Cash Model Under Double-
barrier Framework
This theoretical (S, s) model derives the location of thresholds and targets given
known geometric Brownian motion process that cash holdings follow and adjustment
costs. The relationships revealed confirm the rationale to apply the (S, s) type em-
pirical model to real data of cash holdings. The model is built based on a single firm
situation. To simplify the case, we assume cash is the only asset of the firm, denoted
by ct, and follows geometric Brownian motion, but cash itself does not generate any
interest.
dc = µdt+ σdw, (2.15)
in which dw follows a Winner process. The drift rate µ determines the trend of one
step movement within each time unit, while variance rate σ represents the noise term
of the movement. Both µ and σ are known parameters which are exogenously deter-
mined. The firm has investors and access to capital markets. The firm will distribute
cash to investors when it is too high, and will borrow from capital market if cash level
is too low. Since adjustments in either side invoke costs immediate adjustment is not
optimal. In other words, the firm will allow cash to freely fluctuate without inter-
ruption, and adjust immediately when it reaches either boundary (denoted by Cu for
the upper barrier and by Cl for the lower barrier) of this inaction range. Considering
that the costs of downward and upward adjustments may be different, we separate
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the target into two, denoted by C++ and C+,15 respectively. The general framework
of our model is then explained by three parts: 1) the process of ct is not interrupted
within the area bounded by Cu and Cl; 2) when cash balance reaches Cu, the firm
cut it back to C++ by distributing cash back to investors; 3) the firm increases cash
balance to C+ whenever c goes to Cl by external financing such as debt issue and
equity issue. The derivation and solution of this model follows Dixit (1993).
Firm value
This part derives the firm value (denoted by FV (ct)) under the theoretical model
framework. The cash management policy described by the (S, s) model is actually a
process reseting the problem. Precisely, when cash balance level meets the condition
by reaching either Cu or Cl, the firm reset the position of cash holdings to C
++ or
C+. The resetting means to let the process continue from a different level by paying
costs. In other words, the process cannot be retested if there is no thresholds Cu and
Cl. In this further simplified situation, the value of the firm is
FV (ct) = 0, (2.16)
because cash is the only asset and no cash raising or distribution will occur. Since
cash level can never reach any threshold, no cash injection or distribution will occur,
which means the firm will have no interaction with investors. Then we regard the firm
15There are two targets in this theoretical model, because this is a more general setting which
releases all restrictions on refinancing cost components. When we set the fractional costs of cash
injection and distribution to be equal, the two targets overlap and become one target. Our empirical
analysis adopts this one-target setting, and it is a special case in this theoretical framework.
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value under (S, s) model as the value without barrier plus the effect of barriers. The
barriers incur cash payout denoted by f(ct). The current cash payout is observable,
but payout in future is unknown. When f(ct) > 0, we identify cash injection through
external financing. When f(ct) < 0, we identify cash distribution to investors. For
most of the cases, we expect f(ct) = 0, which implies that the cash process is within
inaction range.
We use F (ct) to represent the present value of total future effect of barriers. To
demonstrate the value of decision is each interval, we separate the value of current
payout and the discounted future barrier effect. Assume current cash level is c:
F (c) = f(c)dt+ e−ρdtE[F (c+ dc)]. (2.17)
The first component f(c)dt is the payout during the sufficiently small interval dt. The
second term e−ρdtE[F (c+dc)] is the present value of firm value at the end of the short
interval dt. This term consist of two steps: (1) E[F (c + dc) is the expected barrier
effect at the end of dt; (2) the discounting factor e−ρdt further discounts it back to
current time point. This component e−ρdtE[F (c+ dc)] contains the recursive nature,
and the inter-temporal decomposition provides the possibility to value the decision
making flexibility in cash balance.












3× 2× 1 + · · ·.
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According to our setting, dt is a quite short time interval, and hence we regard any
dt terms with order higher than 1 as negligible components. Then, only the first two
terms of the Taylor series expansion count:
e−ρdt = 1− ρdt. (2.18)
Substitute the e−ρdt in equation (9) with equation (10):
F (c) = f(c)dt+ (1− ρdt)E[F (c+ dc)]
= f(c)dt+ (1− ρdt){F (c) + [E[F (c+ dc)]− F (c)]}
= f(c)dt+ (1− ρdt){F (c) + E[dF ]}
= f(c)dt+ F (c)− ρdtF (c) + E[dF ]− ρdtE[dF ].
The product of dtdF is also negligible, and rearrangement leads to:
ρdtF (c) = f(c)dt+ E[dF ]. (2.19)
For investors, the firm value increase consists of cash distribution and expected future
cash balance (the only asset) drift. Since ct follows the geometric Brownian motion
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Then, we take the expectation so that E(dw) = 0:








σ2F ′′(c) + µF ′(c)− ρF (c) + f(c) = 0. (2.21)
Our target is to derive the effect of barrier, and hence we choose the normal situation
when f(c) = 0 which means no payout occurs.
1
2
σ2F ′′(c) + µF ′(c)− ρF (c) = 0. (2.22)
This is a typical second-order ordinary differential equation, and its standard solution
is in the form:
F (c) = Aexc,
in which A and x are the unknown coefficients. Then, F ′(c) = x × Aexc, F ′′(c) =
x2 × Aexc, substitute them into equation (2.20) leads to:
Aexc ∗ (1
2
σ2x2 + µx− ρ) = 0.
We set A 6= 0 to keep the meaning of our solution. Obvisously, exc > 0, and hence:
1
2
σ2x2 + µx− ρ = 0.
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There are two possible solutions x1 = −α and x2 = β which make two possible
solution term Ae−αc and Aeβc independent. Thus we write the effect of barriers as:
F (c) = Ae−αc +Beβc.
The total firm value under (S, s) policy will be
FV (ct) = Ae
−αct +Beβct . (2.23)
Value matching and smooth pasting
With the help of equation (2.21) we can specify the value matching relationship. In
reality, if the firm adjusts cash level downward, it may distribute extra dividend,
repurchase shares, or repay debt before expiration. If the cash level is too low, the
firm should inject cash through raising debt, issuing equity, or liquidating asset.
These activities incur two types of costs: 1) lumpy cost depending on whether or
not the adjustment happens, denoted by Kd for downward adjustment and by Ku for
upward adjustment. This lumpy value mainly reflects the jump of cash holding levels,
because it is the cost to reset the cash holdings process to any different levels and to
continue. For example, in reality, it corresponds to the costs to get the permission to
liquidate asset and to sell equity, costs of hosting auctions, etc. 2) Proportional cost
with rates md and mu for downward and upward adjustments is a linear component
depending on the amount of the adjustment. For example, the service charge of
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IPO,16 value loss in asset liquidation, tax expense of repurchase, etc. The existence
of costs make continuous adjustment suboptimal. In other words, the firm will not
immediately adjust once cash deviates from the target level. It suggests that the firm
will allow cash holdings to freely float within a range without interrupting and will
make adjustment only when the cash level go out of this inaction range.
We firstly consider a downward adjustment. Suppose at future time t, ct reaches
the upper threshold Cu, and the firm makes immediate adjustment to decrease the
cash balance to the related optimal level C++ at the cost of Kd + md(Cu − C++).
Hence, the value matching for downward adjustment is:
FV (C++) = FV (Cu) +Kd +md(Cu − C++). (2.24)
Similarly, the value matching for the upward adjustment is:
FV (C+) = FV (Cl) +Ku +mu(C
+ − Cl). (2.25)
We analytically solve A and B, the parameters in equation (2.23), as:
A =
[Kd +md ∗ (Cu − C++)] ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)− (eβ∗C++ − eβ∗Cu) ∗ [Ku +mu(C+ − Cl)]
(e−α∗C++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)− (eβ∗C++ − eβ∗Cu) ∗ (e−α∗C+ − e−α∗Cl)
B =
(e−α∗C
++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ [Ku +mu(C+ − Cl)]− [Kd +md ∗ (Cu − C++)] ∗ (e−α∗C+ − e−α∗Cl)
(e−α∗C++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)− (eβ∗C++ − eβ∗Cu) ∗ (e−α∗C+ − e−α∗Cl)
(2.26)
As we stated previously, the adjustment does not stop the process of ct but
continues the process at a different level at the expense of the cost. Hence, there
16Usually in percentage of the capital raised.
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should be smooth pasting relationships for the downward adjustment and upward
adjustment, respectively:
FV ′(Cu) = FV ′(C++) = mu, (2.27)
FV ′(Cl) = FV ′(C+) = −md. (2.28)
Overall, equations (2.22) to (2.25) enable us to solve the model as demonstrated in
the following numerical example.
Stationary distribution
Our model assumes cash holdings follow Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). If we do
not apply the double-barrier policy discussed before, the cash holdings observations
will not converge to a single distribution for two reasons. Firstly, each observation
will have its own mean and standard deviation
mean = c0 + µ ∗ t,
std. = σ ∗ √t.
(2.29)
due to the trend of GBM. Secondly, after a sufficiently long period (approaches in-
finity), the observations will not have a finite mean or standard deviation. However,
our resetting policy restricts the GBM with the range between thresholds, which may
lead to a long-run stationary distribution as depicted by figure 2.2 is higher than that
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Figure 2.2: Stationary distribution of cash holdings with low drift
The drift means step length of variation in cash holdings without refi-
nancing. Cash holdings is assumed to follow Geometric Brownian Motion
between thresholds.
in figure 2.3. Our example sets a target of 0.5, and the lower and upper thresholds
are 0.35 and 0.6, respectively. The drift refers to the step length of variation in cash
holdings without refinancing. No matter the drift is high or low, target is the level
which is the most likely to occur because of our resetting policy. Under high drift
setting, refinancing will become more frequent due to the large step length, and hence
the peak in figure 2.3 is higher than that in figure 2.2.
To derive the stationary density function, we apply these further assumptions:
1) the upper barrier is b, target is zero, and the lower barrier is −b; 2) at each
position, cash balance level has 0.5 probability to move upward by ∆H,17 and has
the probability of 0.5 to move downward by ∆H; 3) there are m steps from the upper
threshold to target, and m = b
∆H
, and hence at any time cash balance must be at
any one of these steps (the same situation also applies to the lower gap); 4) at the p-
17We define step length as unit, and hence ∆H = 1.
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Figure 2.3: Stationary distribution of cash holdings with high drift
The drift means step length of variation in cash holdings without refi-
nancing. Cash holdings is assumed to follow Geometric Brownian Motion
between thresholds.
osition m − 1, if the cash balance moves upward, it will be adjusted back to the
target once touching the threshold, and hence under equilibrium cash level has zero
probability to stay at either threshold. Suppose there are plenty of particles following
the same policy of cash balance (either moves upward or downward with equal prob-
ability, and go back to target once touching thresholds), and the system approaches
equilibrium condition after a sufficiently long time. The equilibrium means that each
particle continues to move. The number of particles remains stable at each position
and at any future time, because the inflow to this position equals outflow from this
position. The stationary probability of a position is the fraction of the number of
particles at this position over total particles. We use Pi to denote the stationary
probability at position i. Consider the first position below upper threshold Pm−1, the
only source of particle inflow is from the next position Pm−2, because from the upper
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The part of particles at the position m − 2 moving upward is the only inflow of
particles at the position m− 1. With respect to position m− 2, the inflows can come
from either downward moving particles from m− 1 or upward moving particles from








From the equations, we know that Pm−2 = 2Pm−1 and Pm−3 = 3Pm−1. If the process
continues, we can derive that Pm−n = nPm−1 with 0 ≤ n < m. The positions
below target have the same argument, which leads to P−m+n = nP−m+1 with 0 ≤
n < m. According to our assumption, the probability at either threshold is zero
P−m = Pm = 0. m − 1 is the next step adjacent to the upper threshold, and hence
the two positions are pretty close. Similarly, position −m + 1 is quite close to the
lower threshold. Then, we can reasonably assume that P−m+1 = Pm−1 = K, and K
is a constant. The particles inflow of target position is different, because the particles
moving upward (downward) from position m−1 (−m+1) also move to target. Hence

















∗ (m− 1) ∗K + 1
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Under the equilibrium condition of our policy, the cash balance must be at any one
Chapter 2. An (S, s) Model of Corporate Cash Holdings 82
position among positions from m− 1 to −m+ 1, which means the sum of probability
of all positions must equal to one:
Pm−1 + Pm−2 + ...+ P1 + P0 + P−1 + ...+ P−m+2 + P−m+1 = 1. (2.33)
That is
K + 2K + ...+ (m− 1)K +mK + (m− 1)K + ...+ 2k +K = 1.
Hence we have K = 1
m2
. Then we can derive the stationary density function when
cash balance is c between b and −b18:













Figure 2.4 depicts the distribution based on this derived density function.
18Cash balance cannot be negative in real case. Our assumptions here is just that target is right at
the middle between the two thresholds. The negative lower threshold is for mathematic simplicity,
and we can make it consistent with the reality by shifting the whole system upward.
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Figure 2.4: Stationary distribution of cash holdings based on derived density
function
This figure depicts the probability density function derived for the station-
ary distribution.
Numerical example
The numerical example results are demonstrated in Table 2.17. We studied three
different situations, economy expansion, normal time, and economy recession, and we
report the thresholds and targets in three panels. The results intuitively proves that
it is reasonable to assume that thresholds and targets of our policy are determined
by market conditions and firm features as in our model setting. Panel A discusses
the expansion situation of economy. The market interest rate ρ is high (15%) and
the risk level measure by σ2 is low (0.9). We further assume the project of the
firm reflects average return level, hence the increasing trend µ is as high as ρ. The
fixed distribution cost is 0.5, and the proportional cost rate is 0.1. The fixed and
proportional cost for upward refinancing are 1 and 0.1, respectively. Based on these
information, we get the optimized upper threshold being 13.48, lower threshold 0.791.
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The related targets are
Table 2.17: Numerical example
Panel A: Economy expansion
Setting ρ µ σ2 −α β
0.150 0.150 0.900 -0.768 0.434
Cost Kd md Ku mu
0.5 0.1 1.0 0.1
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Initial Value 13 7 4.5 0.5 -1 0.1
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Optimization 13.479 5.208 3.676 0.791 -1.424 0.004
Panel B: Normal situation
Setting ρ µ σ2 −α β
0.100 0.100 1.200 -0.449 0.310
Cost Kd md Ku mu
2.0 0.1 3.0 0.2
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Initial Value 15 9 9 1 3 2
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Optimization 16.075 7.797 5.874 2.343 -4.785 0.010
Panel C: Economy reccession
Setting ρ µ σ2 −α β
0.050 0.050 3.000 -0.200 0.167
Cost Kd md Ku mu
5.0 0.3 9.0 0.5
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Initial Value 17 10 7 2 4.4 1
Cu C
++ C+ Cl A B
Optimization 48.667 19.5221 9.9728 3.5787 -5.4198 0.0041
Note: This table presents the numerical examples of our model solution in expansion,
normal situation, and recession. Normal situation is the base case, and we increase
(decrease) the return of projects but decrease (increase) the refinancing cost to simulate
the expansion (recession).
5.21 and 3.68. The normal situation documented in Panel B has interest rate ρ equal
to 10%, and the risk level increases to 1.2. The costs also incline compared with
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expansion time. The optimized thresholds are 16.08 and 7.80 for upper and lower
cases, and the related targets are 5.87 and 2.34, respectively. In recession time, as
in Panel C, the market interest rate further decrease to 5%, and the risk level raises
to 3. The refinancing costs also experience a great increase. This situation leads the
upper and lower thresholds to be 48.68 and 3.58, and the related targets to be 19.52
and 9.97.
The comparison among the three scenarios reveals that firms raise both targets
and both thresholds in response to recession, and loosen these restrictions when the
economy becomes better. Compared Panel C to Panel B, either threshold or target
inclines. The high lower threshold makes the upward refinancing more frequent, and
the related target implies the amount of upward refinancing also enlarges. On the
other side, the upper threshold (48.67) leads to less frequent cash distribution, and
the high target implies that the amount of distribution when it happens shrinks. The
comparison reveals the firm’s attempt to retain cash when the economy experiences
depression. However, the firm lowers down the lower threshold to 0.791 when the
economy booms because it is not expensive to raise cash from market when needed.
The distribution amount is measured by the gap between upper threshold and upper
target, and the small gap suggests that it benefits investors if the firm keeps cash in
economy expansion because of the fast increasing trend.
Figure 2.5 depicts the relationships between firm value and current cash holding
level for each of the three scenarios. As in previous derivation, firm value is the present
value of all expected cash distributions or injections in future. In general, firm value
increases with current cash level and there are three stages for any scenario. The fi-
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Figure 2.5: Firm value variation with current cash position
This figure depicts relationships between firm value and cash holding level.
To keep consistent with our numerical example, we demonstrate the rela-
tionship in expansion, normal situation, and recession, respectively.
rst stage is when the cash level is low, and the firm value is negative. The negative
firm value means the cash injection from investors to the firm is more than the cash
distribution from firm to investors. The second stage is approximately the range
bounded by the upper and lower thresholds, during which firm value increases slowly
with cash level. Since cash value is within the inaction range, an additional increase
in cash makes distribution more likely bu cannot incurs distribution. In other words,
increase in cash within this range increases only the probability of cash distribution,
and hence the present value of true distribution will be affected largely. The third
stage is after the upper threshold, and firm value increases rapidly with cash level.
Since it is higher than the upper bound, and increase invokes additional distribution
immediately. The firm value is lowest at any cash position for the recession economy,
this is because the firm is experiencing low growth rate and high financing costs,
which makes it less likely to distribute and more likely to get from investors. At
the early stage, expansion economy has lower firm value than the normal situation
because the target of upward refinancing is higher in expanding economy. In other
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Figure 2.6: Cash value variation with current cash position
This figure depicts the variations of cash value along with cash holding
levels. To keep consistent with our numerical example, we demonstrate the
relationship in expansion, normal situation, and recession, respectively.
words, firm requires investors to inject more in expansion to take advantage of the
growth. In high cash level stage, the expanding economy results in the highest firm
value due to the high growth rate.
The value of cash holdings is measured by the gap between current firm value
and the firm value with zero cash:
CV = FV (ct)− FV (0) = Ae−αct +Beβct − (A+B). (2.35)
The value of cash follows the same shape with the firm value shape, and it is increasing
monotonically. The speed of value increment is slow in the middle stage and fast at
the beginning and end. Cash worth more when the economy expands compared with
normal and recession situations. At the beginning, cash injected establishes the firm,
and its value origins from the fact that firms begins to have the potential to earn
profits for investors. Then, when cash level enters into the inaction range, extra cash
will not increase cash value too much because increment in cash holdings cannot af-
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Figure 2.7: Marginal value of cash holdings
This figure depicts the variations of marginal cash value along with cash
holding levels. To keep consistent with our numerical example, we demon-
strate the relationship in expansion, normal situation, and recession, re-
spectively.
fect cash injection or distribution decisions. Finally, when cash level goes above the
upper threshold, additional cash incurs distribution immediately, which leads to the
stead increase cash value in this range. The stead increase in cash value occurs earlier
in expanding economy than in normal and recession of economy, because the upper
threshold in expansion in relatively lower.
Marginal value of the firm measures the value of each additional unit cash:
MVC = −α ∗ Ae−αct + β ∗Beβct . (2.36)
Based on equation (2.24), we replace A and B with their analytic solutions:
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MVC =− α ∗
[Kd +md ∗ (Cu − C++)] ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)
− (eβ∗C++ − eβ∗Cu) ∗ [Ku +mu(C+ − Cl)]
(e−α∗C
++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)




++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ [Ku +mu(C+ − Cl)]
− [Kd +md ∗ (Cu − C++)] ∗ (e−α∗C+ − e−α∗Cl)
(e−α∗C
++ − e−α∗Cu) ∗ (eβ∗C+ − eβ∗Cl)
− (eβ∗C++ − eβ∗Cu) ∗ (e−α∗C+ − e−α∗Cl)
eβct .
(2.37)
At the initial stage, cash is below the lower threshold, which means cash injected
invokes the firm and requires more invested. Hence, the marginal value of cash
decreases. Then the marginal value of cash stays near zero within the inaction range,
because the money increment within this area has almost zero effect on the decisions
of injection or distribution. The marginal value of cash increases at a high speed after
the inaction range. Expanding economy has the earliest occurrence of zero marginal
value range and the earliest steady increasing. Economy in recession will have the
longest zero marginal value range because it has the largest gap between refinancing
thresholds as illustrated by the numerical example.
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Appendix 2.2 Likelihood Function
This appendix presents the likelihood function in our estimation. In order to study
the trigger of cash refinancing as well as the target, our research exploits identifica-
tion strategy to categorize the observations into four groups, namely upper threshold,
target, lower threshold, and ordinary observation, and calculate the loglikelihood for
each group specifically. In the following presentation, φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the prob-
ability density function and cumulative function of normal distribution, respectively;
ε∗ represents the error term for the true target; εu and εl denote the error terms
in the upper and lower gaps; y refers to the observed cash holding level; x is the
explanatory variable set; β is the coefficient vector for the target; θu and θl repre-
sent the coefficient sets for determinants of the upper and lower exponential terms,
respectively; σ∗, σu and σl are standard deviations for error terms ε∗, εu, and εl,
respectively; ρ1 is the correlation coefficient between ε
∗ and εu; ρ4 is the correla-
tion coefficient between ε∗ and εl; θML represents the vector of all parameters to be
estimated θML = [β, θu, θl, σ
∗, σu, σl, ρ1, ρ4].
Case 1 : Upper Threshold When a firm makes no cash refinancing now but
adjusts cash downward next period, the observation in current period falls into this
group. The cash value observations in this group hence reflects the upper thresholds
of cash holdings because they have exceeded the upper thresholds and invoked future
cash distributions. As suggested by our empirical setting, equation (2.2), the error
in the upper exponential term is conditional on the error term for the true target
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Case 2 : Target When a firm makes cash refinancing now, either injection
or distribution, the observation in current period falls into this group. Our research
assumes adjustments bring cash holding level back to target level, and hence the
observations in this group are the true target with error term. The likelihood is:
p2 = φ(y2 − x2β, 0, σ∗) (2.39)
Case 3 : Lower Threshold When a firm makes no cash refinancing now but
adjusts cash upward next period, the observation in current period falls into this
group. In contrary to Case 1, the observations in this group convey information about
the lower thresholds of cash holdings. As suggested by our empirical setting, equation
(2.2), the error in the lower exponential term is εl|ε∗ = log(−y4 + x4β + ε∗) − x4θl









Case 4 : Ordinary Observation When a firm makes no cash refinancing in
this and next periods, the observation in current period is regarded as the ordinary
one since it is neither threshold nor target. Since these observations do not cause
any future refinancing, they are within the range bounded by the upper and lower
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threshold. Hence, εu|ε∗ > log(y0−x0β− ε∗)−x0θu and εl|ε∗ > log(−y0 +x0β+ ε∗)−

















p0 = p01 + p02
(2.41)
Then, take the logarithm of the probability to back out the log-likelihood:
l = log(p1) + log(p2) + log(p4) + log(p0) (2.42)
Our calculation of standard error is based on the Hessian Matrix: V ar( ˆθML) =
[−H( ˆθML)]−1, in which Hessian represents the second order derivative matrixH( ˆθML) =
∂2l
∂θi∂θj
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and more details about the calculation of the Hessian matrix is in the attached MAT-
LAB program.
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Appendix 2.3 MATLAB Program
1 % Title: Maximum Likelihood Esitmation of (S, s)
2 % Author: Qifan Zhai
3 % Date: 2017 -04 -12
4
5 function [beta_ss ,se_ss ,result ,hessian ,c_ini]= mle_20170412_fminunc_g_h(yche ,x,id)
6
7 % In the original data , id=2 indicates target after distribution and id=3 indicates
target after injection
8 id(id==3) =2; % Merge the two targets
9 % id=1: upper threshold; id=2: target; id=4: lower threshold; id=0: ordinary
10
11 y1=yche;x1=x;y1(id~=1,:) =[];x1(id~=1 ,:) =[];y2=yche;x2=x;y2(id~=2 ,:) =[];x2(id~=2 ,:)




14 c_beta =(x2 ’*x2)\(x2 ’*y2)*(rand -0.5) *2; c_theta_u =(x1 ’*x1)\(x1 ’*log(abs(y1 -x1*c_beta)
))*(rand -0.5) *2; c_theta_l =(x4 ’*x4)\(x4 ’*log(abs(x4*c_beta -y4)))*(rand -0.5) *2;
c_cov=rand (5,1)*2-1; c_ini =[ c_beta;c_theta_u;c_theta_l;c_cov];
15
16 tic;options = optimoptions(@fminunc ,’Algorithm ’,’trust -region ’,’
SpecifyObjectiveGradient ’,true ,’HessianFcn ’,’objective ’,’MaxIter ’ ,4000000,’
MaxFunEvals ’ ,10000000 ,’display ’,’Iter’,’TolX’ ,10^-6,’TolFun ’ ,10^-6);




20 result =[c_ini ,beta_ss ,se_ss ];
21 end
22
23 function [l,g,h]= loglike_g_h(y1 ,x1,y2,x2 ,y4,x4,y0 ,x0,nvar ,n1,n2 ,n4,n0 ,ini)
24 r1=ini(3* nvar +4,1);r4=ini(3* nvar +5,1);
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25 b=ini (1:nvar ,1);tu=ini(nvar +1:2* nvar ,1);tl=ini(2* nvar +1:3*nvar ,1);sig2=exp(ini(3*
nvar +1,1));sig_u=exp(ini(3* nvar +2,1)); sig_l=exp(ini(3* nvar +3,1)); rho1=erf(r1);
rho4=erf(r4);
26 m1=( sig_u/sig2)*rho1;sig1=sig_u*sqrt(1-rho1 ^2);m4=( sig_l/sig2)*rho4;sig4=sig_l*sqrt
(1-rho4 ^2);
27
28 lb=(10^( -3));ub=1 -10^( -3);
29 % Notation: Cu=1; C*=2; Cl=4; C_ordi =0
30 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
31 % 1. Upper Threshold
32 funode1=@(t1 ,y)normpdf(log(t1)+y1-x1*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu,m1*(log(




35 part1_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*( log(t1)+y1-x1*b);
36 part2_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*( log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b))
;
37 part3_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).*(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-
m1*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)));
38 part4_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2);
39 part5_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)
).^2);
40
41 part6_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*((( log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2) .*(log(-log(t1))-x1
*tu -m1*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)));
42 part7_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).*(( log(-log(t1))-x1*tu -
m1*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2));
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43 part8_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^3);
44 part9_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(
log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)
).^3);
45
46 part10_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1
*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*((( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2) .*(( log(-log(t1))
-x1*tu -m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^2));
47 part11_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1
*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*((( log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^3) .*(log(-log(t1))-
x1*tu-m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)));
48 part12_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1
*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).*(( log(-log(t1))-x1*
tu-m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*b)).^3));
49 part13_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1
*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(t1)+y1 -x1*b).^4);
50 part14_funode1=@(t1,y)(exp(-(log(t1)+y1-x1*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t1))-x1*tu-m1
*(log(t1)+y1-x1*b)).^2/(2* sig1 ^2))./t1).*(( log(-log(t1))-x1*tu -m1*(log(t1)+y1 -x1*
b)).^4);
51
52 [~, part1_result1 ]= ode45(part1_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part1=part1_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
53 [~, part2_result1 ]= ode45(part2_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part2=part2_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
54 [~, part3_result1 ]= ode45(part3_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part3=part3_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
55 [~, part4_result1 ]= ode45(part4_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part4=part4_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
56 [~, part5_result1 ]= ode45(part5_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part5=part5_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
57
58 [~, part6_result1 ]= ode45(part6_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part6=part6_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
59 [~, part7_result1 ]= ode45(part7_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part7=part7_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
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60 [~, part8_result1 ]= ode45(part8_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part8=part8_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
61 [~, part9_result1 ]= ode45(part9_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part9=part9_result1
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
62
63 [~, part10_result1 ]= ode45(part10_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part10=
part10_result1 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
64 [~, part11_result1 ]= ode45(part11_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part11=
part11_result1 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
65 [~, part12_result1 ]= ode45(part12_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part12=
part12_result1 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);
66 [~, part13_result1 ]= ode45(part13_funode1 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n1 ,1)); part13=
part13_result1 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig1);





71 coef1=rho1/(1-rho1 ^2);coef2=sig_u*rho1/(sqrt(1-rho1 ^2)*sig1 ^3);coef3=m1/(rho1*sig1
^2);coef4 =(1+ rho1 ^2)/(sig2*sig_u*(1-rho1 ^2)^2);coef5 =(1+3* rho1 ^2)/(( sig_u ^2)*(1-
rho1 ^2)^3);% sig_u/(sig2*sig1*sig1)+2*m1*sig_u*rho1/(sqrt(1-rho1 ^2)*sig1 ^3);%
72
73 p_b=repmat(part1 ,1,nvar).*x1/(sig2 ^2)-m1*repmat(part2 ,1,nvar).*x1/(sig1 ^2);% p_b
74 p_tu=repmat(part2 ,1,nvar).*x1/(sig1 ^2); % p_tu
75 p_sig2 =(part4 /(sig2 ^3)-m1*part3/(sig2*sig1 ^2)-prob1ode/sig2)*sig2; % p_sig2
76 p_sigu =(part3*m1/(sig_u*sig1 ^2)+part5 /(sig_u*sig1 ^2)-prob1ode/sig_u)*sig_u;
77 p_rho1 =(part3*m1/(rho1*sig1 ^2)-part5*coef1 /(sig1 ^2)+prob1ode*coef1)*exp(-r1^2)*2/
sqrt(pi);
78 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
79 % Gradient Components
80 g1b=sum(p_b./deno ,1) ’;g1tu=sum(p_tu./deno ,1) ’;g1sig2=sum(p_sig2 ./ prob1ode);g1sigu=
sum(p_sigu ./ prob1ode);g1rho1=sum(p_rho1 ./ prob1ode);
81
82 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
83 % Common secondary derivative terms
84 part1_sig2=part8 /(sig2 ^3)-part6*m1/(sig2*sig1*sig1)-part1/sig2;




88 part2_sig2=part6 /(sig2 ^3)-part7*m1/(sig2*sig1*sig1)+part1*m1/sig2 -part2/sig2;
89 part2_sigu=part7*m1/(sig_u*sig1*sig1)+part9/( sig_u*sig1*sig1)-part1*m1/sig_u -part2/
sig_u;
90 part2_rho1=part7*coef3 -part9*coef2 -part1*m1/rho1+part2*coef1;
91
92 part3_sig2 =( part11 /(sig2 ^2)-part10*m1/(sig1 ^2)+part4*m1-part3)/sig2;
93 part3_sigu =( part10*m1/(sig1 ^2)+part12 /(sig1 ^2)-part4*m1-part3)/sig_u;
94 part3_rho1=part10*coef3 -part12*coef2 -part4*m1/rho1+part3*coef1;
95
96 part4_sig2=part13 /(sig2 ^3)-part11*m1/(sig1*sig1*sig2)-part4/sig2;
97 part4_sigu =( part11*m1/(sig1 ^2)+part10 /(sig1 ^2)-part4)/sig_u;
98 part4_rho1=part11*coef3 -part10*coef2+part4*coef1;
99
100 part5_sigu=part12*m1/( sig_u*sig1 ^2)+part14 /(sig_u*sig1 ^2)-part5/sig_u -part3 *2* rho1/
sig2;





106 p_b_b=part4 /(sig2 ^4)-part3 *2*m1/(sig2*sig2*sig1*sig1)+part5*m1*m1/(sig1 ^4);
107
108 h1bb_part1=p_b ’*(-p_b./deno2);




112 p_b_tu=part3/(sig1 ^2* sig2 ^2)-part5*m1/(sig1 ^4);
113 h1btu_part1=p_b ’*(-p_tu./ deno2);
114 h1btu_part2=x1 ’*(( repmat(p_b_tu ,1,nvar).*x1)./deno)+x1 ’*x1*m1/(sig1 ^2);
115 h1btu=h1btu_part1+h1btu_part2;
116
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117 p_b_sig2_prep=part1_sig2 /(sig2 ^2) -2*part1/(sig2 ^3)+part2*m1/(sig2*sig1*sig1)-
part2_sig2*m1/(sig1 ^2);p_b_sig2=repmat(p_b_sig2_prep ,1,nvar).*x1;
118 h1bsig2_part1=p_b ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
119 h1bsig2_part2=sum(p_b_sig2 ./deno ,1) ’;
120 h1bsig2=h1bsig2_part1+h1bsig2_part2*sig2;
121
122 p_b_sigu_prep=part1_sigu /(sig2 ^2)-part2_sigu*m1/(sig1 ^2)+part2*m1/(sig1*sig1*sig_u);
p_b_sigu=repmat(p_b_sigu_prep ,1,nvar).*x1;
123 h1bsigu_part1=p_b ’*(- p_sigu ./deno2 (:,1));
124 h1bsigu_part2=sum(p_b_sigu ./deno ,1) ’;
125 h1bsigu=h1bsigu_part1+h1bsigu_part2*sig_u;
126
127 p_b_rho1_prep=part1_rho1 /(sig2 ^2)-part2_rho1*m1/(sig1 ^2)-part2*coef4;p_b_rho1=repmat
(p_b_rho1_prep ,1,nvar).*x1;
128 h1brho1_part1=p_b ’*(- p_rho1 ./deno2 (:,1));
129 h1brho1_part2=sum(p_b_rho1 ./deno ,1) ’;
130 h1brho1=h1brho1_part1+h1brho1_part2*exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi);
131
132 % h_tu series
133 h1tub=h1btu ’;
134
135 p_tu_tu=repmat(part5 ,1,nvar).*x1/(sig1 ^2);
136 h1tutu_part1=p_tu ’*(-p_tu./deno2);
137 h1tutu_part2=x1 ’*( p_tu_tu ./deno)-x1 ’*x1;
138 h1tutu=h1tutu_part1+h1tutu_part2 /(sig1 ^2);
139
140 p_tu_sig2=repmat(part2_sig2 /(sig1 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x1;
141 h1tusig2_part1=p_tu ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
142 h1tusig2_part2=sum(p_tu_sig2 ./deno ,1) ’;
143 h1tusig2=h1tusig2_part1+h1tusig2_part2*sig2;
144
145 p_tu_sigu_prep=part2_sigu /(sig1 ^2)-part2 *2/( sig_u*sig1 ^2);p_tu_sigu=repmat(
p_tu_sigu_prep ,1,nvar).*x1;
146 h1tusigu_part1=p_tu ’*(- p_sigu ./deno2 (:,1));
147 h1tusigu_part2=sum(p_tu_sigu ./deno ,1) ’;
148 h1tusigu=h1tusigu_part1+h1tusigu_part2*sig_u;
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149
150 p_tu_rho1_prep=part2_rho1 /(sig1 ^2)+part2 *2* sig_u*rho1 /(( sig1 ^3)*sqrt(1-rho1 ^2));
p_tu_rho1=repmat(p_tu_rho1_prep ,1,nvar).*x1;
151 h1turho1_part1=p_tu ’*(- p_rho1 ./deno2 (:,1));
152 h1turho1_part2=sum(p_tu_rho1 ./deno ,1) ’;
153 h1turho1=h1turho1_part1+h1turho1_part2*exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi);
154





160 p_sig2_sig2_prep =-3*part4/(sig2 ^4)+part4_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)+2* part3*m1/(sig2*sig2*sig1*
sig1)-part3_sig2*m1/(sig2*sig1*sig1)+prob1ode /(sig2 ^2)-p_sig2 /(sig2 ^2);
161 h1sig2sig2_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
162 h1sig2sig2_part2=sum(p_sig2_sig2_prep ./deno (:,1));
163 h1sig2sig2 =( h1sig2sig2_part1/sig2+h1sig2sig2_part2*sig2)*sig2+g1sig2;
164
165 p_sig2_sigu_prep=part4_sigu /(sig2 ^3) -(part3_sigu/sig_u -part3 /(sig_u ^2))*coef1/(sig2
^2)-p_sigu /(sig_u*sig2);
166 h1sig2sigu_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_sigu ./deno2 (:,1));
167 h1sig2sigu_part2=sum(p_sig2_sigu_prep ./deno (:,1));
168 h1sig2sigu =( h1sig2sigu_part1/sig2+h1sig2sigu_part2*sig_u)*sig2;
169
170 p_sig2_rho1_prep=part4_rho1 /(sig2 ^3)-part3*coef4/sig2 -part3_rho1*coef1/(sig2*sig2*
sig_u)-(p_rho1 /(exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi)))/sig2;
171 h1sig2rho1_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_rho1 ./deno2 (:,1));
172 h1sig2rho1_part2=sum(p_sig2_rho1_prep ./deno (:,1));
173 h1sig2rho1 =( h1sig2rho1_part1/sig2+h1sig2rho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig2;
174
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180 p_sigu_sigu_prep=part3_sigu*m1/(sig_u*sig1 ^2)-part3 *2* coef1 /(sig2*sig_u ^3)+
part5_sigu /(sig_u*sig1*sig1)-part5 *3/( sig_u*sig_u*sig1*sig1)-p_sigu /( sig_u ^2)+
prob1ode /(sig_u ^2);
181 h1sigusigu_part1=p_sigu ’*(- p_sigu ./deno2 (:,1));
182 h1sigusigu_part2=sum(p_sigu_sigu_prep ./deno (:,1));
183 h1sigusigu =( h1sigusigu_part1/sig_u+h1sigusigu_part2*sig_u)*sig_u+g1sigu;
184
185 p_sigu_rho1_prep=part3_rho1*coef1/(sig2*sig_u ^2)+part3*coef4/sig_u+part5_rho1 /((1-
rho1 ^2)*sig_u ^3)+part5 *2* rho1 /(( sig_u ^3)*(1-rho1 ^2) ^2)-p_rho1 /(sig_u*(exp(-r1^2)
*2/ sqrt(pi)));
186 h1sigurho1_part1=p_sigu ’*(- p_rho1 ./deno2 (:,1));
187 h1sigurho1_part2=sum(p_sigu_rho1_prep ./deno (:,1));
188 h1sigurho1 =( h1sigurho1_part1/sig_u+h1sigurho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig_u;
189







197 p_rho1_rho1_prep=part3_rho1*coef3+part3 *2* rho1/(sig2*sig_u*(1-rho1 ^2) ^2) -(part5_rho1
*coef1/(sig1 ^2)+part5*coef5)+p_rho1*coef1/(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi))+prob1ode *(1+
rho1 ^2)/(1-rho1 ^2) ^2;
198 h1rho1rho1_part1=p_rho1 ’*(- p_rho1 ./deno2 (:,1));
199 h1rho1rho1_part2=sum(p_rho1_rho1_prep ./deno (:,1));
200 h1rho1rho1 =( h1rho1rho1_part1 /(exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi))+h1rho1rho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2) *2/





204 % 2. Target
205 l2=-n2*log(sig2) -(y2 -x2*b) ’*(y2-x2*b)/(2* sig2 ^2);
206 % Gradient
207 g2b=x2 ’*(y2 -x2*b)/(sig2 ^2);
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208 g2sig2=-n2/sig2+(y2-x2*b) ’*(y2 -x2*b)/(sig2 ^3);
209 % Hessian
210 h2bb=-x2 ’*x2/(sig2 ^2);h2bsig2 =-2*x2 ’*(y2 -x2*b)/(sig2 ^3);h2sig2b=h2bsig2 ’; h2sig2sig2=




214 % 3. Lower
215 funode4=@(t4 ,y)normpdf(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl ,m4*(-





219 part1_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b);
220 part2_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4
*b));
221 part3_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).*( log(-log(t4))-x4*
tl-m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)));
222 part4_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^2);
223 part5_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(( log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4*(-log(t4)+y4-
x4*b)).^2);
224
225 part6_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(((- log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^2) .*( log(-log(t4)
)-x4*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)));
226 part7_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).*(( log(-log(t4))-x4
*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2));
227 part8_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^3);
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228 part9_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl -m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(( log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4*(-log(t4)+y4-
x4*b)).^3);
229
230 part10_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(((- log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^2) .*(( log(-log(t4
))-x4*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2));
231 part11_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(((- log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^3) .*( log(-log(t4)
)-x4*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)));
232 part12_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).*(( log(-log(t4))-x4
*tl -m4*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^3));
233 part13_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*((-log(t4)+y4-x4*b).^4);
234 part14_funode4=@(t4,y)(exp(-(-log(t4)+y4 -x4*b).^2/(2* sig2 ^2) -(log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4
*(-log(t4)+y4-x4*b)).^2/(2* sig4 ^2))./t4).*(( log(-log(t4))-x4*tl-m4*(-log(t4)+y4-
x4*b)).^4);
235
236 [~, part1_result4 ]= ode45(part1_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part1=part1_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
237 [~, part2_result4 ]= ode45(part2_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part2=part2_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
238 [~, part3_result4 ]= ode45(part3_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part3=part3_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
239 [~, part4_result4 ]= ode45(part4_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part4=part4_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
240 [~, part5_result4 ]= ode45(part5_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part5=part5_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
241
242 [~, part6_result4 ]= ode45(part6_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part6=part6_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
243 [~, part7_result4 ]= ode45(part7_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part7=part7_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
244 [~, part8_result4 ]= ode45(part8_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part8=part8_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
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245 [~, part9_result4 ]= ode45(part9_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part9=part9_result4
(3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
246
247 [~, part10_result4 ]= ode45(part10_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part10=
part10_result4 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
248 [~, part11_result4 ]= ode45(part11_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part11=
part11_result4 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
249 [~, part12_result4 ]=ode45(part12_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part12=
part12_result4 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);
250 [~, part13_result4 ]=ode45(part13_funode4 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n4 ,1)); part13=
part13_result4 (3,:) ’/(2*pi*sig2*sig4);





255 coef1=rho4/(1-rho4 ^2);coef2=sig_l*rho4/(sqrt(1-rho4 ^2)*sig4 ^3);coef3=m4/(rho4*sig4
^2);coef4 =(1+ rho4 ^2)/(sig2*sig_l*(1-rho4 ^2)^2);coef5 =(1+3* rho4 ^2)/(( sig_l ^2)*(1-
rho4 ^2)^3);% sig_l/(sig2*sig4*sig4)+2*m4*sig_l*rho4/(sqrt(1-rho4 ^2)*sig4 ^3);%
256
257 p_b=repmat(part1 ,1,nvar).*x4/(sig2 ^2)-m4*repmat(part2 ,1,nvar).*x4/(sig4 ^2);
258 p_tl=repmat(part2 ,1,nvar).*x4/(sig4 ^2);
259 p_sig2 =(part4 /(sig2 ^3)-m4*part3/(sig2*sig4 ^2)-prob4ode/sig2)*sig2;
260 p_sigl =(part3*m4/(sig_l*sig4 ^2)+part5 /(sig_l*sig4 ^2)-prob4ode/sig_l)*sig_l;





265 % Gradient Components
266 g4b=sum(p_b./deno ,1) ’;g4tl=sum(p_tl./deno ,1) ’;g4sig2=sum(p_sig2 ./ prob4ode);g4sigl=
sum(p_sigl ./ prob4ode);g4rho4=sum(p_rho4 ./ prob4ode);
267
268 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
269 % Common secondary derivative terms
270 part1_sig2=part8 /(sig2 ^3)-part6*m4/(sig2*sig4*sig4)-part1/sig2;




274 part2_sig2=part6 /(sig2 ^3)-part7*m4/(sig2*sig4*sig4)+part1*m4/sig2 -part2/sig2;
275 part2_sigl=part7*m4/(sig_l*sig4*sig4)+part9/( sig_l*sig4*sig4)-part1*m4/sig_l -part2/
sig_l;
276 part2_rho4=part7*coef3 -part9*coef2 -part1*m4/rho4+part2*coef1;
277
278 part3_sig2 =( part11 /(sig2 ^2)-part10*m4/(sig4 ^2)+part4*m4-part3)/sig2;
279 part3_sigl =( part10*m4/(sig4 ^2)+part12 /(sig4 ^2)-part4*m4-part3)/sig_l;
280 part3_rho4=part10*coef3 -part12*coef2 -part4*m4/rho4+part3*coef1;
281
282 part4_sig2=part13 /(sig2 ^3)-part11*m4/(sig4*sig4*sig2)-part4/sig2;
283 part4_sigl =( part11*m4/(sig4 ^2)+part10 /(sig4 ^2)-part4)/sig_l;
284 part4_rho4=part11*coef3 -part10*coef2+part4*coef1;
285
286 part5_sigl=part12*m4/( sig_l*sig4 ^2)+part14 /(sig_l*sig4 ^2)-part5/sig_l -part3 *2* rho4/
sig2;





292 p_b_b=part4 /(sig2 ^4)-part3 *2*m4/(sig2*sig2*sig4*sig4)+part5*m4*m4/(sig4 ^4);
293 h4bb_part1=p_b ’*(-p_b./deno2);




297 p_b_tl=part3/(sig4 ^2* sig2 ^2)-part5*m4/(sig4 ^4);
298 h4btl_part1=p_b ’*(-p_tl./ deno2);
299 h4btl_part2=x4 ’*(( repmat(p_b_tl ,1,nvar).*x4)./deno)+x4 ’*x4*m4/(sig4 ^2);
300 h4btl=h4btl_part1+h4btl_part2;
301
302 p_b_sig2_prep=part1_sig2 /(sig2 ^2) -2*part1/(sig2 ^3)+part2*m4/(sig2*sig4*sig4)-
part2_sig2*m4/(sig4 ^2);p_b_sig2=repmat(p_b_sig2_prep ,1,nvar).*x4;
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303 h4bsig2_part1=p_b ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
304 h4bsig2_part2=sum(p_b_sig2 ./deno ,1) ’;
305 h4bsig2=h4bsig2_part1+h4bsig2_part2*sig2;
306
307 p_b_sigl_prep=part1_sigl /(sig2 ^2)-part2_sigl*m4/(sig4 ^2)+part2*m4/(sig4*sig4*sig_l);
p_b_sigl=repmat(p_b_sigl_prep ,1,nvar).*x4;
308 h4bsigl_part1=p_b ’*(- p_sigl ./deno2 (:,1));
309 h4bsigl_part2=sum(p_b_sigl ./deno ,1) ’;
310 h4bsigl=h4bsigl_part1+h4bsigl_part2*sig_l;
311
312 p_b_rho4_prep=part1_rho4 /(sig2 ^2)-part2_rho4*m4/(sig4 ^2)-part2*coef4;p_b_rho4=repmat
(p_b_rho4_prep ,1,nvar).*x4;
313 h4brho4_part1=p_b ’*(- p_rho4 ./deno2 (:,1));
314 h4brho4_part2=sum(p_b_rho4 ./deno ,1) ’;
315 h4brho4=h4brho4_part1+h4brho4_part2*exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi);
316
317 % h_tl series
318 h4tlb=h4btl ’;
319
320 p_tl_tl=repmat(part5 ,1,nvar).*x4/(sig4 ^2);
321 h4tltl_part1=p_tl ’*(-p_tl./deno2);
322 h4tltl_part2=x4 ’*( p_tl_tl ./deno)-x4 ’*x4;
323 h4tltl=h4tltl_part1+h4tltl_part2 /(sig4 ^2);
324
325 p_tl_sig2=repmat(part2_sig2 /(sig4 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x4;
326 h4tlsig2_part1=p_tl ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
327 h4tlsig2_part2=sum(p_tl_sig2 ./deno ,1) ’;
328 h4tlsig2=h4tlsig2_part1+h4tlsig2_part2*sig2;
329
330 p_tl_sigl_prep=part2_sigl /(sig4 ^2)-part2 *2/( sig_l*sig4 ^2);p_tl_sigl=repmat(
p_tl_sigl_prep ,1,nvar).*x4;
331 h4tlsigl_part1=p_tl ’*(- p_sigl ./deno2 (:,1));
332 h4tlsigl_part2=sum(p_tl_sigl ./deno ,1) ’;
333 h4tlsigl=h4tlsigl_part1+h4tlsigl_part2*sig_l;
334
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335 p_tl_rho4_prep=part2_rho4 /(sig4 ^2)+part2 *2* sig_l*rho4 /(( sig4 ^3)*sqrt(1-rho4 ^2));
p_tl_rho4=repmat(p_tl_rho4_prep ,1,nvar).*x4;
336 h4tlrho4_part1=p_tl ’*(- p_rho4 ./deno2 (:,1));
337 h4tlrho4_part2=sum(p_tl_rho4 ./deno ,1) ’;
338 h4tlrho4=h4tlrho4_part1+h4tlrho4_part2*exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi);
339





345 p_sig2_sig2_prep =-3*part4/(sig2 ^4)+part4_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)+2* part3*m4/(sig2*sig2*sig4*
sig4)-part3_sig2*m4/(sig2*sig4*sig4)+prob4ode /(sig2 ^2)-p_sig2 /(sig2 ^2);
346 h4sig2sig2_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_sig2 ./deno2 (:,1));
347 h4sig2sig2_part2=sum(p_sig2_sig2_prep ./deno (:,1));
348 h4sig2sig2 =( h4sig2sig2_part1/sig2+h4sig2sig2_part2*sig2)*sig2+g4sig2;
349
350 p_sig2_sigl_prep=part4_sigl /(sig2 ^3) -(part3_sigl/sig_l -part3 /(sig_l ^2))*coef1/(sig2
^2)-p_sigl /(sig_l*sig2);
351 h4sig2sigl_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_sigl ./deno2 (:,1));
352 h4sig2sigl_part2=sum(p_sig2_sigl_prep ./deno (:,1));
353 h4sig2sigl =( h4sig2sigl_part1/sig2+h4sig2sigl_part2*sig_l)*sig2;
354
355 p_sig2_rho4_prep=part4_rho4 /(sig2 ^3)-part3*coef4/sig2 -part3_rho4*coef1/(sig2*sig2*
sig_l)-(p_rho4 /(exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi)))/sig2;
356 h4sig2rho4_part1=p_sig2 ’*(- p_rho4 ./deno2 (:,1));
357 h4sig2rho4_part2=sum(p_sig2_rho4_prep ./deno (:,1));
358 h4sig2rho4 =( h4sig2rho4_part1/sig2+h4sig2rho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig2;
359
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365 p_sigl_sigl_prep=part3_sigl*m4/(sig_l*sig4 ^2)-part3 *2* coef1 /(sig2*sig_l ^3)+
part5_sigl /(sig_l*sig4*sig4)-part5 *3/( sig_l*sig_l*sig4*sig4)-p_sigl /( sig_l ^2)+
prob4ode /(sig_l ^2);
366 h4siglsigl_part1=p_sigl ’*(- p_sigl ./deno2 (:,1));
367 h4siglsigl_part2=sum(p_sigl_sigl_prep ./deno (:,1));
368 h4siglsigl =( h4siglsigl_part1/sig_l+h4siglsigl_part2*sig_l)*sig_l+g4sigl;
369
370 p_sigl_rho4_prep=part3_rho4*coef1/(sig2*sig_l ^2)+part3*coef4/sig_l+part5_rho4 /((1-
rho4 ^2)*sig_l ^3)+part5 *2* rho4 /(( sig_l ^3)*(1-rho4 ^2) ^2)-p_rho4 /(sig_l*(exp(-r4^2)
*2/ sqrt(pi)));
371 h4siglrho4_part1=p_sigl ’*(- p_rho4 ./deno2 (:,1));
372 h4siglrho4_part2=sum(p_sigl_rho4_prep ./deno (:,1));
373 h4siglrho4 =( h4siglrho4_part1/sig_l+h4siglrho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig_l;
374







382 p_rho4_rho4_prep=part3_rho4*coef3+part3 *2* rho4/(sig2*sig_l*(1-rho4 ^2) ^2) -(part5_rho4
*coef1/(sig4 ^2)+part5*coef5)+p_rho4*coef1/(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi))+prob4ode *(1+
rho4 ^2)/(1-rho4 ^2) ^2;
383 h4rho4rho4_part1=p_rho4 ’*(- p_rho4 ./deno2 (:,1));
384 h4rho4rho4_part2=sum(p_rho4_rho4_prep ./deno (:,1));
385 h4rho4rho4 =( h4rho4rho4_part1 /(exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi))+h4rho4rho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2) *2/
sqrt(pi)))*(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)) -2*g4rho4 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi))*r4/(exp(-r4
^2) *2/ sqrt(pi));
386 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
387 % 4. Ordinary Observation
388 tic;
389 % upper part
390 funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).*(1- normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*tu,
m1*(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b),sig1))./t01;
391 [~,result01 ]= ode45(funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));prob01ode=result01 (3,:) ’;
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392 % lower part
393 funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).*(1- normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0*tl,
m4*(-log(t02)+y0 -x0*b),sig4))./t02;





399 % function 01
400 part1_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).*(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b)./t01;
401 part2_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*( log(t01)+y0-x0*b)./t01;
402 part3_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1)./t01;
403 part4_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).*(( log(t01)+y0-x0*b).^2)./
t01;
404 part5_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2)./t01;
405 part6_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^2)./t01;
406 part7_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1)./t01;
407 part8_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*( log(t01)+y0-x0*b)./t01;
408 part9_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*( log(-log(t01))-x0*tu-m1*(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b))./t01
;
409 part10_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^3)./
t01;
410 part11_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^3)./t01;
411 part12_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^2)./t01;
412 part13_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*( log(t01)+y0-x0*b).*(log(-log(t01))-x0*tu -m1*(log
(t01)+y0 -x0*b))./t01;
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413 part14_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^4)./
t01;
414 part15_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^4)./t01;
415 part16_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^3)./t01;
416
417 part18_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(t01)+y0 -x0*b).^2) .*(log(-log(t01))-x0*tu -m1
*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b))./t01;
418 part19_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*( log(t01)+y0-x0*b).*(( log(-log(t01))-x0*tu-m1*(
log(t01)+y0 -x0*b)).^2)./t01;
419 part20_funode01=@(t01 ,y)normpdf(log(t01)+y0 -x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t01))-x0*
tu,m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b),sig1).*(( log(-log(t01))-x0*tu -m1*(log(t01)+y0-x0*b)).^2)
./t01;




422 [~, part1_result01 ]=ode45(part1_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part1=
part1_result01 (3,:) ’;
423 [~, part2_result01 ]=ode45(part2_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part2=
part2_result01 (3,:) ’;
424 [~, part3_result01 ]=ode45(part3_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part3=
part3_result01 (3,:) ’;
425 [~, part4_result01 ]=ode45(part4_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part4=
part4_result01 (3,:) ’;
426 [~, part5_result01 ]=ode45(part5_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part5=
part5_result01 (3,:) ’;
427 [~, part6_result01 ]=ode45(part6_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part6=
part6_result01 (3,:) ’;
428 [~, part7_result01 ]=ode45(part7_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part7=
part7_result01 (3,:) ’;
429 [~, part8_result01 ]=ode45(part8_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part8=
part8_result01 (3,:) ’;
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430 [~, part9_result01 ]= ode45(part9_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part9=
part9_result01 (3,:) ’;
431 [~, part10_result01 ]=ode45(part10_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part10=
part10_result01 (3,:) ’;
432 [~, part11_result01 ]=ode45(part11_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part11=
part11_result01 (3,:) ’;
433 [~, part12_result01 ]=ode45(part12_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part12=
part12_result01 (3,:) ’;
434 [~, part13_result01 ]=ode45(part13_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part13=
part13_result01 (3,:) ’;
435 [~, part14_result01 ]=ode45(part14_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part14=
part14_result01 (3,:) ’;
436 [~, part15_result01 ]=ode45(part15_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part15=
part15_result01 (3,:) ’;




440 [~, part18_result01 ]=ode45(part18_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part18=
part18_result01 (3,:) ’;
441 [~, part19_result01 ]=ode45(part19_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part19=
part19_result01 (3,:) ’;
442 [~, part20_result01 ]=ode45(part20_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part20=
part20_result01 (3,:) ’;
443 [~, part21_result01 ]=ode45(part21_funode01 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part21=
part21_result01 (3,:) ’;
444
445 p01_b=part1 /(sig2 ^2)-part2/(sig2 ^2)-part3*m1;
446 p01_tu=part3;
447 p01_sig2=part4/(sig2 ^3)-part5/sig2 -part6/(sig2 ^3)+part7/sig2 -part8*m1/sig2;
448 p01_sigu=part8*m1/sig_u+part9/sig_u;
449 p01_rho1=part8*m1/rho1 -part9*rho1/(1-rho1 ^2);
450
451 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
452 part1_b=repmat(part4/(sig2 ^2)-part5 ,1,nvar).*x0;
453 part1_sig2=part10 /(sig2 ^3)-part1/sig2;
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454
455 part2_b=repmat(part6/(sig2 ^2)+part8*m1-part7 ,1,nvar).*x0;
456 part2_tu=-repmat(part8 ,1,nvar).*x0;




461 part3_b=repmat(part8/(sig2 ^2)-part9*m1/(sig1 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x0;
462 part3_tu=repmat(part9/(sig1 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x0;
463 part3_sig2=part12 /(sig2 ^3)-part3/sig2 -part13*m1/(sig2*sig1*sig1);
464 part3_sigu=part13*m1/( sig_u*sig1*sig1)+part20 /(sig_u*sig1*sig1)-part3/sig_u;
465 part3_rho1=part13*m1/(rho1*sig1*sig1)-part20*rho1 /((1- rho1 ^2)*sig1*sig1)+part3*rho1
/(1-rho1 ^2);
466
467 part4_sig2=part14 /(sig2 ^3)-part4/sig2;
468 part5_sig2=part4 /(sig2 ^3)-part5/sig2;
469 part6_sig2=part15 /(sig2 ^3)-part6/sig2+part16*m1/sig2;
470 part7_sig2=part6 /(sig2 ^3)-part7/sig2+part8*m1/sig2;








479 part8_rho1=part18*m1/(rho1*(sig1 ^2))-part19*rho1 /((1- rho1 ^2)*(sig1 ^2))+part8*rho1
/(1-rho1 ^2);
480
481 part9_sigu=part19*m1/( sig_u*sig1*sig1)+part21 /(sig_u*sig1*sig1)-part9/sig_u -part8*m1
/sig_u;




485 % Hessian Component
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486 p01_bb=part1_b /(sig2 ^2)-part2_b /(sig2 ^2)-part3_b*m1;
487 p01_btu=-part2_tu /(sig2 ^2)-part3_tu*m1;
488 p01_bsig2=part1_sig2 /(sig2 ^2)-part2_sig2 /(sig2 ^2)-part3_sig2*m1 -(2* part1 /(sig2 ^3) -2*
part2/(sig2 ^3)-part3*m1/sig2);
489 p01_bsigu=-part2_sigu /(sig2 ^2) -(part3_sigu*m1+part3*m1/sig_u);







497 p01_sig2sig2 =-3*part4/(sig2 ^4)+part5/(sig2 ^2)+3* part6/(sig2 ^4)-part7/(sig2 ^2)+2*
part8*m1/(sig2 ^2)+( part4_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)-part5_sig2/sig2 -part6_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)+
part7_sig2/sig2 -part8_sig2*m1/sig2);
498 p01_sig2sigu=-part6_sigu /(sig2 ^3)+part7_sigu/sig2 -( part8_sigu*m1/sig2+part8*m1/(sig2
*sig_u));
499 p01_sig2rho1=-part6_rho1 /(sig2 ^3)+part7_rho1/sig2 -( part8_rho1*m1/sig2+part8*sig_u/(
sig2 ^2));
500
501 p01_sigusigu=part8_sigu*rho1/sig2+( part9_sigu/sig_u -part9/(sig_u ^2));
502 p01_sigurho1=part8_rho1*rho1/sig2+part8/sig2+part9_rho1/sig_u;
503
504 p01_rho1rho1=part8_rho1*sig_u/sig2 -( part9_rho1*rho1/(1-rho1 ^2)+part9 *(1+ rho1 ^2)/((1-
rho1 ^2)^2));
505 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
506 % function 02
507
508 part1_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b)./t02;
509 part2_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0*
tl,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b)./t02;
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513 part6_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0*
tl,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^2)./t02;
514 part7_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0*
tl,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4)./t02;
515 part8_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0*
tl,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b)./t02;





518 part11_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^3)./t02;
519 part12_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^2)./t02;





522 part15_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normcdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^4)./t02;
523 part16_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^3)./t02;
524 part18_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*((-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).^2) .*( log(-log(t02))-x0*tl
-m4*(-log(t02)+y0 -x0*b))./t02;
525 part19_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b).*(( log(-log(t02))-x0*tl -m4
*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b)).^2)./t02;
526 part20_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*(( log(-log(t02))-x0*tl-m4*(-log(t02)+y0 -x0*b))
.^2)./t02;
527 part21_funode02=@(t02 ,y)normpdf(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b,0,sig2).* normpdf(log(-log(t02))-x0
*tl ,m4*(-log(t02)+y0-x0*b),sig4).*(( log(-log(t02))-x0*tl-m4*(-log(t02)+y0 -x0*b))
.^3)./t02;
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528
529 [~, part1_result02 ]= ode45(part1_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part1=
part1_result02 (3,:) ’;
530 [~, part2_result02 ]= ode45(part2_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part2=
part2_result02 (3,:) ’;
531 [~, part3_result02 ]=ode45(part3_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part3=
part3_result02 (3,:) ’;
532 [~, part4_result02 ]=ode45(part4_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part4=
part4_result02 (3,:) ’;
533 [~, part5_result02 ]=ode45(part5_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part5=
part5_result02 (3,:) ’;
534 [~, part6_result02 ]=ode45(part6_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part6=
part6_result02 (3,:) ’;
535 [~, part7_result02 ]=ode45(part7_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part7=
part7_result02 (3,:) ’;
536 [~, part8_result02 ]=ode45(part8_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part8=
part8_result02 (3,:) ’;
537 [~, part9_result02 ]=ode45(part9_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part9=
part9_result02 (3,:) ’;
538 [~, part10_result02 ]=ode45(part10_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part10=
part10_result02 (3,:) ’;
539 [~, part11_result02 ]=ode45(part11_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part11=
part11_result02 (3,:) ’;
540 [~, part12_result02 ]=ode45(part12_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part12=
part12_result02 (3,:) ’;
541 [~, part13_result02 ]=ode45(part13_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part13=
part13_result02 (3,:) ’;
542 [~, part14_result02 ]=ode45(part14_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part14=
part14_result02 (3,:) ’;
543 [~, part15_result02 ]=ode45(part15_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part15=
part15_result02 (3,:) ’;
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547 [~, part18_result02 ]=ode45(part18_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part18=
part18_result02 (3,:) ’;
548 [~, part19_result02 ]=ode45(part19_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part19=
part19_result02 (3,:) ’;
549 [~, part20_result02 ]=ode45(part20_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part20=
part20_result02 (3,:) ’;
550 [~, part21_result02 ]=ode45(part21_funode02 ,[lb 0.6 ub],zeros(n0 ,1));part21=
part21_result02 (3,:) ’;
551
552 p02_b=part1 /(sig2 ^2)-part2/(sig2 ^2)-part3*m4;
553 p02_tl=part3;
554 p02_sig2=part4/(sig2 ^3)-part5/sig2 -part6/(sig2 ^3)+part7/sig2 -part8*m4/sig2;
555 p02_sigl=part8*m4/sig_l+part9/sig_l;
556 p02_rho4=part8*m4/rho4 -part9*rho4/(1-rho4 ^2);
557
558 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
559 part1_b=repmat(part4/(sig2 ^2)-part5 ,1,nvar).*x0;
560 part1_sig2=part10 /(sig2 ^3)-part1/sig2;
561
562 part2_b=repmat(part6/(sig2 ^2)+part8*m4-part7 ,1,nvar).*x0;
563 part2_tl=-repmat(part8 ,1,nvar).*x0;




568 part3_b=repmat(part8/(sig2 ^2)-part9*m4/(sig4 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x0;
569 part3_tl=repmat(part9/(sig4 ^2) ,1,nvar).*x0;
570 part3_sig2=part12 /(sig2 ^3)-part3/sig2 -part13*m4/(sig2*sig4*sig4);
571 part3_sigl=part13*m4/( sig_l*sig4*sig4)+part20 /(sig_l*sig4*sig4)-part3/sig_l;
572 part3_rho4=part13*m4/(rho4*sig4*sig4)-part20*rho4 /((1- rho4 ^2)*sig4*sig4)+part3*rho4
/(1-rho4 ^2);
573
574 part4_sig2=part14 /(sig2 ^3)-part4/sig2;
575 part5_sig2=part4 /(sig2 ^3)-part5/sig2;
576 part6_sig2=part15 /(sig2 ^3)-part6/sig2+part16*m4/sig2;
577 part7_sig2=part6 /(sig2 ^3)-part7/sig2+part8*m4/sig2;
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586 part8_rho4=part18*m4/(rho4*(sig4 ^2))-part19*rho4 /((1- rho4 ^2)*(sig4 ^2))+part8*rho4
/(1-rho4 ^2);
587
588 part9_sigl=part19*m4/( sig_l*sig4*sig4)+part21 /(sig_l*sig4*sig4)-part9/sig_l -part8*m4
/sig_l;




592 % Hessian Components
593 p02_bb=part1_b /(sig2 ^2)-part2_b /(sig2 ^2)-part3_b*m4;
594 p02_btl=-part2_tl /(sig2 ^2)-part3_tl*m4;
595 p02_bsig2=part1_sig2 /(sig2 ^2)-part2_sig2 /(sig2 ^2)-part3_sig2*m4 -(2* part1 /(sig2 ^3) -2*
part2/(sig2 ^3)-part3*m4/sig2);
596 p02_bsigl=-part2_sigl /(sig2 ^2) -(part3_sigl*m4+part3*m4/sig_l);







604 p02_sig2sig2 =-3*part4/(sig2 ^4)+part5/(sig2 ^2)+3* part6/(sig2 ^4)-part7/(sig2 ^2)+2*
part8*m4/(sig2 ^2)+( part4_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)-part5_sig2/sig2 -part6_sig2 /(sig2 ^3)+
part7_sig2/sig2 -part8_sig2*m4/sig2);
605 p02_sig2sigl=-part6_sigl /(sig2 ^3)+part7_sigl/sig2 -( part8_sigl*m4/sig2+part8*m4/(sig2
*sig_l));
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606 p02_sig2rho4=-part6_rho4 /(sig2 ^3)+part7_rho4/sig2 -( part8_rho4*m4/sig2+part8*sig_l/(
sig2 ^2));
607
608 p02_siglsigl=part8_sigl*rho4/sig2+( part9_sigl/sig_l -part9/(sig_l ^2));
609 p02_siglrho4=part8_rho4*rho4/sig2+part8/sig2+part9_rho4/sig_l;
610













623 g0b=x0 ’*( p0_b./ prob0ode);
624 g0tu=x0 ’*( p0_tu./ prob0ode);
625 g0tl=x0 ’*( p0_tl./ prob0ode);
626 g0sig2=sum(p0_sig2 ./ prob0ode);
627 g0sigu=sum(p0_sigu ./ prob0ode);
628 g0sigl=sum(p0_sigl ./ prob0ode);
629 g0rho1=sum(p0_rho1 ./ prob0ode);









639 znn=zeros(nvar ,nvar);zn1=zeros(nvar ,1);
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640







648 rp0_rho1=-p0_rho1 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi))./dn12;
649 rp0_rho4=-p0_rho4 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi))./dn12;
650 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
651 % h0b series p02_brho4
652 h0bb_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_b;
653 h0bb_part2=x0 ’*(( p01_bb+p02_bb)./dnn);
654 h0bb=h0bb_part1+h0bb_part2;
655
656 h0btu_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_tu;
657 h0btu_part2=x0 ’*( p01_btu ./dnn);
658 h0btu=h0btu_part1+h0btu_part2;
659
660 h0btl_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_tl;
661 h0btl_part2=x0 ’*( p02_btl ./dnn);
662 h0btl=h0btl_part1+h0btl_part2;
663
664 h0bsig2_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_sig2;
665 h0bsig2_part2=x0 ’*(( p01_bsig2+p02_bsig2)./dn1);
666 h0bsig2=h0bsig2_part1+h0bsig2_part2*sig2;
667
668 h0bsigu_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_sigu;
669 h0bsigu_part2=x0 ’*( p01_bsigu ./dn1);
670 h0bsigu=h0bsigu_part1+h0bsigu_part2*sig_u;
671
672 h0bsigl_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_sigl;
673 h0bsigl_part2=x0 ’*( p02_bsigl ./dn1);
674 h0bsigl=h0bsigl_part1+h0bsigl_part2*sig_l;
675
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676 h0brho1_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_rho1;
677 h0brho1_part2=x0 ’*( p01_brho1 ./dn1);
678 h0brho1=h0brho1_part1+h0brho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi));
679
680 h0brho4_part1 =( repmat(p0_b ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_rho4;
681 h0brho4_part2=x0 ’*( p02_brho4 ./dn1);
682 h0brho4=h0brho4_part1+h0brho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi));
683
684 % h0tu series
685 h0tub=h0btu ’;
686
687 h0tutu_part1 =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_tu;
688 h0tutu_part2=x0 ’*( p01_tutu ./dnn);
689 h0tutu=h0tutu_part1+h0tutu_part2;
690
691 h0tutl =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_tl;
692
693 h0tusig2_part1 =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_sig2;
694 h0tusig2_part2=x0 ’*( p01_tusig2 ./dn1);
695 h0tusig2=h0tusig2_part1+h0tusig2_part2*sig2;
696
697 h0tusigu_part1 =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_sigu;
698 h0tusigu_part2=x0 ’*( p01_tusigu ./dn1);
699 h0tusigu=h0tusigu_part1+h0tusigu_part2*sig_u;
700
701 h0tusigl =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_sigl;
702
703 h0turho1_part1 =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_rho1;
704 h0turho1_part2=x0 ’*( p01_turho1 ./dn1);
705 h0turho1=h0turho1_part1+h0turho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi));
706
707 h0turho4 =( repmat(p0_tu ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_rho4;
708
709 % h0tl series
710 h0tlb=h0btl ’;
711
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712 h0tltu=h0tutl ’;
713
714 h0tltl_part1 =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_tl;
715 h0tltl_part2=x0 ’*( p02_tltl ./dnn);
716 h0tltl=h0tltl_part1+h0tltl_part2;
717
718 h0tlsig2_part1 =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_sig2;
719 h0tlsig2_part2=x0 ’*( p02_tlsig2 ./dn1);
720 h0tlsig2=h0tlsig2_part1+h0tlsig2_part2*sig2;
721
722 h0tlsigu =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_sigu;
723
724 h0tlsigl_part1 =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_sigl;
725 h0tlsigl_part2=x0 ’*( p02_tlsigl ./dn1);
726 h0tlsigl=h0tlsigl_part1+h0tlsigl_part2*sig_l;
727
728 h0tlrho1 =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0)’*rp0_rho1;
729
730 h0tlrho4_part1 =( repmat(p0_tl ,1,nvar).*x0) ’*rp0_rho4;
731 h0tlrho4_part2=x0 ’*( p02_tlrho4 ./dn1);
732 h0tlrho4=h0tlrho4_part1+h0tlrho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi));
733







741 h0sig2sig2_part1=p0_sig2 ’* rp0_sig2;
742 h0sig2sig2_part2=sum(( p01_sig2sig2+p02_sig2sig2)./dn1);
743 h0sig2sig2 =( h0sig2sig2_part1+h0sig2sig2_part2*sig2)*sig2+g0sig2*sig2;
744
745 h0sig2sigu_part1=p0_sig2 ’* rp0_sigu;
746 h0sig2sigu_part2=sum(( p01_sig2sigu)./dn1);
747 h0sig2sigu =( h0sig2sigu_part1+h0sig2sigu_part2*sig_u)*sig2;
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748
749 h0sig2sigl_part1=p0_sig2 ’* rp0_sigl;
750 h0sig2sigl_part2=sum(( p02_sig2sigl)./dn1);
751 h0sig2sigl =( h0sig2sigl_part1+h0sig2sigl_part2*sig_l)*sig2;
752
753 h0sig2rho1_part1=p0_sig2 ’* rp0_rho1;
754 h0sig2rho1_part2=sum(( p01_sig2rho1)./dn1);
755 h0sig2rho1 =( h0sig2rho1_part1+h0sig2rho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig2;
756
757 h0sig2rho4_part1=p0_sig2 ’* rp0_rho4;
758 h0sig2rho4_part2=sum(( p02_sig2rho4)./dn1);
759 h0sig2rho4 =( h0sig2rho4_part1+h0sig2rho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig2;
760










771 h0sigusigu_part1=p0_sigu ’* rp0_sigu;
772 h0sigusigu_part2=sum(( p01_sigusigu)./dn1);
773 h0sigusigu =( h0sigusigu_part1+h0sigusigu_part2*sig_u)*sig_u+g0sigu*sig_u;
774
775 h0sigusigl=p0_sigu ’* rp0_sigl*sig_u;
776
777 h0sigurho1_part1=p0_sigu ’* rp0_rho1;
778 h0sigurho1_part2=sum(( p01_sigurho1)./dn1);
779 h0sigurho1 =( h0sigurho1_part1+h0sigurho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig_u;
780
781 h0sigurho4=p0_sigu ’* rp0_rho4*sig_u;
782
783 % h0sigl series












795 h0siglsigl_part1=p0_sigl ’* rp0_sigl;
796 h0siglsigl_part2=sum(( p02_siglsigl)./dn1);
797 h0siglsigl =( h0siglsigl_part1+h0siglsigl_part2*sig_l)*sig_l+g0sigl*sig_l;
798
799 h0siglrho1=p0_sigl ’* rp0_rho1*sig_l;
800
801 h0siglrho4_part1=p0_sigl ’* rp0_rho4;
802 h0siglrho4_part2=sum(( p02_siglrho4)./dn1);
803 h0siglrho4 =( h0siglrho4_part1+h0siglrho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*sig_l;
804














819 h0rho1rho1_part1=p0_rho1 ’* rp0_rho1;
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820 h0rho1rho1_part2=sum(( p01_rho1rho1)./dn1);
821 h0rho1rho1 =( h0rho1rho1_part1+h0rho1rho1_part2 *(exp(-r1^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*(exp(-r1^2)
*2/ sqrt(pi))-g0rho1 *(2*r1*exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi));
822
823 h0rho1rho4=p0_rho1 ’* rp0_rho4 *(exp(-r1^2) *2/ sqrt(pi));
824
















841 h0rho4rho4_part1=p0_rho4 ’* rp0_rho4;
842 h0rho4rho4_part2=sum(( p02_rho4rho4)./dn1);
843 h0rho4rho4 =( h0rho4rho4_part1+h0rho4rho4_part2 *(exp(-r4^2)*2/ sqrt(pi)))*(exp(-r4^2)
*2/ sqrt(pi))-g0rho4 *(2*r4*exp(-r4^2) *2/ sqrt(pi));
844
845 h0=[h0bb ,h0btu ,h0btl ,h0bsig2 ,h0bsigu ,h0bsigl ,h0brho1 ,h0brho4 ;...
846 h0tub ,h0tutu ,h0tutl ,h0tusig2 ,h0tusigu ,h0tusigl ,h0turho1 ,h0turho4 ;...
847 h0tlb ,h0tltu ,h0tltl ,h0tlsig2 ,h0tlsigu ,h0tlsigl ,h0tlrho1 ,h0tlrho4 ;...
848 h0sig2b ,h0sig2tu ,h0sig2tl ,h0sig2sig2 ,h0sig2sigu ,h0sig2sigl ,h0sig2rho1 ,h0sig2rho4
;...
849 h0sigub ,h0sigutu ,h0sigutl ,h0sigusig2 ,h0sigusigu ,h0sigusigl ,h0sigurho1 ,h0sigurho4
;...
850 h0siglb ,h0sigltu ,h0sigltl ,h0siglsig2 ,h0siglsigu ,h0siglsigl ,h0siglrho1 ,h0siglrho4
;...
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851 h0rho1b ,h0rho1tu ,h0rho1tl ,h0rho1sig2 ,h0rho1sigu ,h0rho1sigl ,h0rho1rho1 ,h0rho1rho4
;...















865 hbb=h1bb+h2bb+h4bb;hbsig2=h1bsig2+h2bsig2+h4bsig2;hsig2b=hbsig2 ’; hsig2sig2=
h1sig2sig2+h2sig2sig2+h4sig2sig2;
866 znn=zeros(nvar ,nvar);zn1=zeros(nvar ,1);z1n=zeros(1,nvar);
867 h124=[hbb ,h1btu ,h4btl ,hbsig2 ,h1bsigu ,h4bsigl ,h1brho1 ,h4brho4;h1tub ,h1tutu ,znn ,
h1tusig2 ,h1tusigu ,zn1 ,h1turho1 ,zn1;h4tlb ,znn ,h4tltl ,h4tlsig2 ,zn1 ,h4tlsigl ,zn1 ,
h4tlrho4;hsig2b ,h1sig2tu ,h4sig2tl ,hsig2sig2 ,h1sig2sigu ,h4sig2sigl ,h1sig2rho1 ,
h4sig2rho4;h1sigub ,h1sigutu ,z1n ,h1sigusig2 ,h1sigusigu ,0,h1sigurho1 ,0; h4siglb ,z1n ,
h4sigltl ,h4siglsig2 ,0,h4siglsigl ,0, h4siglrho4;h1rho1b ,h1rho1tu ,z1n ,h1rho1sig2 ,
h1rho1sigu ,0,h1rho1rho1 ,0; h4rho4b ,z1n ,h4rho4tl ,h4rho4sig2 ,0,h4rho4sigl ,0,
h4rho4rho4 ];
868 h=-(h0+h124);




Corporate Credit Ratings when
Ratings are Sticky
3.1 Introduction
Credit rating, as a crucial indicator of firms’ risk level, assists investors in decision
making, and even becomes the standard for the national capital assessment after
the NewBasel Accord in 1999. The credit rating in the US market has deteriorated
in the past few decades. More precisely, rating downgrades have dominated the
migration trend in these decades, which is supported by empirical evidence. For
instance, studies reveal that rating migrations tend to move in the same direction,
and the consecutive downgrades are more highly-correlated (Altman & Kao 1992,
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Lando & Skødeberg 2002, Du 2003).1 In other words, rating downgrades become the
dominating trend in both frequency and persistence. Unsurprisingly, the observed
rating levels demonstrate downward momentum, and the average rating dropped by
three notches between 1985 and 2009 Baghai et al. (2014).
The phenomenon of rating deterioration has led to debate whether it is a result
of a decreasing credit quality or the tightening of rating standard (Blume et al. 1998,
Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013). A rating event involves two main participants, which are
firms to be evaluated and rating agencies. Hence, possible causes of the deterioration
may come from either of the two sides, which are the quality of the borrower and
the stringency of rating standard. Studies, such as Blume et al. (1998), Jorion et al.
(2009), and Alp (2013), focus on the cause of deterioration by matching ratings to
firm characteristics. They use empirical models attempting to control for all relevant
covariates and leave the effect of the (time-varying) rating standards to year dummies.
Their general conclusion is that the continuous tightening of rating standards indeed
contributes to the observed rating deterioration. While offering valuable insights, this
line of research cannot put a definitive end to the debate, since it does not address
the question of the evolution of the quality of firms’ borrowing.
This chapter attempts to fill the void in the literature by focusing on the mech-
anism of rating migrations. The migrations are informative because they consider the
most recent updates of rating agencies, and hence involve the trigger and motivation
of agencies’ decisions. To directly assess the interaction between credit quality and
varying standards, it is necessary to filter out the effect of each component. This
1Rating downgrades tend to be followed by downgrades, and upgrades tend to be followed by
further upgrades.
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cannot be done without reflecting in the empirical design the mechanism of how rat-
ings are assigned and updated. The empirical work in rating area, largely agrees on
two attributes of credit rating, namely, the high stability and the slow respondance.
Empirical results suggest that ratings demonstrate considerably higher stability com-
pared with credit quality in current economic conditions (Kealhofer et al. 1998, Carey
& Hrycay 2001, Lo¨ﬄer 2004). In other words, it is not unusual that the credit quality
changes but the ratings do not. Moreover, credit ratings are also characterized by
their slow respondence. For example, during the Asian crisis in 1997, rating agencies
made no downgrades in 1996 and even the first half year of 1997. Designed as a
forward-looking indicator, the slow reaction of credit rating events investors’ trust.
These two features imply that the credit ratings are sticky.
This research proposes a stickiness-based model of rating process, and explores
the impact of stickiness on rating migrations.2 Differing from existing empirical
studies (Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013), the model has embedded
stickiness in the empirical design and the estimation. The basic assumption in current
empirical research is that firms’ credit quality matches its rating. More precisely,
rating agencies apply immediate rating update to eliminate any deviations outside
of its current rating, resulting in ratings being accurate at all times. However, this
research challenges the assumption of accurate and contemporaneous rating. We
argue that credit ratings demonstrate the high-stability and the slow-respondance
features, which makes credit rating a lagged indicator of credit quality. In other words,
these features of credit rating introduce some tolerance for deviations of credit quality
2Here, we define stickiness as the deviation of credit quality from the nominal range of its rating.
Suppose the nominal Z-score range of rating AA is 5 to 10. The stickiness refers to the situation
when credit quality moves to 4 or 11 but the rating still remains of AA.
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outside of the ratings’ nominal range in the same way in which lump sum cost affect
optimal control policies. The tolerance may be small, but it represents a different
mechanism of rating process and leads to a specific definition of stickiness. More
precisely, the immediate migration assumed in most other studies interprets credit
rating as a continuous spectrum with a single boundary between each two adjacent
categories. However, the stickiness-based model presented here assumes that adjacent
rating categories overlap to a certain extent, similar to the hysteresis effect.3 The
overlapping area belongs to both categories, and hence it reflects the credit quality
entering next rating range but the deviation not being sufficient to invoke rating
migration, which is our definition of stickiness. Compared to the traditional view
(which implies zero lump sum cost of rating adjustment), our model allows for two
boundaries between adjacent rating categories to overlap. Entering the overlapping
area solely cannot invoke rating changes, and rating migration will be triggered only
when the deviation is large enough.
Our first aim is to empirically demonstrate the existence of stickiness in credit
ratings, which is the theoretical basis of the mechanism this chapter proposes. This
demonstration is important for a number of reasons. First, the proposed mechanism
must fit the observed phenomenon in market, which is the high stability and slow
respondence. Second, whether or not stickiness exists determines whether it is ap-
propriate to use the standard estimation models such as linear regression and ordered
logit. Earlier empirical studies also question the reliability of credit rating as a con-
temporaneous measure of credit quality (Altman 1998, Becker & Milbourn 2008, Hull
3For example, suppose ratings A and B are next to each other. Traditional view assumes their
nominal Z-score ranges are 10 to 6, and 5 to 1, respectively. However, our model under the stickiness
framework assumes the ranges of ratings A and B are 10 to 5 and 6 to 1, respectively.
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et al. 2004, Norden & Weber 2004), and hence the existence of stickiness deserves
more careful studying. Our findings strongly support the presence of rating stickiness
by showing that the introduction of stickiness in the estimation absorbs the decreasing
trend of yearly intercept, and that the terms of explanatory variables interacting with
migration dummies are statistically significant. Further, we decompose the stickiness
into the t-dimensional one and the z-dimensional one. The t-dimensional stickiness
measures agencies’ delay in implementing rating migrations. In other words, the
length of period between credit quality moving outside of the nominal range and the
migration. In comparison, the z-dimensional stickiness measures agencies’ tolerance
of the deviation of credit quality from the target range of its rating. We find that the
z-stickiness dominates and explains most of the effect.
Our results directly address the debate about the interaction of credit quality
deterioration and rating standards. The stickiness-based framework allows to isolate
the effect of rating standards, and such a filtering reveals the variation of credit quality
during our sample period. Although the observed rating levels deteriorate during 1985
to 2015, the credit quality actually improves with an increment of 0.573 measured in
Z-score. Moreover, our findings confirm the contribution of more stringent standards
to the deterioration, in line with other studies (Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009,
Alp 2013). However, the unique feature of our model is that it reveals the asymmetry
between upgrade and downgrade decisions. More precisely, the rating standards for
upgrades strengthens, but the the standard for downgrades does not exhibit a clear
trend in how stringent it is. Further tests confirm the asymmetry. The frequency and
magnitude of upgrades drop dramatically, but this is not the case for downgrades.
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This asymmetry further leads to the observed deterioration from the perspective of
stickiness-based mechanism.
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature that investigates determi-
nants of credit ratings (Horrigan 1966, Pogue & Soldofsky 1969, Kamstra et al. 2001).
Although rating agencies are thought to apply complex and proprietary approaches
(such as grid method) to assign ratings, academic interest in estimating determinants
of ratings and to establish the link between ratings and firm characteristics is high.4
This chapter introduces stickiness and hence provides a different perspective on the
understanding of the rating process. The comparison between our results and those in
the existing literature can further demonstrate the effect of stickiness. For instance,
the existing literature documents a decreasing trend in year intercepts to support the
tightening rating standard argument. When we control in estimation for stickiness,
this decreasing trend disappears. Moreover, different from static methods applied in
earlier studies, we have adjusted the ordered probit model to fit the stickiness fea-
ture and to incorporate the dynamic aspect of the rating mechanism. This adjusted
model nests the ordered probit, and it can empirically detect the existence of stick-
iness. Further tests in Appendix 3.6 provide further support that results estimated
by the adjusted model converge to that by the standard ordered probit when the
stickiness goes to zero.
Section 3.2 summarizes existing literature to provide the background. Section
3.3 explains the model and the estimation. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section
4Moody’s (2018) illustrates the application of grid method in rating assignment. They firstly
identify grid factors, which are dimensions agencies consider to evaluate credit quality (e.g. finan-
cial policy, leverage and coverage), and estimate a quality score for each factor. Then, calculate
the weighted average value, denoted by x, as the indicator of the overall credit quality. Finally,
transforms the numeric quality score x into ratings (e.g. assign Aaa if x < 1.5).
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3.5 presents main findings, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Empirical work has provided plenty of evidence on high stability of credit ratings
(Kealhofer et al. 1998, Carey & Hrycay 2001, Lo¨ﬄer 2004). Usually, the stability
reflects in the situation that rating updates fall behind variation of credit quality,
and hence detrimentally affect the accuracy of ratings. Ellis (1997), using survey data
of 200 CFOs and 400 institutional fixed income investors, reports that 70% of the
interviewees believe that ratings should improve to reflect recent positive changes in
credit quality. Kealhofer et al. (1998) create a rating of current credit quality based
on default probability suggested by Merton (1974). Compared with this current-
condition rating, the agency rating demonstrates a much higher probability of staying
in the same rating category (around 90%). Carey & Hrycay (2001) allocate issuers
into rating categories following banks’ internal rating methodology. This rating grade
reflects borrowers point-in-time credit quality as this method fulfills the frequent
information update needed for banks’ monitoring and risk-control purposes. This
current-condition rating indicates that 40%-50% observations remain unchanged over
one-year horizon, while the remaining rate in agency rating is 80%-90%, indicating
that agency ratings are twice more stable than current-condition ratings.
The high stability of credit ratings has created tolerance for the deviation of
actual quality from the nominal rating range, and empirical evidence demonstrates
the correlation between the magnitude of this deviation and the probability of rating
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migrations (Altman & Rijken 2004, Mora 2006, Posch 2011). These empirical results
show that rating migrations are triggered when the borrowers’ actual credit quality
exceeds the nominal quality of their current ratings by 1.25 notches. Mora (2006)
provides more direct evidence about the rating drifts mechanism, and states that
rating changes when the divergence between actual quality and assigned ratings is
sufficiently large. Posch (2011) further measures the amount of tolerance (inertia) by
extending the model with frictions to allow for non-constant thresholds, and shows
that default probability has to change by at least two notches before rating agencies
react.5
The stickiness proposed in this research also receives theoretical support from
the structure of agency rating market. Cheng & Neamtiu (2009) emphasize the lack
of timeliness and increasing regulatory pressure in agency ratings, which implies that
the accuracy of the ratings deserves more careful investigation. There is evidence
from existing literature explaining the origins of stickiness. In general, agencies have
incentives to make credit rating sticky considering their profitability and reputation.
Lo¨ﬄer (2005) documents that agencies attempt to avoid rating reversal after a mi-
gration, which contributes to the stability which causes stickiness.6 Moreover, Jeon
& Lovo (2013) introduce the ’reputation build-up’ which suggests that frequent rat-
ing adjustments harm the profitability of the agencies by weakening their reputation
to potential issuers. More precisely, Bolton et al. (2012) elaborate on the ”rating
5Default probability is the indicator of credit quality in Posch (2011), and it is the basis of rating
assignment. For example, if the default probability p is within the first notch (0 < p 6 10%), this
observation will be assigned the best rating AAA.
6It is worth to clarify that stability does not equal to stickiness. Stability refers to the observed
fact that rating does not change. This feature causes the phenomenon that rating tends to stay even
when credit quality has changed. Stickiness refers to this phenomenon that rating does not change
when it should.
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shopping” phenomenon according to which agencies attract business by enhancing
the stability as issuers can shop in the market for the best ratings they can get. The
issuer-paid pattern indeed results in extra cautiousness for agencies to update ratings
which is detrimental to rating accuracy (Xia 2014). Xia (2014) find that introduc-
ing investor-paid rating agencies (e.g. Egan-Jones Rating Company) improves the
accuracy and timeliness over the traditional issuer-paid ratings (e.g. S&P’s rating).
A number of studies investigates the changes in rating standards (Blume et al.
1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013, Baghai et al. 2014). Blume et al. (1998) is one of the
the early studies that attempts to explain the reported declining credit quality using
accounting ratios and market information. Their study finds that the credit rating
deterioration is not fully explained by changes in credit quality, and that it is caused
at least partly by the increasingly stringent standard. In other words, rating agencies
become more and more conservative in issuing higher ratings. Alp (2013) quantifies
this effect, showing that tightened standard leads to 1.5 notches drop in ratings from
2002 to 2007. Baghai et al. (2014) find the drop to be 3 notches from 1985 to 2009.
Alp (2013) also finds that the the tightening standards pattern applies to investment
grade bonds but the speculative grade bonds reflect loosening standards. This is
consistent with Jorion et al. (2009) who study the origins of the standards tightening.
This study finds that the accounting quality affects the rating standard tightening
for the investment grade issuers. After incorporating changes in accounting quality,
the tightening pattern in rating standards disappears. Baghai et al. (2014) study
the impact of tightening rating standards on firms’ behavior, and show that firms
affected more by the tightening standards (measured by the difference between the
actual rating and the predicted rating assuming constant standards) issue less debt,
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hold more cash, experience lower growth, and are less likely to access debt market.
These studies rely on the ordered probit model, and this static model is subject to the
criticism of neglecting ratings’ time-varying nature and the effect of omitted variables
(Blume et al. 1998, Shumway 2001, Du 2003). Shumway (2001) criticizes the static
model for the timeliness bias. Most of the models use rolling-average covariates,
which fail to reflect the true level corresponding to the observed rating if there is
rating migration just after an observation. Therefore, it is essential to integrate the
dynamics of the rating mechanism to explain this phenomenon. This study considers
the mechanism by isolating observations whose credit quality moves outside of the
ratings’ nominal range. This isolation leads to three categories (exceeding the upper
threshold, exceeding the lower threshold, and normal ”inaction” observations), for
which the likelihood function is separately formulated.
3.3 The Model
Rating agencies are careful in choosing the migration frequency since immediate up-
dates harm reputation (Jeon & Lovo 2013), while no updates lead to the criticism
from investors (Ellis 1997). The optimal policy for agencies is to wait until the credit
quality gap from nominal range becomes sufficiently large, and then implement up-
dates to eliminate the gap. This reaction pattern leads to stickiness in credit ratings.
The stickiness-based model proposed here differs from the common approach in the
literature on rating mechanism mainly in two aspects. Typically, researchers interpret
rating categories as a spectrum of credit quality. In simple words, single boundary
separates two adjacent rating categories. However, our model absorbs more dynamics
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Figure 3.1: Credit Rating Mechanism
The mechanism of rating migrations under stickiness framework. This ex-
ample contains 100 observations from one firm within consecutive 100 pe-
riod. The vertical axis indicates credit quality of the firm, and the horizon-
tal axis represents period. There are three rating categories, A, B, and C,
in which A indicates the best credit quality and C indicates the worst. The
nominal quality range of rating A is the area from line A2 and above; the
quality range for rating B is the area between lines B1 and B2; and the
range for rating C is the area below line C1. The green line presents the
path of the firm’s credit quality movements, and demonstrates the mecha-
nism of rating migration. A migration is triggered by credit quality crossing
the boundaries of its nominal range. For instance, dots q2, q3, and q4 de-
pict the process of a downgrade migration. When credit quality drops from
q2 to q3, it moves outside of rating B’s range and this magnitude of devi-
ation exceeds agency’s tolerance. A downgrade decision is made at q3 but
implemented at q4 to fit the slow-respondance feature. Inversely, dots q9,
q10, and q11 describe a rating upgrade process. Credit quality crosses B1,
the upper boundary of rating B, to q10, and the rating upgrade is observed
next period at q11.
for the agency, by allowing for an overlap between two neighboring ratings. The
overlapping area reflects agencies’ tolerance of credit quality deviation, and hence
represents the stickiness. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the mechanism of rating migrations
under the stickiness framework. There are three rating categories, namely A, B, and
C, in which A indicates the best credit quality and C indicates the worst. The
nominal quality range of rating A is the area from line A2 and above; the quality
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range for rating B is the area between lines B1 and B2; and the range for rating C is
the area below line C1. The area between lines B1 and A2 is the overlapping range
of ratings A and B. It reflects the stickiness by allowing credit quality deviation from
either upper (rating A) or lower (rating B) position without invoking migrations.
Secondly, the standard approach simply assumes a perfect match between credit
quality and ratings. More precisely, the location of credit quality itself determines
its rating. Under this concept, agencies has no freedom but to immediately close any
deviation in credit quality by updating. However, this setting contradicts with the
stability and slow respondence features of credit ratings. Our model deals with this
challenge by forming a rating migration mechanism which is determined by both its
current rating and the deviation outside this range. Migrations are invoked by credit
quality hitting either upper or lower boundary, but differing from the traditional
view, the upper threshold of rating B is not necessary the lower threshold of rating
A (suppose ratings A and B are adjacent, and A indicates better quality). As in
Figure 3.1, the green line presents the path of the firm’s credit quality movements,
and demonstrates the mechanism of rating migrations. A migration is triggered by
credit quality crossing the boundaries of its nominal range. For instance, points q2,
q3, and q4 indicate different credit quality levels, depicting the process of a downgrade
migration. Credit quality enters the range of rating C at q1, but this movement will
not cause downgrade since it has not touched the lower threshold of rating B (the line
B2). When credit quality drops from q2 to q3, it moves outside of rating B’s range
and this magnitude of deviation exceeds agency’s tolerance. A downgrade decision
is made at q3 but implemented at q4 to fit the slow-respondance feature. Inversely,
points q9, q10, and q11 describe a rating upgrade process. Credit quality crosses B1,
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the upper boundary of rating B, to q10, and the rating upgrade is observed next
period at q11.
In general, our model includes three groups of observations, namely those ex-
ceeding the upper threshold, the lower threshold, and the observations which have
their ratings correctly matched with credit quality. The estimation of this model
accordingly requires an accurate identification for data in each of the three groups.
Our identification methodology concentrates on rating migrations. Rating upgrade
(downgrade) is triggered by credit quality breaching the upper (lower) threshold of
its previous rating range. Hence, the observation before an upgrade (downgrade) is
informative for the upper (lower) threshold. For example, there is an upgrade in
Figure 3.1 depicted by points q9, q10, and q11. The upgrade happens at q11, which
suggests that the credit quality at q10 exceeds the upper threshold (i.e. Zq10 > B1).7
Hence, observation q10 falls into the group of upper threshold. Similarly, q3 can be
an example of lower threshold identification through downgrade (i.e Zq10 6 B2).
Further, we use the Z-score to represent the credit quality (Zit)
Zit = βXit + εit, (3.1)
in which β is the coefficient set, matrix Xit contains firm characteristics as covariates,
and εit represents the normally-distributed error term. The Z-score serves as a linking
function which transforms firm characteristics to ratings through categorization. Our
data contains five rating levels with rating 5 the best quality and rating 1 the worst.8
7The upgrade action happens one period behind the breach because of the time agencies need to
collect and interpret information. This setting fits the slow-respondance feature of credit rating.
8Details are given in Section 3.4.
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R∗it in equation (3.2) represents observations that are not thresholds. In other words,
the credit quality and rating levels are correctly matched for these observations.
Each rating level Ri is quantified by the nominal Z-score range with upper and lower




5 if Zit ∈ [L5,∞)
4 if Zit ∈ [L4, U4]
3 if Zit ∈ [L3, U3]
2 if Zit ∈ [L2, U2]
1 if Zit ∈ (−∞, U1]
(3.2)
the credit quality, denoted by Zit is within the nominal range for each rating level.




4 if Zit > U4
3 if Zit > U3
2 if Zit > U2
1 if Zit > U1
(3.3)
9Obviously, rating level 5 indicates the best quality and hence no further upgrade available. Its
upper threshold is infinity. On the other hand, the worst rating level 1 has minus infinity as the
lower threshold.
10The same assumption refers to the accurate match between rating and quality.
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Ruit in equation (3.3) is the rating level of an observation in upper threshold
group. As stated before, credit quality and ratings are not matched in this group
because quality exceeds upper threshold (Zit > URit) and is the trigger of upgrade.
Rlit =

5 if Zit 6 L5
4 if Zit 6 L4
3 if Zit 6 L3
2 if Zit 6 L2
(3.4)
Lastly, Rlit in equation set (3.4) means the rating for lower threshold observa-
tions, and the trigger of downgrade requires Zit 6 LRit . We estimate the three parts
jointly through the Maximum Likelihood method.
3.4 Data
Our sample contains 1,488 US firms from 1985 to 2014, which leads to 20,557 obser-
vations overall. The S&P ratings have been obtained from the Compustat Ratings
File. This sample excludes observations with negative or zero total assets, finan-
cial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), and quasi-governmental enterprises (SIC 9000 and
above). Missing explanatory values reduce the sample to 20,557 firm-year observa-
tions from 1,488 unique firms for the full sample analysis. We merged ratings based
on the original S&P categories: our rating A includes S&P ratings from AAA to AA;
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Table 3.1: Number of Companies by Year and S&P Rating Category
Year A B C D E Total A B C D E
1985 75 164 142 154 159 694 10.8% 23.6% 20.5% 22.2% 22.9%
1986 73 154 159 194 247 827 8.8% 18.6% 19.2% 23.5% 29.9%
1987 69 137 170 230 284 890 7.8% 15.4% 19.1% 25.8% 31.9%
1988 66 135 170 200 242 813 8.1% 16.6% 20.9% 24.6% 29.8%
1989 62 135 173 187 208 765 8.1% 17.6% 22.6% 24.4% 27.2%
1990 57 137 164 177 154 689 8.3% 19.9% 23.8% 25.7% 22.4%
1991 58 149 165 161 116 649 8.9% 23.0% 25.4% 24.8% 17.9%
1992 52 152 182 196 121 703 7.4% 21.6% 25.9% 27.9% 17.2%
1993 50 159 190 222 123 744 6.7% 21.4% 25.5% 29.8% 16.5%
1994 43 146 191 230 113 723 5.9% 20.2% 26.4% 31.8% 15.6%
1995 41 158 182 216 113 710 5.8% 22.3% 25.6% 30.4% 15.9%
1996 41 152 194 234 115 736 5.6% 20.7% 26.4% 31.8% 15.6%
1997 41 147 221 238 103 750 5.5% 19.6% 29.5% 31.7% 13.7%
1998 34 160 224 265 110 793 4.3% 20.2% 28.2% 33.4% 13.9%
1999 29 143 222 260 94 748 3.9% 19.1% 29.7% 34.8% 12.6%
2000 25 130 214 233 107 709 3.5% 18.3% 30.2% 32.9% 15.1%
2001 20 119 207 235 104 685 2.9% 17.4% 30.2% 34.3% 15.2%
2002 24 113 211 256 98 702 3.4% 16.1% 30.1% 36.5% 14.0%
2003 21 108 217 253 92 691 3.0% 15.6% 31.4% 36.6% 13.3%
2004 21 101 217 259 103 701 3.0% 14.4% 31.0% 36.9% 14.7%
2005 25 94 229 231 99 678 3.7% 13.9% 33.8% 34.1% 14.6%
2006 25 89 217 239 92 662 3.8% 13.4% 32.8% 36.1% 13.9%
2007 25 90 183 226 98 622 4.0% 14.5% 29.4% 36.3% 15.8%
2008 20 87 183 204 112 606 3.3% 14.4% 30.2% 33.7% 18.5%
2009 19 82 179 186 113 579 3.3% 14.2% 30.9% 32.1% 19.5%
2010 17 77 185 183 96 558 3.0% 13.8% 33.2% 32.8% 17.2%
2011 16 74 187 192 82 551 2.9% 13.4% 33.9% 34.8% 14.9%
2012 16 70 197 177 85 545 2.9% 12.8% 36.1% 32.5% 15.6%
2013 17 73 198 165 70 523 3.3% 14.0% 37.9% 31.5% 13.4%
2014 17 73 200 155 66 511 3.3% 14.3% 39.1% 30.3% 12.9%
Total 1099 3608 5773 6358 3719 20557 5.3% 17.6% 28.1% 30.9% 18.1%
The distribution of ratings for our sample firms over time. The sample contains 1,488
firms from 1985 to 2014, with 20,557 observations overall. The ratings have been ob-
tained from the Compustat Ratings File. We merged ratings based on the original S&P
categories: A includes S&P ratings from AAA to AA; rating B includes S&P ratings
from AA− to A; rating C includes S&P ratings from A− to BBB; rating D includes
S&P ratings from BBB− to BB−; and rating E includes S&P ratings CCC+ and
below.
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Table 3.2: Number of Cutoff Identified by Rating Category
Upper Middle Lower Total
A 0 1001 98 1099
B 23 3272 313 3608
C 159 5207 407 5773
D 329 5632 397 6358
E 338 3381 0 3719
Total 849 18493 1215 20557
Cutoff observations identified for the Adjusted Ordered Probit estimation. Our iden-
tification relies on the observed rating migration. More precise, suppose for a firm in
two consecutive years t and t + 1, if there is an upgrade happens in year t + 1 (eg.
Ratingt = C and Ratingt+1 = B), the credit quality in t is regarded as exceeding the
upper cutoff of its original rating, and hence observation in t is upper cutoff observation.
Inversely, we identify lower cutoff observation based on downgrade. The observations
not related to any rating migration are defined as middle category observations.
our rating B includes S&P ratings from AA− to A; our rating C includes S&P
ratings from A− to BBB; our rating D includes S&P ratings from BBB− to BB−;
and our rating D includes S&P ratings CCC+ and below.11 Therefore, this sample
includes the full spectrum of S&P rating categories with our ratings from A to C
corresponds to the investment grade, and the remaining being the speculative grade.
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of ratings in the sample. We identify 849 and 1,215
observations to form the upper threshold and lower threshold groups, respectively.
Table 3.2 provides details about the threshold categories.
The selection of explanatory variables follows existing literature (Blume et al.
1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013). Intcov measures interest coverage calculated by
ebitda divided by interest expense (ebitda/xint). Variables k1 to k4 indicate different
11Our merging strategy differs from that in other studies (Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009,
Alp 2013, Baghai et al. 2014) in terms of the width of each category and the coverage of ratings.
Our categorization strategy identifies upper and lower thresholds based on rating migrations. We
merge credit ratings to ensure that there are sufficient number of rating migrations for each category
in each year.
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levels of Intcov. We do this to capture the non-linearity of interest coverage effect
of credit rating, following Blume et al. (1998). k1 indicates Intcov range from 0 to
5 (e.g. an observation with Intcov = 3 will have k1 = 3, k2 = 0, k3 = 0, k4 = 0).
k2 indicates Intcov range from 5 to 10 (e.g. an observation with Intcov = 7 will
have k1 = 5, k2 = 2, k3 = 0, k4 = 0). k3 indicates a range from 10 to 20, and k4
indicates Intcov above 20. V ol is the volatility of profit, calculated as the standard
deviation of the last 5 years of ebitda/sale. T lev refers to total leverage measured by
total debt divided by total asset (dlc+dltt
at
). Rent is the rent expense divided by total
asset (xrent/at). Tan refers tangibility, measured by property, plant and equipment
divided by total asset (ppe/at). Dni is a dummy variable which equals to one when net
income is negative. Ddiv is a dummy variable which equals to one when a firm pays
dividend in a given period. Rd is the research and development expense divided by
total asset (xrd/at). Rd is set to zero when the expense is missing. Mtb is the market
to book ratio measured by total asset minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity and then divided by book value of assets ((at− bv +mv)/at). The market
value of equity is the product of year-end price and number of shares outstanding
(prccf ∗ csho). Book value of equity is shareholders’ equity minus preferred stock
liquidating value plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (seq−pstkl+ txditc).
The deferred tax credit txditc is set to zero if missing. Equity (seq) will be replaced
by either common equity plus preferred stock at par value (ceq+ pstk) or total asset
minus total liability (at− lt) if missing. Preferred stock liquidating value prstkl will
be replaced by either redemption value pstkrv or par value pstk if missing. Firm size
(Size) is the logarithm of total asset. Beta and Rmse measure systematic risk and
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. 10th 90th
Intcov 9.848 5.350 15.221 1.536 19.548
k1 4.044 5.000 1.356 1.801 5.000
k2 1.896 0.544 2.172 0.000 5.000
k3 1.615 0.000 3.326 0.000 10.000
k4 2.491 0.000 10.667 0.000 0.628
Vol 0.035 0.020 0.050 0.006 0.071
Tlev 0.333 0.312 0.180 0.129 0.560
Rent 0.023 0.013 0.031 0.003 0.052
Tan 0.389 0.344 0.236 0.104 0.743
Dni 0.196 0.000 0.397 0.000 1.000
Ddiv 0.671 1.000 0.470 0.000 1.000
Rd 0.016 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.053
Mtb 1.496 1.275 0.682 0.933 2.346
Size 7.942 7.904 1.614 5.848 10.101
Beta 0.952 0.958 2.012 0.231 1.943
Rmse 0.068 0.020 0.167 0.010 0.083
Descriptive statistics of covariates for the whole sample. All continuous variables win-
sorized at top and bottom 1 percentile. Intcov measures interest coverage calculated by
ebitda divided by interest expense (ebitda/xint). k1 measures the Intcov range from 0
to 5 (e.g. an observation with Intcov = 3 will have k1 = 3, k2 = 0, k3 = 0, k4 = 0).
k2 measures the range from 5 to 10 (e.g. an observation with Intcov = 7 will have
k1 = 5, k2 = 2, k3 = 0, k4 = 0). k3 measures the range from 10 to 20, and k4 mea-
sures the range above 20. V ol is the volatility of current and past four year profits
(ebitda/sale). T levis leverage measured by debt divided by total asset (dlc+dlttat ). Rent
is the rent expense divided by total asset (xrent/at). Tan refers tangibility, measured
by property, plant and equipment divided by total asset (ppe/at). Dni is the dummy
variable which equals one when net income is negative. Ddiv is the dummy variable
which equals one when firms pay dividend. Rd is research and development expense
divided by total asset (xrd/at). Rd is set to zero when the expense is missing. Mtb is
the market to book ratio measured by total asset minus book equity plus market equity
and then divided by book assets ((at− bv+mv)/at). The market value of equity is the
product of year-end price and number of shares outstanding (prccf ∗ csho).12 Equity
seq will be replaced by either common equity plus preferred stock par value (ceq+pstk)
or total asset minus total liability (at− lt) if missing. Preferred stock liquidating value
prstkl will be replaced by either redemption value pstkrv or par value pstk if missing.
Firm size Size is the logarithm of total asset. Beta and Rmse measure Systematic Risk
and Idiosyncratic Risk, respectively. They are estimated in market model regressions of
a firms daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index return. The regressions
are adjusted for nonsynchronous trading effects using the Dimson (1979) procedure with
12Book equity is shareholders’ equity on balance sheet minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes
and investment tax credit (seq − pstkl + txditc). The deferred tax credit txditc is set to zero if
missing.
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one leading and one lagging value of the market return. One firm-year observations of
Beta and Rmse are computed from one regression using firm-specific daily stock returns
from one calendar year.
idiosyncratic risk, respectively.13 They are estimated in market model regressions of
a firms daily stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index return. The regressions
are adjusted for nonsynchronous trading effects using the Dimson (1979) procedure
with one leading and one lagging value of the market return. One firm-year observa-
tions of Beta and Rmse are computed from one regression using firm-specific daily
stock returns from one calendar year. All continuous variables are winsorized at top
and bottom 1 percentile. Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics of these variables.
3.5 Empirical Results
This section presents the chapter’s main findings. Firstly, we test the existence of
stickiness and explore its effect on credit ratings. Subsequently, empirical results show
that credit quality actually improves though the rating levels deteriorate. Lastly,
we document the asymmetry in rating standard stringency, which contributes to
explaining the rating deterioration phenomenon.
3.5.1 Stickiness Effect
This section presents the estimation of both ordered probit and adjusted ordered
probit models given in equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4). A comparison of the results
13Beta is the coefficient in the market model estimation, and Rmse is the standard error.
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of the two models demonstrates the difference in coefficients with and without con-
sidering stickiness, and hence explores the effect of stickiness. Table 3.4 presents the
main estimation. The ordered probit regression neglects stickiness, as in Models 1
and 5, and provides the basis of comparison in the analysis. Our adjusted ordered
probit regression, as in Models 2 and 6, considers both time-series (t) and credit
quality tolerance (z) stickiness. Moreover, we use lagged ratings as dependent vari-
able in the ordered probit regression, as in Models 3 and 7, to separate the effect
of t-stickiness. We measure the z-stickiness by adjusted ordered probit model with
the new categorizing assumption of immediate rating adjustment, as in Models 4 and
8. The Fama-MacBeth models takes the decades average (85-94, 95-04, and 05-14)
of coefficients for adjusted ordered regressions controlling for all stickiness based on
every two years of data. Values in parentheses present the standard error for each
estimation. Standard errors for adjusted ordered models are calculated using boot-
strapping method, and those for Fama-MacBeth models use Delta method. Panel
A presents estimation for explanatory variables, Panel B provides the estimation of
cut-offs, and Panel C lists year dummy intercepts.
Model 1 in Table 3.4 summarizes the estimation of ordered probit, which at-
tempts to replicate the findings in existing literature without considering stickiness.
The estimated effects of covariates are consistent with prior studies (Blume et al.
1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013) and our expectations. Consistent with Blume
et al. (1998), firms with better ability to pay back borrowings receive higher ratings
as indicated by the positive signs of Intcov, Tan, Ddiv, and Size. Interest coverage
is a direct measure of the ability to bear credit, and tangible assets can be used as
collateral to reduce debt holders’ risk. Paying dividends indicates healthy financial
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condition and considerable profitability. Moreover, potential growth opportunities
also improve credit ratings consistent with Alp (2013). (The letter is captured by the
positive coefficients of Mtb and Rd.) Lastly, risk factors lead to a more conservative
assessment from the rating agencies. Cash flow uncertainty, denoted by V ol, and
systematic risk level, represented by Beta significantly reduce firms’ credit quality
and drive down the ratings. Credit risk measured by total leverage T lev demonstrates
a similar effect.
Model 2 in Table 3.4 introduces stickiness by estimating the adjusted ordered
probit model described by equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4). As explained previously,
this estimation controls stickiness from both time-series (t) and tolerance of credit
quality deviation (z). The introduction of stickiness does not change the coefficients
in large magnitude compared to Model 1. Further, we decompose the stickiness
into the t-dimensional and z-dimensional ones in Models 3 and 4, respectively. The
t-dimensional stickiness assumes zero tolerance of agencies regarding credit quality
deviation from its nominal range of the ratings, but assumes action a delay in taking
by one period. In other words, current ratings match lagged firm features, and ordered
probit model is appropriate with all covariates lagged by one period as in Model 3.
Model 4 measures the z-dimensional stickiness which assumes agencies allow some
deviation in credit quality but react immediately when the deviation exceeds the
tolerance.14 The coefficients of control variables in Model 3 and Model 4 do not
deviate from that in the full stickiness results in Model 2.
14For example, in the downgrade situation depicted by points q2, q3, and q4 in Figure 3.1, credit
quality breaches the threshold at q3. The z-dimensional stickiness assumes rating changes at q3 to
reflect the immediate reaction. In comparison, the full stickiness assumes rating updates happens
at q4 to reflect the slow-respondance.
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Moreover, Blume et al. (1998) expressed concerns about a non-linear relation-
ship between interest coverage and ratings. Following their method, we decompose
the Intcov into four components according to its magnitude as discussed in Sub-
section 3.4. We replicate Models 1 to 4 with Intcov replaced by the components,
and Models 5 to 8 summarize this replication. This decomposition reveals that the
correlation between components of interest coverage and ratings weakens along the
magnitude of interest coverage. As in Model 5, one unit of increment in the low range
of interest coverage, the k1, brings 0.306 extra credit quality measured by Z-score,
but this effect shrinks to 0.003 as the range shifts to k4.15 A similar effect also appears
in other studies (Blume et al. 1998, Alp 2013).
The key novel evidence from adjusted ordered probit model is on the stringency
of rating standard over the analyzed period. Existing empirical studies (Blume et al.
1998, Alp 2013) consider the declining year dummy intercepts (as in Panel B of Table
3.4) to be the indicators of rating standard becoming more strict. Those studies find
that the intercepts indeed move downward, and hence claim that rating standards are
strengthening. (More precisely, the decreasing year dummy intercepts implies that
a firm whose all characteristics remain unchanged will receive a lower rating by just
stepping into the next year.16) Figure 3.2 plots the year intercepts of Models 5 to 8
(Panel B, Table 3.4). The downward moving intercepts of the ordered probit model
confirm the pattern in Blume et al. (1998). However, this trend disappears in the
adjusted model which controls for rating stickiness. In addition, rating stickiness is
15As discussed in previous section, k1 measures the Intcov range from 0 to 5, and k4 measures
the range above 20.
16A lower rating refers to a worse rating. This paper exploits the same rating denotement as in
(Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013), which means that a better rating matches a higher
number.
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Figure 3.2: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Dummy Intercepts
Year dummy intercepts estimated from ordered probit and adjusted ordered
probit models in Table 3.4, based on a panel dataset containing 20,557 firm-
year observations from 1985 to 2014. Rating stickiness is further separated
into the t-dimensional and z-dimensional ones. The t stickiness refers to
the delay of rating adjustment in time series. It is measured by the year
intercepts from Ordered Probit model with lagged rating being the depen-
dent variable. The z stickiness measures the tolerance of credit quality
deviation, and the year intercepts are from adjusted ordered Probit with
different categorization method. The difference in categorization refers to
neglecting the time-series delay of rating adjustment. More precise, our
main adjusted ordered probit model assumes the rating migration at time t
is caused by the breaching of rating threshold at time t−1. However, the z
stickiness model assumes the rating migration at time t happens because of
the breaching at the time t as well. Hence, it is an assumption of immediate
adjustment.
further separated into the t-dimensional and z-dimensional ones. The t-stickiness
refers to the delay of rating adjustment in time series. It is measured by the year
intercepts from ordered probit model with lagged rating being the dependent vari-
able. The z-stickiness measures the tolerance of credit quality deviation, and the
year intercepts are from the adjusted ordered probit with a different categorization
method. The difference in categorization refers to ignoring the time-series delay of
rating adjustment.
The disappearing downward pattern in year intercepts suggests that these dummy
variables may contain more information than rating standards. For example, Du
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(2003) challenges the conclusion of tightening rating standards in Blume et al. (1998)
and provides an alternative explanation. Du (2003) interprets the decreasing year
dummy coefficients as the outcome of the situation that new bonds are mainly issued
by low quality firms. From the perspective of stickiness, changes in year dummies
reflect both the standard effect and the unabsorbed impact from rating mechanism.
In other words, the model setting and estimation of existing studies are in static way,
which ignores agencies’ freedom in timing the rating migrations. Compared to the
stickiness-based model, the estimation of ordered probit model forces the threshold
observations, either upper or lower, to be withinits current rating, but the credit
quality of these observations actually deviates into the ranges of other ratings. For
example, dot q10 in Figure 3.1 is an upper threshold observation whose credit quality
enters range of rating A but its current rating is still B since migration happens in
next period. Static estimation will force q10 to fit the range of rating B, which leads
to the negative year intercepts. Inversely, the fitting of the ignored lower thresh-
old observations tend to have positive year intercepts. The downward trend implies
asymmetric influence between the upper and lower threshold groups, and it seems
that the effect from the upper threshold observations strongly affect the estimation
results.
We further demonstrate the impact of stickiness through rating migrations (Ta-
ble 3.5). The first three columns present the true migration observations from per-
spectives of an upgrade, no migration, and a downgrade. The next three columns
summarize the predicted migrations without considering stickiness, and the last three
columns state the prediction under the stickiness framework. The inferred migrations
for non-stickiness and stickiness predictions are based on the same credit quality, and
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Table 3.5: Predicted Rating Migrations
TRUE Adj-No Stickiness Adj-Stickiness
Up. Stay Down. Up. Stay Down. Up. Stay Down.
1986 18 755 54 81 673 73 0 822 5
1987 23 823 44 104 717 69 0 839 51
1988 30 744 39 93 639 81 0 765 48
1989 30 704 31 70 618 77 0 719 46
1990 21 636 32 120 531 38 0 652 37
1991 25 598 26 100 477 72 0 634 15
1992 28 648 27 166 480 57 1 683 19
1993 41 674 29 89 519 136 0 728 16
1994 22 678 23 92 548 83 1 704 18
1995 24 658 28 71 560 79 0 696 14
1996 31 678 27 128 566 42 0 723 13
1997 35 695 20 37 546 167 0 733 17
1998 35 720 38 90 574 129 0 765 28
1999 23 688 37 48 523 177 0 711 37
2000 14 647 48 37 482 190 0 652 57
2001 19 610 56 66 523 96 0 639 46
2002 9 645 48 100 528 74 0 647 55
2003 13 625 53 123 516 52 0 667 24
2004 18 651 32 63 556 82 0 678 23
2005 18 623 37 32 542 104 0 664 14
2006 19 603 40 47 554 61 0 645 17
2007 27 563 32 35 468 119 0 598 24
2008 10 559 37 83 456 67 0 574 32
2009 13 533 33 251 303 25 0 561 18
2010 20 516 22 42 427 89 0 552 6
2011 26 510 15 34 451 66 0 548 3
2012 16 512 17 140 378 27 0 538 7
2013 19 497 7 34 416 73 0 521 2
2014 16 484 11 13 373 125 0 507 4
Total 643 18277 943 2389 14944 2530 2 19165 696
Predicted rating migrations. The first three columns report the true number of upgrade
observations, unchanged observations, and downgrade observations. The next three
columns reports the predicted migration volume assuming no stickiness. The last three
columns present the predicted migration numbers with stickiness. The credit quality is
calculated using the regression results in Model 6 in Table 3.4.
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 157
the only difference is the model embedded.17 As shown in the columns that cor-
respond to non-stickiness, this model tends to overpredict the frequency of both
upgrades and downgrades. The total number of migrations predicted is almost three
times the number of the actual rating adjustments. In comparison, the prediction
from stickiness framework is close to the actual value in magnitude. Moreover, the
stickiness framework may reveal the asymmetry of the impact between upper and
lower thresholds, since upgrades very infrequent during this period.
3.5.2 Credit Quality
The stickiness considered in the presented model absorbs effects of the rating migra-
tion process, and hence leaves the coefficients directly determined by credit quality.
We further decompose the variation of credit quality during the deterioration period,
and find out that the credit quality of firms actually improves. Table 3.6 summarizes
the variation of predicted average level of credit quality between the last six-year
period (2009-2014) average level and the first six-year period (1985-1990). The con-
tribution of each variable is the product of increment in period average and the cor-
responding coefficients. Column 1 reports the contribution of variables to the credit
quality variation. Overall, credit quality, measured by Z-score, increases by 0.573,
while firm size contributes the most (0.312). Further, we separate the full sample
by rating levels and firm size, and find that investment grade rated and large firms
experience more credit quality improvement compared to speculative rated and small
firms.
17The credit quality is the predicted Z-score based on Model 6 in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Deviation in Credit Quality
Full Invest. Specu. Diff. Large Small Diff.
k1 0.016 0.022 0.008 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
k2 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k3 0.026 0.014 0.047 -0.032 0.028 0.024 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
k4 -0.027 -0.013 -0.053 0.040 -0.025 -0.029 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Vol 0.020 0.036 0.001 0.035 0.027 0.014 0.013
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Tlev 0.091 0.146 0.015 0.131 0.105 0.077 0.028
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Rent 0.040 0.034 0.054 -0.021 0.038 0.041 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Tan -0.017 -0.009 -0.029 0.021 -0.018 -0.016 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dni 0.026 0.039 0.012 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Ddiv 0.007 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Rd 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.008 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mtb 0.087 0.040 0.173 -0.133 0.095 0.080 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Size 0.312 0.334 0.295 0.039 0.319 0.304 0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Beta -0.007 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rmse -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total 0.573 0.646 0.525 0.121 0.612 0.535 0.077
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Variation of predicted credit quality between the last six-year period (2009-2014) average
level and the first six-year period (1985-1990) average level. The Z-score following Model
9 of Table 3.4 serves the proxy of credit quality: Z-score= 0.023∗k1+0.001∗k2+0.014∗
k3− 0.006 ∗ k4− 2.479 ∗ V ol− 1.381 ∗ T lev− 6.185 ∗Rent+ 0.204 ∗ tan− 0.448 ∗Dni+
0.141 ∗Ddiv − 1.659 ∗Rd+ 0.436 ∗Mtb+ 0.147 ∗ Size− 0.021 ∗Beta+ 0.112 ∗Rmse.
The contribution of each variable is the product of increment in period average and the
corresponding coefficients.18 The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
Delta method.
3.5.3 Asymmetry
Since credit quality improves during this period, the deterioration in ratings is con-
cluded to be caused by a tightening rating standard. Unlike in previous empirical
studies (Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009, Alp 2013), our model allows us to sepa-
rate the standards for upgrade and downgrade decisions, by isolating upper and lower
thresholds from their combined (average) effect. Figure 3.3 shows the upper thresh-
old movements from 1985 to 2014 for every two years. Upper thresholds represent
cut-off levels for ratings, for which every crossing by credit quality causes an upgrade
to the adjacent rating above. As shown in Figure 3.3, upper thresholds generally rise
for each rating category, which suggests that upgrade migration becomes increasingly
difficult. For example, the threshold U4 has experienced a dramatic increase during
this period, which implies that upgrade to the best rating category (level 5) became
increasingly difficult.19 Moreover, Figure 3.4 plots the lower cut-off variation in the
same format. Lower thresholds exhibit substantial variation around their original lev-
els, but no visible trend is present. The latter implies no tightening on relaxation of
standards for downgrades. Overall, our results suggest that the standard stringency
18The average V ol in period 2009 to 2017 is 0.033, and the average level in period 1985 to 1990 is
0.041. Then, the contribution of V ol to credit quality variation is 0.020 (which is (0.033− 0.041) ∗
(−2.479)).
19Threshold U4 refers to the upper cut-off for rating level 4. The firm will receive upgrade to
rating level 5 once its credit quality crosses this boundary, and level 5 is the best rating in this study.
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 160
Figure 3.3: Plot of the Estimates of the Upper Cut-off for Rating Categories
The stickiness in rating behavior makes the separation of cutoff between
adjacent ratings. For example, suppose two rating categories A and B are
next to each other (A indicates better quality), the stickiness argues that
the lower cutoff of A is not necessarily being the upper cutoff of B. Upgrade
happens only when one’s credit quality reaches the upper threshold of its
current rating. The plots are based on the estimates of upper cutoff from
Adjusted Ordered Probit model for every two-year period. Overall, there
are five rating categories, but the upper cutoff for the highest rated category
is infinity (no further upgrade available).
for upgrade decisions goes up but for downgrade decisions keeps flat. We consider
this kind of asymmetry to be the main cause of the deterioration in credit ratings.
The asymmetry may result from the partial release of information as suggested
in other empirical studies (Altman & Kao 1992, Lando & Skødeberg 2002). Altman &
Kao (1992) create a measure defined by the frequency of subsequent migrations in the
same direction (i.e. upgrade followed by upgrade, downgrade followed by downgrade)
divided by the frequency of subsequent migrations in the opposite directions (i.e.
upgrade followed by downgrade, downgrade followed by upgrade). This statistic is
larger than 1, which means that rating migrations tend to be followed by migrations
in the same direction. The correlation between consecutive downgrades is higher than
the one between consecutive upgrades. Lando & Skødeberg (2002) confirm this migr-
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 161
Figure 3.4: Plot of the Estimates of the Lower Cut-off for Rating Categories
The stickiness in rating behavior makes the separation of cutoff between
adjacent ratings. For example, suppose two rating categories A and B are
next to each other (A indicates better quality), the stickiness argues that the
lower cutoff of A is not necessarily being the upper cutoff of B. Downgrade
happens only when one’s credit quality reaches the lower threshold of its
current rating. The plots are based on the estimates of lower cutoff from
Adjusted Ordered Probit model for every two-year period. Overall, there
are five rating categories, but the lower cutoff for the worst rated category
is negative infinity (no further downgrade available).
ation correlation pattern using semi-parametric regression based on continuous ob-
servations. Lo¨ﬄer (2005) interprets this phenomenon, that agencies respond partially
to a piece of information and ”dole out the bad news in small doses rather than sav-
aging the bond issuer - who is, after all, their customer - all in one go” (Economist
1997). This is also consistent with the partial adjustment pattern documented by
Altman & Rijken (2004). From this perspective, rating agencies respond to a piece
of information in more than one period, and hence, breaks a big rating migration
decision down to several small migrations. This responding pattern also contributes
to the stickiness in credit ratings.
Further, we study the determinants of rating migrations to investigate the role
this asymmetry in credit rating deterioration. Table 3.7 reports the coefficients of m-
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Table 3.7: Regressions of Migration Determinants
Model 1 Model 2
Oprobit ME1 ME2 ME3 Oprobit ME1 ME2 ME3
k1 -0.042 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.031 0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
k2 -0.015 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
k3 -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
k4 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Vol -0.038 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.479 0.043 -0.011 -0.032
(0.271) (0.023) (0.006) (0.016) (0.320) (0.028) (0.007) (0.021)
Tlev -0.728 0.060 -0.016 -0.044 -0.838 0.074 -0.019 -0.056
(0.089) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.100) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Rrent -1.451 0.121 -0.033 -0.088 -0.492 0.044 -0.011 -0.033
(0.407) (0.034) (0.010) (0.025) (0.670) (0.060) (0.015) (0.045)
Tan 0.107 -0.009 0.002 0.006 -0.024 0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.057) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.108) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007)
Dni -0.511 0.056 -0.033 -0.023 -0.512 0.037 0.002 -0.039
(0.034) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Ddiv -0.275 0.021 -0.003 -0.018 -0.270 0.018 0.007 -0.024
(0.031) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.037) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Rd -1.224 0.102 -0.027 -0.074 -2.436 0.218 -0.054 -0.165
(0.444) (0.037) (0.011) (0.027) (0.757) (0.069) (0.018) (0.052)
Mtb 0.235 -0.020 0.005 0.014 0.290 -0.025 0.006 0.019
(0.022) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.030 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.052 0.005 -0.001 -0.003
(0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Beta 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Rmse 0.142 -0.012 0.003 0.009 0.139 -0.012 0.003 0.009
(0.080) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.088) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
D1986 -0.277 0.029 -0.016 -0.013 -0.276 0.024 -0.005 -0.019
(0.092) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.093) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
D1987 -0.204 0.020 -0.010 -0.010 -0.211 0.019 -0.004 -0.014
(0.091) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.092) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
D1988 -0.087 0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.085 0.008 -0.002 -0.006
(0.092) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.094) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
D1989 -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.094) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.096) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006)
D1990 -0.105 0.010 -0.004 -0.006 -0.096 0.009 -0.002 -0.006
(0.096) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
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D1991 -0.034 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.040 0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(0.097) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.100) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1992 0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.096) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1993 0.065 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.066 -0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.094) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.096) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006)
D1994 -0.056 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.068 0.006 -0.001 -0.005
(0.096) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1995 -0.095 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.107 0.009 -0.002 -0.007
(0.096) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1996 -0.040 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.061 0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.095) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1997 0.049 -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.021 -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.095) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1998 -0.059 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.074 0.007 -0.002 -0.005
(0.094) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.096) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D1999 -0.140 0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.159 0.014 -0.003 -0.011
(0.095) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.098) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2000 -0.334 0.036 -0.021 -0.015 -0.349 0.030 -0.007 -0.024
(0.096) (0.013) (0.010) (0.003) (0.099) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
D2001 -0.305 0.033 -0.018 -0.014 -0.316 0.028 -0.006 -0.022
(0.096) (0.013) (0.009) (0.003) (0.099) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2002 -0.283 0.030 -0.016 -0.013 -0.285 0.025 -0.006 -0.019
(0.096) (0.012) (0.009) (0.003) (0.100) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2003 -0.387 0.044 -0.027 -0.017 -0.390 0.034 -0.007 -0.027
(0.096) (0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.099) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
D2004 -0.202 0.020 -0.010 -0.010 -0.215 0.019 -0.004 -0.015
(0.097) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.101) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2005 -0.244 0.025 -0.013 -0.012 -0.244 0.021 -0.005 -0.017
(0.098) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.102) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2006 -0.272 0.028 -0.015 -0.013 -0.295 0.026 -0.006 -0.020
(0.099) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.102) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2007 -0.098 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.116 0.010 -0.002 -0.008
(0.100) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.104) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2008 -0.187 0.018 -0.009 -0.010 -0.185 0.016 -0.004 -0.012
(0.101) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.104) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2009 -0.130 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.135 0.012 -0.003 -0.009
(0.102) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.106) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007)
D2010 -0.038 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.037 0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.104) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.108) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007)
D2011 0.132 -0.010 0.001 0.009 0.142 -0.013 0.003 0.009
(0.104) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.108) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007)
D2012 0.009 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.105) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.109) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007)
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D2013 0.131 -0.010 0.001 0.009 0.128 -0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.107) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.111) (-0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
D2014 0.042 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.029 -0.003 0.001 0.002





Pseudo R 0.0511 0.0708
Ind. FE No Yes
Determinants of rating migrations under Ordered Probit model. The dependent variable
is 1 if downgrade happens at that firm-year observation; it is 2 if rating remains; and
it is 3 if upgrade happens. The first and fifth columns present the estimation, and
the other columns provide marginal effect. The marginal effect for continuous variables
refers to the slope of a specific probability20 at the mean level of that variable. For
dummy variables, marginal effect measures the probability deviation due to changes of
that variable from 0 to 1. Model 2 controls for industry fixed effects.
igration determinants under the ordered probit model.21 The dependent variable is
rating migrations: it takes the value 1 if downgrade happens at that firm-year ob-
servation; 2 if rating remains; and 3 if upgrade happens. The first and fifth columns
present the estimation, and the other columns report marginal effects. Most of the
year intercepts in Model 1 demonstrates negative signs, which suggests that the prob-
ability of being a downgrade observation increases with time, holding all other control
variables the same. This is consistent with the observed asymmetry that upgrades
become increasingly difficult. Marginal effects reported in columns 2 to 4 confirm
the asymmetry. ME1 reports the probability of being a downgrade observation, and
most of the year dummies show positive contribution. Inversely, year dummy impact
20For ”ME1” columns, the probability refers to the probability of being downgrade observations.
For ”ME2” columns, the probability refers to the probability of being observations with remaining
ratings. For ”ME3” columns, the probability refers to the probability of being upgrade observations.
21The adjusted ordered probit model is not appropriate in migration studies since it ignores
stickiness embedded in decisions to upgrade or downgrade.
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 165
in ME3 has a negative sign, which means the probability to be an upgrade obser-
vations decreases. This pattern does not change after controlling for industry fixed
effects as in Model 2. This evidence supports that asymmetry exists between upgrade
and downgrade decision standards, and hence contributes to the rating deterioration.
3.5.4 Robustness Analysis
To check the robustness of our results, we perform a number of additional tests. To
further support the claim about the existence of stickiness, we provide evidence from
the interaction analysis and lag rating analysis. Table 3.8 summarizes the interac-
tion analysis, in which the specification follows Model 5 in Table 3.4, but adding
interaction terms. One fundamental assumption of stickiness is that agencies update
ratings after credit quality breaches a threshold. One way to test this conjecture is
to demonstrate the existence of a relationship between covariates and ratings at the
breaching point, the period right before a rating migration, differs from the one in
the other periods. In line with our expectations, all interactions terms in Panel A
are highly significant, suggesting that the threshold observations statistically differ
from normal observations. Panel B controls lagged credit rating in interaction terms,
and the highly significant effects strongly confirms our argument. Moreover, we ar-
gue that past and current locations on credit quality spectrum jointly determine the
rating migration behavior and, hence, the observed ratings. In other words, rating in
last period has to be an influential factor under the stickiness framework. Therefore,
we use the lagged rating analysis to show this (Table 3.9). The lagged credit rating
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variable, denoted by LagY , is highly significant in all models, consistent with our ini-
tial assumption. We further apply the lag rating analysis for each year data, and plot
the coefficients and t-statistics of LagY in Figure 3.7. The coefficients spike around 3
and t-statistics range between 24 and 6. These highly significant coefficients of LagY
further support our claim.
To investigate whether our results are caused by shifts in relationships of firm
characteristics rather than rating stickiness, we apply Fama-MacBeth estimation for
every ten years data as in Models 9 to 11 in Table 3.4. We firstly estimate re-
gressions using adjusted ordered probit on every two-year data controlling for both
z-dimensional and t-dimensional stickiness. Then, we take the average of regression
coefficients for every decade (85-94, 95-04, and 05-14) to calculate the Fama-MacBeth
coefficients. The comparison between these three models reveals that the relations
between credit rating and firm characteristics do not shift during our sample period.
Further, we redo the credit quality contribution decomposition but varying the rela-
tionship (regression coefficients) applied. The original contribution analysis reported
in Table 3.6 is based on the relation in decade from 1985 to 1994. Then, we repli-
cate this analysis by using 1995-2004 relation and 2005-2014 relation, with Table 3.10
and Table 3.11 summarizing the results, respectively. Our main results indicate that
credit quality does not change. Further, we also plot the average predicted credit
quality controlling for lagged rating in Figure 3.8.22 This figure suggests a slight
improvement in credit quality during our sample period.
Furthermore, we re-run our tests within investment grade and speculative grade
22The prediction is based on the relationship in each year regression controlling for lagged rating.
The relationships are estimated in lagged rating analysis in Figure 3.7.
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subsamples. Table 3.12 replicates Table 3.4 within subsamples of investment grade
observations and speculative grade observations. ”Investment grade” refers to BBB-
or above under S&P credit rating framework. The subsample includes ratings A, B,
and C in our merged ratings, which totally contains 10,480 observations. In com-
parison, observations with S&P ratings below BBB- fall into the speculative grade,
which covers ratings D and E in our merged category and totally include 10,077
observations. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 plot the year intercepts for the investment
grade and speculative grade subsamples, respectively. Our main results in Table 3.4
indicate that the downward trend of year intercepts in the ordered probit model dis-
appears after controlling for stickiness. This pattern also exists in the investment
grade subsample, but is less clear in the speculative grade subsample. Further, Ta-
ble 3.13 shows the goodness of fit through predicted ratings. Panel A presents the
predicted ratings without considering stickiness in rating assignment, and Panel B
reports the predictions within stickiness framework. Prediction with stickiness tends
to overvalue ratings, while predicted ratings without stickiness spikes around the ac-
tual one. Moreover, we have controlled missing R&D dummy variable and replicates
regressions of Model 5 to 8 in Table 3.4 as shown in Table 3.14 to test the sensitivity
of our R&D setting (replace missing values with zero). The relationships estimated
do not significantly change. Figure 3.9 plot the year dummy intercepts in Table 3.14
regressions. The pattern of diminishing downward trend as stickiness being controlled
still exists. Lastly, our argument about asymmetry between upgrade and downgrade
rating standard are based on Figure 3.3 and 3.4, which are estimated based on two-
year moving window. We replicate these estimations based on expanding window as
shown in Figure 3.10 and 3.11. The asymmetry still exists. The downward sloping
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lower cut-off in Figure 3.11 even suggests downgrade becomes increasingly easy, which
further enhances our explanation to the credit rating deterioration.
3.6 Conclusion
The stickiness-based model used in this study facilitates the understanding of the
observed general deterioration on credit ratings. The contribution of this study is
that it embeds rating mechanism, with its inertia equivalent to the presence of lump
sum costs, into the model setting and estimation. The model therefore enables us to
separate the effects of credit quality variation and changes in rating standards. Our
findings shed light on the debate whether the downward trend in credit ratings is due
to the deteriorating credit quality or the tightening of rating standard. The results
support the existence of stickiness in credit ratings, and demonstrate its significant
impact on rating migrations. After introducing stickiness, the downward trend of year
dummy intercepts disappears and the interaction terms are statistically significant.
These findings strongly underpin the existence of stickiness. After controlling for
stickiness, we find that firms’ credit quality actually improves during that period.
We also document asymmetry in rating migrations. Upgrades become increasingly
difficult while downgrade standard appear to remain the same. This mechanism
offsets the slight improvement in credit quality, and hence leads to the preserved
credit quality ”deterioration” (i.e. based on ratings). Also, our study contributes to
the literature on rating determinants. Controlling for the rating mechanism allows
us to more precisely measure the effects of the explanatory factors affecting credit
ratings.
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 169
Table 3.8: Interaction Analysis
Panel A: Interaction without Lagged Rating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent y y lag y y y
Interac. M U D
Inter M -0.235
(0.267)
Inter U 1.314 1.522 1.128 -2.126
(0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.488)
Inter D 2.087 2.487 1.774 2.352
(0.056) (0.060) (0.055) (0.347)
k1 0.312 0.363 4.253 0.308 0.059 0.319 0.123 -0.108
(0.010) (0.012) (0.095) (0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.058) (0.040)
k2 0.075 0.135 6.166 0.073 0.045 0.075 0.022 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.100) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.038) (0.028)
k3 0.025 0.024 7.578 0.023 0.022 0.024 -0.014 0.022
(0.004) (0.004) (0.103) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.024) (0.018)
k4 0.003 0.005 9.019 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.024 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.107) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
Vol -5.332 -3.959 0.313 -5.536 3.201 -5.739 2.055 3.572
(0.233) (0.275) (0.010) (0.250) (0.672) (0.252) (1.278) (0.876)
Tlev -1.392 -1.866 0.080 -1.413 1.698 -1.464 1.985 0.004
(0.066) (0.079) (0.006) (0.070) (0.209) (0.071) (0.387) (0.275)
Rrent -9.271 -8.289 0.026 -9.111 4.489 -9.475 0.443 0.399
(0.310) (0.529) (0.004) (0.325) (0.962) (0.329) (2.085) (1.204)
Tan 0.859 0.961 0.003 0.842 -0.211 0.873 -0.249 -0.197
(0.040) (0.079) (0.001) (0.041) (0.131) (0.042) (0.220) (0.173)
Dni -0.490 -0.392 -4.841 -0.496 0.531 -0.515 -0.097 0.143
(0.025) (0.028) (0.225) (0.027) (0.074) (0.027) (0.164) (0.091)
Ddiv 0.981 0.830 -1.004 0.955 0.304 0.995 0.148 -0.292
(0.022) (0.027) (0.065) (0.023) (0.068) (0.024) (0.115) (0.093)
Rxrd -1.637 -0.043 -8.082 -1.648 0.921 -1.715 0.265 -0.612
(0.319) (0.569) (0.302) (0.336) (1.029) (0.338) (1.790) (1.337)
Mtb 0.461 0.480 0.770 0.456 -0.465 0.472 -0.165 -0.038
(0.015) (0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.049) (0.016) (0.074) (0.073)
Size 0.459 0.629 -0.259 0.454 -0.050 0.469 -0.015 -0.113
(0.007) (0.010) (0.025) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008) (0.039) (0.029)
Beta -0.038 -0.026 1.026 -0.035 -0.011 -0.037 -0.011 -0.051
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.030) (0.025)
Rmse -0.171 -0.120 -1.087 -0.141 -0.212 -0.149 0.233 -0.389
(0.058) (0.067) (0.314) (0.060) (0.202) (0.060) (0.384) (0.259)
Cut1 4.293 6.461 0.362 2.957 3.035
(0.097) (0.204) (0.015) (0.091) (0.091)
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Cut2 6.314 8.920 0.449 4.907 5.085
(0.102) (0.209) (0.007) (0.094) (0.095)
Cut3 7.798 10.738 -0.037 6.342 6.573
(0.105) (0.213) (0.004) (0.097) (0.098)
Cut4 9.300 12.553 -0.208 7.803 8.080
(0.110) (0.216) (0.057) (0.101) (0.103)
Pseudo R 0.395 0.491 0.371 0.378 0.400
Ind. FE No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Interaction with Lagged Rating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent y y y y
Inter M -0.414
(0.406)
Inter U -0.840 -1.048 -1.727
(0.067) (0.070) (0.736)
Inter D 0.589 0.777 1.117
(0.051) (0.053) (0.525)
lag y 2.936 2.867 2.920 0.342 2.947 -0.035 0.019
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.053) (0.025) (0.111) (0.076)
k1 0.085 0.135 0.080 0.049 0.083 0.145 -0.013
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.048) (0.016) (0.089) (0.061)
k2 0.010 0.042 0.009 -0.005 0.009 0.000 -0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.058) (0.042)
k3 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.030 0.003 0.022 0.028
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.037) (0.028)
k4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.006 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.007)
Vol -2.568 -2.701 -2.570 0.907 -2.627 -3.325 1.798
(0.330) (0.385) (0.350) (1.003) (0.353) (1.902) (1.296)
Tlev -1.554 -1.952 -1.629 1.722 -1.665 1.574 0.769
(0.097) (0.113) (0.102) (0.315) (0.103) (0.584) (0.411)
Rrent -5.766 -4.855 -5.878 5.761 -6.048 2.276 1.951
(0.452) (0.751) (0.473) (1.444) (0.478) (3.054) (1.821)
Tan 0.513 0.517 0.513 -0.388 0.525 -0.098 -0.350
(0.058) (0.114) (0.061) (0.200) (0.062) (0.326) (0.261)
Dni -0.705 -0.680 -0.711 0.287 -0.728 -0.603 0.274
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.110) (0.039) (0.224) (0.135)
Ddiv 0.192 0.165 0.191 -0.088 0.201 0.218 -0.222
(0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.110) (0.035) (0.181) (0.145)
Rxrd -1.973 -2.690 -1.884 -0.661 -1.944 -0.433 -1.689
(0.466) (0.807) (0.490) (1.526) (0.494) (2.710) (1.936)
Mtb 0.415 0.484 0.423 -0.395 0.432 -0.156 -0.128
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(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.075) (0.023) (0.112) (0.108)
Size 0.169 0.250 0.170 -0.095 0.173 0.059 -0.067
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011) (0.062) (0.047)
Beta -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 0.014 -0.012 -0.026 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.047) (0.038)
Rmse 0.041 0.051 0.069 -0.336 0.068 0.324 -0.548
(0.086) (0.099) (0.090) (0.308) (0.091) (0.573) (0.395)
Cut1 4.976 5.592 4.935 4.975
(0.128) (0.282) (0.135) (0.136)
Cut2 8.798 9.658 8.717 8.838
(0.140) (0.291) (0.146) (0.148)
Cut3 12.365 13.386 12.254 12.409
(0.154) (0.300) (0.159) (0.161)
Cut4 15.968 17.124 15.836 16.020
(0.172) (0.312) (0.176) (0.179)
Pseudo R 0.791 0.804 0.789 0.793
Ind. FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stickiness in credit ratings through interaction analysis using ordered probit model.
The specification generally follows Model 5 in Table 3.4 but adds interaction terms.
The dependent variable is observed credit ratings or lagged ratings as presented. Inter
M refers to the dummy variable with value 1 indicating rating migration (either upgrade
or downgrade). Similarly, Inter U and Inter D refer to dummies specifically indicating
upgrade and downgrade, respectively. Model 4 includes terms interacting with migration
dummies, and model 5 further replaces the migration interaction terms with upgrade
and downgrade interaction terms. Panel A report the results without lagged rating
interactions, and Panel B controls these interaction terms.
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Table 3.9: Lag Rating Analysis: Real Data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lag Y 2.916 2.900 2.905 2.870











Vol -2.901 -2.683 -2.750 -2.378
(0.327) (0.331) (0.332) (0.336)
Tlev -1.495 -1.613 -1.394 -1.360
(0.088) (0.090) (0.096) (0.098)
Rent -4.410 -5.023 -4.460 -5.245
(0.437) (0.445) (0.439) (0.449)
Tan 0.605 0.471 0.600 0.462
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)
Dni -0.660 -0.704 -0.637 -0.663
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Ddiv 0.189 0.196 0.183 0.185
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Rd -0.489 -1.588 -0.555 -1.876
(0.457) (0.469) (0.458) (0.472)
Mtb 0.371 0.392 0.363 0.368
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Size 0.079 0.145 0.079 0.153
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Beta -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Rmse 0.035 0.006 0.060 0.049
(0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088)
Cut1 4.538 4.919 4.709 5.273
(0.098) (0.113) (0.111) (0.128)
Cut2 8.135 8.573 8.321 8.959
(0.108) (0.125) (0.123) (0.141)
Cut3 11.524 12.029 11.706 12.416
(0.124) (0.141) (0.137) (0.155)
Cut4 14.951 15.547 15.120 15.919
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(0.145) (0.162) (0.155) (0.174)
Pseudo R 0.769 0.774 0.769 0.775
Year Dummy No Yes No Yes
Ordered probit regression results controlling from lagged rating. LagY refers to the
rating lagged by one year, and all other variables are defined as in Table 3.3. There are
19,069 observations after creating lag rating variable. Model 1 exploit interest coverage,
and Model 2 further controls year fixed effect based on Model 1. Model 3 decomposes
interest coverage into four components, and Model 4 further controls year dummies.
Standard error is in the parentheses.
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Table 3.10: Determinants of Deviation in Credit Quality based on 95-04 Rela-
tionship
Full Invest. Specu. Diff. Large Small Diff.
k1 0.080 0.112 0.039 0.074 0.093 0.068 0.024
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
k2 0.008 0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.009 0.007 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k3 -0.010 -0.006 -0.018 0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k4 -0.009 -0.004 -0.017 0.013 -0.008 -0.009 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vol 0.012 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.016 0.008 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Tlev 0.045 0.072 0.008 0.065 0.052 0.038 0.014
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Rent 0.022 0.018 0.030 -0.011 0.021 0.022 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Tan -0.042 -0.022 -0.073 0.052 -0.045 -0.039 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Dni 0.028 0.043 0.013 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Ddiv 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Rd 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.015 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Mtb 0.085 0.039 0.168 -0.129 0.092 0.078 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Size 0.257 0.276 0.244 0.032 0.264 0.251 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Beta -0.007 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rmse -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total 0.479 0.563 0.404 0.159 0.509 0.451 0.058
Variation of predicted credit quality between the last six-year period (2009-2014) average
level and the first six-year period (1985-1990) average level. The Z-score following Model
10 of Table 3.4 serves the proxy of credit quality: Z-score= 0.115 ∗ k1 + 0.006 ∗ k2 −
0.005∗k3−0.002∗k4−1.495∗V ol−0.674∗T lev−3.370∗Rent+0.514∗tan−0.489∗Dni+
0.063∗Ddiv−3.098∗Rd+0.424∗Mtb+0.123∗Size−0.022∗Beta+0.047∗Rmse. This
relation is the average coefficients of the first five sub-period Adjusted-Ordered Probit
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estimation, covering 1995 to 2004. The contribution of each variable is the product of
increment in period average and the corresponding coefficients.
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Table 3.11: Determinants of Deviation in Credit Quality based on 05-14 Rela-
tionship
Full Invest. Specu. Diff. Large Small Diff.
k1 0.010 0.015 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
k2 0.019 0.016 0.026 -0.011 0.021 0.017 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k3 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k4 0.008 0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.008 0.009 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vol 0.023 0.040 0.001 0.039 0.030 0.016 0.015
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Tlev 0.085 0.137 0.014 0.122 0.098 0.072 0.026
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Rent 0.049 0.042 0.067 -0.025 0.047 0.050 -0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Tan -0.035 -0.018 -0.060 0.042 -0.037 -0.032 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Dni 0.039 0.059 0.018 0.041 0.041 0.037 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Ddiv 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.015 0.007 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Rd -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mtb 0.081 0.037 0.162 -0.124 0.088 0.075 0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Size 0.427 0.458 0.405 0.054 0.438 0.417 0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Beta -0.023 -0.037 0.000 -0.037 -0.028 -0.018 -0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Rmse 0.028 0.044 0.004 0.041 0.029 0.027 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Total 0.716 0.815 0.649 0.166 0.757 0.677 0.080
Variation of predicted credit quality between the last six-year period (2009-2014) average
level and the first six-year period (1985-1990) average level. The Z-score following Model
11 of Table 3.4 serves the proxy of credit quality: Z-score= 0.016 ∗ k1 + 0.014 ∗ k2 −
0.003∗k3+0.002∗k4−2.780∗V ol−1.287∗T lev−7.623∗Rent+0.421∗tan−0.668∗Dni+
0.226∗Ddiv+0.627∗Rd+0.407∗Mtb+0.203∗Size−0.067∗Beta−0.436∗Rmse. This
relation is the average coefficients of the first five sub-period Adjusted-Ordered Probit
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estimation, covering 2005 to 2014. The contribution of each variable is the product of
increment in period average and the corresponding coefficients.
Figure 3.5: Investment: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Dummy Intercepts
Year dummy intercepts estimated from Ordered Probit and adjusted or-
dered probit models of investment grade subsample in Table 3.12.
Figure 3.6: Speculative: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Dummy Intercepts
Year dummy intercepts estimated from Ordered Probit and adjusted or-
dered probit models of speculative grade subsample in Table 3.12.
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Figure 3.7: Lag Rating Analysis: Real Data
(a) Lag Rating Coefficients (b) Lag Rating T-statistics
Further tests of lag rating analysis in addition to Table 3.9. We apply Model 1 and Model 3 regression
coefficients in Table 3.9 for each year data, and plot the coefficients and T-statistics of the LagY
variable.
Figure 3.8: Plot of the Predicted Average Credit Quality
The average predicted credit quality (Z-score) for each year from Model 1
and 3 tests as in Figure 3.7.
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Table 3.12: Subsample Analysis
Panle A: Coefficients
Investment Speculative
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
k1 0.398 0.100 0.292 0.059
(0.028) (0.045) (0.015) (0.020)
k2 0.097 -0.011 0.018 0.004
(0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
k3 0.070 0.016 -0.024 -0.021
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
k4 0.006 0.001 0.010 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Vol -10.011 -2.740 -1.958 -1.332
(0.714) (1.147) (0.272) (0.364)
Tlev -0.541 -1.284 -0.888 -1.035
(0.149) (0.253) (0.092) (0.123)
Rrent -14.343 -7.472 -4.149 -3.421
(0.759) (1.213) (0.412) (0.549)
Tan 0.869 0.342 0.097 -0.001
(0.066) (0.110) (0.073) (0.098)
Dni -0.426 -0.476 -0.390 -0.509
(0.060) (0.103) (0.035) (0.046)
Ddiv 0.830 0.213 0.656 0.030
(0.060) (0.096) (0.034) (0.045)
Rxrd 1.404 -0.125 -5.208 -3.397
(0.511) (0.856) (0.531) (0.714)
Mtb 0.328 0.354 0.324 0.448
(0.022) (0.037) (0.033) (0.044)
Size 0.366 0.123 0.349 0.142
(0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Beta -0.075 -0.010 -0.011 -0.022
(0.011) (0.019) (0.006) (0.008)
Rmse 0.245 0.573 0.035 0.059
(0.143) (0.225) (0.077) (0.105)
U1/Cut1 5.303 3.615 2.945 2.201







Pseudo R 0.2705 0.0828 0.3294 0.1204
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Obs. 10480 10480 10077 10077
Panle B: Time Dummies
Investment Speculative
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
D1986 -0.150 0.187 -0.202 0.094
(0.087) (0.137) (0.107) (0.143)
D1987 -0.303 0.065 -0.167 0.009
(0.088) (0.138) (0.104) (0.141)
D1988 -0.315 0.239 -0.173 -0.026
(0.089) (0.142) (0.108) (0.146)
D1989 -0.436 0.291 -0.032 0.093
(0.089) (0.143) (0.111) (0.152)
D1990 -0.415 0.367 0.209 0.134
(0.090) (0.144) (0.116) (0.158)
D1991 -0.388 0.347 0.317 0.313
(0.089) (0.146) (0.122) (0.165)
D1992 -0.509 0.325 0.422 0.571
(0.089) (0.144) (0.118) (0.159)
D1993 -0.687 0.075 0.460 0.486
(0.088) (0.142) (0.117) (0.160)
D1994 -0.868 0.232 0.497 0.264
(0.090) (0.143) (0.118) (0.159)
D1995 -0.969 0.092 0.364 0.324
(0.089) (0.144) (0.120) (0.162)
D1996 -1.133 0.032 0.248 0.437
(0.090) (0.145) (0.117) (0.162)
D1997 -1.237 -0.298 0.272 0.184
(0.090) (0.146) (0.119) (0.159)
D1998 -1.329 -0.171 0.287 0.220
(0.091) (0.146) (0.116) (0.157)
D1999 -1.441 -0.444 0.237 -0.127
(0.094) (0.154) (0.118) (0.152)
D2000 -1.545 -0.458 -0.059 -0.276
(0.097) (0.154) (0.118) (0.155)
D2001 -1.537 -0.541 0.047 0.052
(0.099) (0.162) (0.119) (0.160)
D2002 -1.520 -0.392 0.251 -0.013
(0.099) (0.162) (0.119) (0.156)
D2003 -1.751 -0.347 0.219 0.053
(0.099) (0.162) (0.122) (0.162)
D2004 -1.955 -0.388 -0.142 -0.316
(0.101) (0.163) (0.118) (0.156)
D2005 -2.143 -0.368 -0.395 -0.271
(0.101) (0.162) (0.122) (0.163)
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D2006 -2.253 -0.229 -0.527 -0.297
(0.102) (0.163) (0.123) (0.165)
D2007 -2.231 -0.692 -0.665 -0.568
(0.104) (0.173) (0.124) (0.163)
D2008 -2.203 -0.344 -0.559 -0.382
(0.105) (0.177) (0.124) (0.165)
D2009 -2.174 -0.395 -0.588 0.350
(0.107) (0.177) (0.125) (0.173)
D2010 -2.342 -0.437 -0.617 -0.007
(0.109) (0.181) (0.129) (0.176)
D2011 -2.429 -0.449 -0.548 -0.169
(0.110) (0.183) (0.131) (0.177)
D2012 -2.540 -0.252 -0.669 -0.090
(0.111) (0.180) (0.132) (0.183)
D2013 -2.604 -0.442 -0.728 -0.137
(0.111) (0.185) (0.138) (0.189)
D2014 -2.684 -0.826 -0.766 -0.117
(0.111) (0.185) (0.141) (0.195)
Main comparison of Table 3.4 between estimations of ordered probit and adjusted or-
dered probit within subsamples of investment grade observations and speculative grade
observations. Investment grade refers to BBB- or above under S&P credit rating frame-
work. It includes ratings A, B, and C, in our merged ratings, which totally contains
10,480 observations. In comparison, observations with S&P ratings below BBB- falls
into the speculative grade, which covers ratings D and E in our merged category and
totally includes 10,077 observations.
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Table 3.13: Predicted Ratings from Adjusted Ordered Model
Panel A: Predicted Rating without Stickiness
TRUE
Predicted A B C D E Total
A 152 101 23 15 3 294
B 595 1058 474 111 5 2243
C 323 1975 3174 1393 163 7028
D 27 466 1989 3546 1210 7238
E 2 8 113 1293 2338 3754
Total 1099 3608 5773 6358 3719 20557
Panel B: Predicted Rating with Stickiness
TRUE
Predicted A B C D E Total
A 1095 3547 5061 3298 762 13763
B 2 42 429 1582 787 2842
C 2 2 248 1101 1117 2470
D 0 17 35 317 844 1213
E 0 0 0 60 209 269
Total 1099 3608 5773 6358 3719 20557
A measure of goodness of fit for our models is to use this panel about predicted ratings.
Each column presents the spectrum of predicted ratings for each true rating category.
For example, the number at row 1 column 2 in Panel A is 101, which means there are
101 observations with true rating B but predicted as A. This prediction is based on the
estimation of Model 6 in Table 3.4. Panel A and B are based on the same predicted credit
quality but different rating assignment method. Panel A presents the prediction without
considering stickiness, which means immediate rating adjustment and single set of rating
boundaries. Since our adjusted ordered model predicts separate rating standards for
upgrade and downgrade, we take the average between the two sets to simulate the single
stream of standard. For example, U1 is the upper boundary of rating 1, L2 is the lower
boundary of rating 2, and hence the simulated single boundary between ratings 1 and
2 is (U1+L2)2 . The ratings in Panel A are predicted by assigning credit quality values
to each category under this standard. Prediction in Panle B considers stickiness, which
applies separated standards for upgrade and downgrade as in Model 6. More precise,
we firstly assign ratings for the first observation of the firm based on credit quality and
the set of downgrade standard to capture the initial rating inflation problem due to
the issuer-paid payment structure of rating agencies, or the so-called ”rating shopping”
problem.
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Table 3.14: Regression with Missing R&D Dummy
Ordered Adj. Ordered Adj.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Stickiness t,z t z
k1 0.313 0.046 0.316 0.097
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016)
k2 0.079 0.000 0.083 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
k3 0.026 -0.003 0.027 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
k4 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vol -5.065 -1.933 -4.696 -2.041
(0.230) (0.303) (0.223) (0.333)
Tlev -1.184 -1.116 -0.851 -1.306
(0.065) (0.095) (0.064) (0.108)
Rrent -8.552 -4.723 -7.603 -4.957
(0.310) (0.435) (0.305) (0.486)
Tan 0.799 0.381 0.721 0.422
(0.040) (0.065) (0.040) (0.060)
Dni -0.409 -0.489 -0.200 -0.676
(0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.041)
Ddiv 0.992 0.094 1.038 0.191
(0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.034)
Rxrd -1.022 -1.962 -0.642 -2.430
(0.363) (0.543) (0.358) (0.600)
Drxrd 0.034 -0.035 0.035 -0.019
(0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.035)
Mtb 0.394 0.405 0.311 0.413
(0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.026)
Size 0.445 0.136 0.440 0.161
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Beta -0.036 -0.019 -0.036 -0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Rmse -0.171 0.025 -0.212 0.059
(0.057) (0.073) (0.056) (0.082)
U1/C12 3.006 2.021 3.165 2.196
(0.060) (0.095) (0.059) (0.073)
U2/C23 4.923 2.886 5.006 3.169
(0.059) (0.086) (0.058) (0.062)
U3/C34 6.345 3.565 6.372 3.871
(0.060) (0.094) (0.060) (0.079)
U4/C45 7.792 4.483 7.774 4.832
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Pseudo R 0.371 0.090 0.354 0.143
Nobs 20557 20557 20557 20557
This table replicates Model 5 to 8 in Table 3.4 with additional dummy variable Drxrd
indicating missing R&D observations. There are 20,557 observations from 1,488 unique
firms in the full sample. Row ”Stickiness” indicates different levels of stickiness con-
sidered in our model, z-dimensional stickiness, t-dimensional stickiness, or both. We
report standard error in parenthesis.
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Figure 3.9: Plot of the Estimates of the Year Dummy Intercepts
Year dummy intercepts estimated from ordered probit and adjusted ordered
probit models in Table 3.14, based on a panel dataset containing 20,557
firm-year observations from 1985 to 2014. This figure replicates Figure
3.2 with missing R&D dummy under control. Rating stickiness is further
separated into the t-dimensional and z-dimensional ones. The t stickiness
refers to the delay of rating adjustment in time series. It is measured by
the year intercepts from Ordered Probit model with lagged rating being
the dependent variable. The z stickiness measures the tolerance of credit
quality deviation, and the year intercepts are from adjusted ordered Probit
with different categorization method. The difference in categorization refers
to neglecting the time-series delay of rating adjustment. More precise, our
main adjusted ordered probit model assumes the rating migration at time t
is caused by the breaching of rating threshold at time t−1. However, the z
stickiness model assumes the rating migration at time t happens because of
the breaching at the time t as well. Hence, it is an assumption of immediate
adjustment.
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Figure 3.10: Plot of the Estimates of the Upper Cut-off: Expanding Window
The plots are based on the estimates of upper cutoff from Adjusted Ordered
Probit model for two-year expanding window. For example, the first esti-
mation is based on the sub-sample 1985 to 1986, and the second estimation
is based on the sub-sample 1985-1988. The following estimations follows
the same expanding pattern.).
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Figure 3.11: Plot of the Estimates of the Lower Cut-off: Expanding Window
The plots are based on the estimates of lower cutoff from Adjusted Ordered
Probit model for two-year expanding window. For example, the first esti-
mation is based on the sub-sample 1985 to 1986, and the second estimation
is based on the sub-sample 1985-1988. The following estimations follows
the same expanding pattern.
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Appendix 3.1 Credit Rating Simulation
This simulation concentrates on releasing the two main concerns of our credit rating
study: 1) the reliability of our adjusted ordered probit model; 2) the existence of
z − stickiness impact. This experiment simulates data for 300 firms in 50 period23.
For simplification, there is only one explanatory variable x from unstable distribution
xit ∈ D[µi(t), σi(t)], in which both µ and σ are decreasing function of period t. Then,
the credit quality (the basis of rating and unobserved in real world) is determined by:
zit = bxit + it, (3.5)
in which the error term it is normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation equal to 1. In most of the time, we set the true coefficient of b to be a
random number 0.5426, and this setting leads to a decreasing average credit quality.
In some other cases requiring increasing credit quality, we set b to -0.5426.
There are two rating mechanisms under consideration, namely the simple rating
(no stickiness, denoted by r1) and sticky rating (with stickiness, denoted by r2). Each
mechanism includes two category: r = 2 indicates the best credit quality, and r = 1
indicates the remaining. The simple rating mechanism r1 set the median level of
zit (0.768) as the cutoff level (S = 0.768), and any observations with credit quality
higher than S will be assigned the best rating r1 = 2 and the rest receives r1 =
23Actually, we simulate 52 period data for each firm but drop the first and last observations, which
make 50 observations available for each firm. The initial rating under stickiness framework comes
from a slightly different mechanism. It has no past rating, and hence there is no way to determine
migration (i.e. upgrade, downgrade, and stay) which is a crucial factor in stickiness study. We also
drop the last observation to keep the comparability to data within t-stickiness introduced in possible
further test.
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1. This assignment ignores stickiness and hence is consistent with the assumptions
of Ordered-probit estimation. Secondly, the sticky rating assignment requires the
separate invoking thresholds for upgrade and downgrade decisions. When credit
quality exceeds the upper threshold U , that observation will be assigned rating r2 = 2.
Inversely, the observation receives rating r2 = 1 if its credit quality locates below the
lower threshold L. When the credit quality falls between U and L, the observation
keeps its rating in last period.
Estimation Methods
We simulate rating data in order to test the performance of our new estimation
methodology of the adjusted ordered probit model. There is one firm with 1,000
period in this simple simulation. Rating simulation follows two steps: 1) simulate
credit quality, and 2) assign ratings. Firstly, create four normally distributed random
variables (x1 to x4) with different mean and standard deviation. Randomly select the
true coefficients as b1 = 0.543, b2 = −0.958, b3 = 0.267, and b4 = 498. Assume the z
score (z = b1∗x1+b2∗x2+b3∗x3+b4∗x4) captures credit quality. Secondly, select two
set of rating standards for upgrade and downgrade. For simplification, use the 40th
(-0.583) and 80th (0.758) percentiles as the upgrade standard, and 20th (-1.387) and
60th (0.077) percentiles as the downgrade standard. Further, assume the first rating
in this simulation is B, since we assume current rating is determined by credit quality
in last period. If the credit quality at time t reaches either upgrade or downgrade
boundary of its current rating (determined by last period quality), an rating migration
to a suitable position happens next period. Moreover, the observation before a migr-
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Table 3.15: Simulation: Estimation Comparison
Simple Rating r1 Sticky Rating r2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Estimation Ordered Adjusted Ordered Adjusted
Stickiness NO z NO z
b=0.543 0.538 0.536 0.600 0.544







Pseudo R 0.214 0.201 0.248 0.206
Estimations based on simulated data. The ordered probit model (Model 1) ignores
stickiness, while the adjusted ordered probit model (Model 2) controls z-stickiness. The
first two columns apply Model 1 and Model 2 to simple rating r1 which contains no
stickiness in rating assignment; and the last two columns apply the two estimation
methods to sticky rating data. Standard error is in the parentheses.
ation is regarded as threshold. For example, if an observation carries rating B at time
t, and upgrade (downgrade) happens at time t+1, the observation at t is informative
about the upper (lower) boundary of rating B. As summarized in Table 3.15, the
estimated coefficients from the adjusted ordered probit model are much more closer
to the true values.
Moreover, the Adjusted model is designed as a more general model than the
ordered probit one. In order to test the reliability of the Adjusted model on the
magnitude of stickiness, we exploit a set of estimations in narrowing stickiness envi-
ronment. There are 41 estimations with the z − stickiness decreasing to 0. More
precise, the U and L are set at 90th and 10th percentiles of credit quality in the first
estimation. Then U (L) decreases (increases) by 1 percentile until the median value,
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Figure 3.12: Z-stickiness Only Estimation
(a) Coefficients (b) Thresholds
The estimated x coefficients and thresholds of ordered probit model and the adjusted model. There
are 41 estimations with the z-stickiness decreasing to 0. More precise, the U and L are set at 90th
and 10th percentiles of credit quality in the first estimation. Then U (L) decreases (increases) by
1 percentile until the median value, at which U and L overlap and the rating assignment becomes
the simple one.
at which U and L overlap and the rating assignment becomes the simple one. As
plotted in Figure 3.12, the estimated x coefficients from the Adjusted model are
more closer to the true value in most of the time, while the accuracy in ordered
probit model results demonstrates sort of dependence on the stickiness level. Also,
the estimated U and L thresholds from the Adjusted model strictly follows the true
values. Unsurprisingly, the two estimation models converge at the end of the test
when stickiness reduces to zero.
Stickiness Impact
Usually, the year dummy intercepts in ordered probit model is interpreted as the in-
dicators of rating stringency. The main evidence of increasingly stringent rating stan-
dard argued in existing literature is the decreasing year dummy coefficients. However,
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Figure 3.13: Plot of Period Intercepts: Flat Standard
(a) Thresholds and Quality (b) Period Intercepts
(c) Thresholds and Quality (d) Period Intercepts
Period intercepts from ordered probit model and the adjusted model. The simple rating framework
results are in Figures (a) and (b); and Figures (c) and (d) plot the results when introducing z-
stickiness. In this case, both the single standard S and the double thresholds U and L are flat.
the year dummies in ordered probit model may not be accurate stringency indicators
when stickiness exists. As shown in Figure 3.13, we set the rating standard flat for
both simple and sticky ratings, which means the rating stringency does not vary
in this case. The simple rating contains no stickiness, and hence the year dummy
intercepts spike around zero. Unsurprisingly, the period intercepts for the ordered
and the adjusted models almost overlap in part (b). In contrast, the ordered model
period intercepts demonstrate downward trend by merely introducing stickiness (part
(c) and (d)), which fails to reflect the flatness of the double barriers U and L. The p-
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Figure 3.14: Plot of Period Intercepts: Increasing Standard
(a) Thresholds and Quality (b) Period Intercepts
(c) Thresholds and Quality (d) Period Intercepts
Period intercepts of from ordered probit model and the adjusted model. The simple rating framework
results are in Figures (a) and (b); and Figures (c) and (d) plot the results when introducing z-
stickiness. In this case, both the single standard S and the double thresholds U and L are increasing.
eriod dummies in the adjusted model keep at the zero level. Hence, this divergence
documents the impact of stickiness. Similar pattern also appears when rating stan-
dards are increasing and decreasing as in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15. We have
also investigated (but not reported) the situations when credit quality are increasing,
and this phenomenon still exists. Moreover, the lagged rating analysis in Table 3.16
presents the stickiness impact from the position dependence perspective. In general,
lagged rating is insignificant when rating is assigned without stickiness, but highly
significant when stickiness exists.
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Figure 3.15: Plot of Period Intercepts: Decreasing Standard
(a) Thresholds and Quality (b) Period Intercepts
(c) Thresholds and Quality (d) Period Intercepts
Period intercepts of from ordered probit model and the adjusted model. The simple rating framework
results are in parts (a) and (b); and parts (c) and (d) plot the results when introducing z-stickiness.
In this case, both the single standard S and the double thresholds U and L are decreasing.
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Table 3.16: Simulation: Lag Rating Analysis
Panel A: Decreasing Credit Quality
Simple Sticky
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lr 0.146 0.034 0.830 0.715
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
x 0.604 0.520 0.603 0.528
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Cut 1.135 0.482 2.345 1.769
(0.038) (0.116) (0.041) (0.117)
Pseudo R 0.266 0.276 0.356 0.365
Year Dummy No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Increasing Credit Quality
Simple Sticky
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lr -0.040 0.004 0.640 0.701
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
x -0.450 -0.554 -0.455 -0.561
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Cut -0.734 -1.026 0.447 0.066
(0.040) (0.102) (0.039) (0.107)
Pseudo R 0.168 0.180 0.222 0.234
Year Dummy No Yes No Yes
Estimation with lagged rating as an additional explanatory variable based on simulated
data. All estimations in this table are using ordered probit model since the lagged rating
variable attempts to capture the position persistence. Model 1 is the basic specification,
while Model 2 further controls for the period dummy. Panel A summarizes the case
when credit quality is increasing, and Panel B depicts the case when credit quality is
decreasing. Standard error is in the parentheses.
Chapter 3. Estimating Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings when Ratings are
Sticky 196
Appendix 3.2 Likelihood Function
Our estimation differs from the traditional ordered probit model from two aspects:
1) categorization of observations; 2) separation of cut-offs. The likelihood function
reflects these features. In following presentation, Φ(·, 0, 1) denotes the cumulative
function of standard normal distribution, x refers the explanatory variable set for
that group, β is the coefficient vector to be estimated, r refers credit rating observed
(ranges from 1 to 5 with increasing credit quality in this research), ur refers to the
upper cut-off of rating r, and lr refers to the lower cut-off of rating r accordingly.
Case 1 : Upper Threshold When a firm has experienced rating upgrade in
next period, its observation in current period falls into the upper threshold group.
Its credit quality has exceeded the upper cut-off of its current rating now, which leads
to the rating upgrade in next period. Hence, observations in this group contains the
information of upper cut-offs. More precise, the upper cut-offs are the lowest possible
level of the credit quality conveyed by observations in this group, and hence the
probability of being in such a situation is
p1 = 1− Φ(ur − x · β, 0, 1). (3.6)
Case 2 : Ordinary Observation When a firm has its credit rating stayed the
same in next period (no upgrade or downgrade), its observation in current period is
within the ordinary group. The credit quality of observations in this group match
their ratings. In other words, the credit quality is correctly bounded by the upper and
lower cut-offs of their observed credit ratings in this group, and hence the probability
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in this situation is
p2 = Φ(ur − x · β, 0, 1)− Φ(lr − x · β, 0, 1). (3.7)
Case 3 : Lower Threshold In contrary to the upper cut-off group, the lower
cut-off group contains observations which has been downgraded in next period. These
observations are informative for the lower cut-off s of credit ratings. In detail, the
credit quality is below the lower cut-offs of their ratings for observations in this group,
and the probability is
p3 = Φ(lr − x · β, 0, 1). (3.8)
Overall, the loglikelihood function is
loglike = log(p1) + log(p2) + log(p3). (3.9)























The covariance matrix is hence V ar( ˆθML) = [−H( ˆθML)]−1, in which θML is the
vector contains all variables to be estimated and it includes β, ur, and lr in this case.
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More details about the calculation of the Hessian matrix is in the attached MATLAB
program.
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Appendix 3.3 MATLAB Program
1 function [beta1 ,se1 ,results1 ,pseudo_r ]= adj_order_probit_fix_musig(yche ,xx ,id)
2 nvar=length(xx(1,:));
3 nr=max(yche); % ensure rating from 1 to nr, indicating quality (AAA=nr)
4 n=length(yche);
5
6 % for subsample
7 id2=id;id2(yche==min(yche) & id==3) =2; id2(yche==max(yche) & id==1) =2;id=id2;
8
9
10 y1=yche;x1=xx;y1(id~=1 ,:) =[];x1(id~=1 ,:) =[];% id=1: upper threshold
11 y2=yche;x2=xx;y2(id~=2 ,:) =[];x2(id~=2 ,:) =[];% id=2: observation




16 c_initial_coeff = (xx ’*xx)\(xx ’*yche)*(rand -0.5) *2;
17 c_initial_shreshold_u = (1:2:2*(nr -1)) ’;
18 c_initial_shreshold_l = c_initial_shreshold_u -1;
19 c_ini1 = [c_initial_coeff;c_initial_shreshold_u;c_initial_shreshold_l ];
20
21
22 tic;options = optimoptions(@fminunc ,’Algorithm ’,’trust -region ’,’
SpecifyObjectiveGradient ’,true ,’HessianFcn ’,’objective ’,’MaxIter ’ ,4000000,’
MaxFunEvals ’ ,10000000 ,’display ’,’Iter’,’TolX’ ,10^-6,’TolFun ’ ,10^-6);
23
24 x10=y1 -y1+1; x20=y2-y2+1;x30=y3 -y3+1; nvar2 =1; c_ini0 = [rand (1,1);
c_initial_shreshold_u;c_initial_shreshold_l ];




28 c_ini1 = [c_initial_coeff;beta0 (2:end ,1)];
29 [beta1 ,loglike ,~,~,~, hessian ]= fminunc(@(ini)loglike_g_h(y1,x1,y2 ,x2,y3,x3 ,nr,nvar ,
ini),c_ini1 ,options);toc;















42 function [l,g,h]= loglike_g_h(y1 ,x1,y2,x2 ,y3,x3,nr ,nvar ,ini)
43
44 b=ini (1:nvar ,1);upper=[ini(nvar +1: nvar+nr -1,1);inf]; lower=[-inf;ini(nvar+nr:nvar+nr+
nr -2,1)];mu=0; sig=1;
45
46 % Part I: Log Likelihood



























72 g1b=x1 ’*( normpdf1 ./p1); % id=1: upper threshold
73 g2b=-x2 ’*(( normpdf2u -normpdf2l)./(pu2 -pl2)); % id=2: traditional observation
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100 ggu2=-normpdf2u .*( upper(y2)-x2*b-mu)/sig;ggu2(y2==nr)=0;
101 ggl2=-normpdf2l .*( lower(y2)-x2*b-mu)/sig;ggl2(y2==1) =0;
102




107 h1bb_part1=repmat(normpdf1 ./p1 ,1,nvar).*x1;
108 h1bb_part2=repmat (( normpdf1 .*( upper(y1)-x1*b-mu))./p1 ,1,nvar).*x1;
109 h1bb=-h1bb_part1 ’* h1bb_part1+h1bb_part2 ’*x1/(sig^2);
110
111 h2bb_part1=repmat ((normpdf2u -normpdf2l)./(pu2 -pl2),1,nvar).*x2;
112 h2bb_part2_fun=-sig*(ggu2 -ggl2)./(pu2 -pl2);
113 h2bb_part2=repmat(h2bb_part2_fun ,1,nvar).*x2;
114 h2bb=-h2bb_part1 ’*h2bb_part1 -h2bb_part2 ’*x2/(sig^2);
115
116 h3bb_part1=repmat(normpdf3 ./p3 ,1,nvar).*x3;
117 h3bb_part2=repmat (( normpdf3 .*( lower(y3)-x3*b-mu))./p3 ,1,nvar).*x3;






124 h1bu_part1_fun =( normpdf1 ./p1).^2;
125 h1bu_part1=repmat(h1bu_part1_fun ,1,nvar).*x1;
126 h1bu_part2_fun =-(normpdf1 ./p1).*( upper(y1)-x1*b-mu);
127 h1bu_part2=repmat(h1bu_part2_fun ,1,nvar).*x1/(sig ^2);
128 h1bu=h1bu_part1+h1bu_part2;
129
130 h2bu_part1_fun =( normpdf2u .*( normpdf2u -normpdf2l)./(pu2 -pl2))./(pu2 -pl2);
131 h2bu_part1=repmat(h2bu_part1_fun ,1,nvar).*x2;
132 h2bu_part2_fun=normpdf2u .*( upper(y2)-x2*b-mu)./(pu2 -pl2);
133 h2bu_part2=repmat(h2bu_part2_fun ,1,nvar).*x2/(sig ^2);
134 h2bu=h2bu_part1+h2bu_part2;
135
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140 h2bl_part1_fun=normpdf2l .*( normpdf2u -normpdf2l)./((pu2 -pl2).^2);
141 h2bl_part1=-repmat(h2bl_part1_fun ,1,nvar).*x2;




146 h3bl_part1_fun =( normpdf3 ./p3).^2;
147 h3bl_part1=repmat(h3bl_part1_fun ,1,nvar).*x3;
148 h3bl_part2_fun=normpdf3 .*( lower(y3)-x3*b-mu)./p3;
149 h3bl_part2=repmat(h3bl_part2_fun ,1,nvar).*x3/(sig ^2);
150 h3bl=h3bl_part1+h3bl_part2;
151
152 hbl_raw =[h2bl;h3bl];yl_=[y2;y3];hbl=zeros(nvar ,nr -1);
153
154
155 for i=1:nr -1
156 hbu_=hbu_raw;
157 hbu_(yu_~=i,:) =[];
158 hbu(:,i)=sum(hbu_ ,1) ’;
159 hbl_=hbl_raw;
160 hbl_(yl_~=i+1,:) =[];









170 h1uu_part1 =-(normpdf1 ./p1).^2;
171 h1uu_part2 =( normpdf1 .*( upper(y1)-x1*b-mu)./p1)/(sig^2);




174 % ggu2=-normpdf2u .*( upper(y2)-x2*b-mu)/sig;ggu2(y2==nr)=0;
175
176 h2uu_part1 =-(normpdf2u ./(pu2 -pl2)).^2;












189 h2ll_part1 =-(normpdf2l ./(pu2 -pl2)).^2;
190 h2ll_part2=normpdf2l .*( lower(y2)-x2*b-mu)./(pu2 -pl2)/(sig^2);
191 h2ll=h2ll_part1+h2ll_part2;
192







200 % huu hul humu husig
201 % hll hlmu hlsig
202
203 huu=zeros(nr -1,nr -1);hll=huu;hul=huu;
204
205 for i=1:nr -1
206 huu_=huu_raw;
207 huu_(yu_~=i,:) =[];

















223 % hll hlmu hlsig
224
225 h=-[hbb ,hbu ,hbl;hub ,huu ,hul;hlb ,hlu ,hll]*m;




Adjustment cost is involved into almost every aspects in financing area but currently
receive little consideration in academic studies. Different types of adjustment intro-
duce new dynamics in finance area such that the existence of targets and thresholds.
This thesis provides two possible application of the model derived within a framework
with dynamic adjustment cost, one investigating the optimal cash holding policy and
providing evidence on the stickiness of credit rating.
The first study is motivated by the existence of adjustment cost in firms’ cash
policy. Expensive cash injection and withdraw make immediate adjustment sub-
optimal. The consideration of these cost in our model leads to a better understanding
of firms’ cash refinancing behavior, and contributes to the comprehension of other
aspects in corporate finance given the intertwined cash policy with other crucial
decisions, such as financial and investment policy (Bolton et al. 2011).
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Our study develops and estimates a double-barrier model to describe firms’ cash
holding management behavior. As oppose to the traditional studies, our model as-
sumes infrequent refinancing and allow cash holding levels to freely evolve within a
range. The estimation of the model yields some interesting results. The most im-
portant one suggests that cash inflow reduces firms demand of cash holding, which
is contrary to the positive correlation in the literature. The observed cash holding
may be affected by the direct injection from cash flow, but the real target shows
endogenously inverse impact if clearly isolated. Accordingly, future outflows posi-
tively affects cash holding demand, since firms prepare funds for future expenditure.
Although the sign of industry risk impact in our model is the same as in standard
regression results, the magnitude is much larger. The demand variation does not fully
reflect in realized cash holdings due to the infrequency of refinancing choice. Besides,
the double barrier model further allows us to study the trigger of refinancing. We find
that inflows shrink the width of inaction range which implies more frequent refinanc-
ing, and future outflows affect inversely. Industry risk enlarges the lower zone but
shrinks the upper zone. It suggests less frequent injection but more often distribution
in future, which provides additional channels to stockpile cash holdings.
The second study attempts to investigate the credit rating deterioration in the
US in the recent decades. In order to do this, establish an unified framework of
rating agency decision making. Our model interprets the dynamic in rating agencies’
decision making process from two aspects, the quantification of firms’ credit quality
and the tolerance of credit quality deviation from the ratings’ nominal range. Our
model integrates the two aspects by introducing stickiness into estimation, and makes
it possible to infer rating agencies’ decision making. Our first goal is to quantify
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the effect of each covariate on the observed rating deterioration. Our second goal
is to reconcile stylized facts in existing empirical studies (e.g. slow respondence,
asymmetric migration, pro-cyclical or countercyclical, etc.) by revealing their origin.
Unlike existing literature, our model assumes the existence of costs for agencies to
adjust rating, which causes stickiness in credit rating.
The study investigates the stickiness in credit ratings, and contributes to ex-
isting literature in a number of ways. First, this paper provides direct empirical
evidence about the existence of rating stickiness. The concept of stickiness integrates
the concern of slow response (Altman & Rijken 2004, Lo¨ﬄer 2004) and the rever-
sal avoidance motivation (Lo¨ﬄer 2005) of credit rating agency. Our results prove
stickiness by showing that the introduction of stickiness in estimation absorbs the
decreasing trend of of yearly intercept, and that the terms of explanatory variables
interacting with migration dummies are statistically significant. Secondly, this study
investigates the effects of stickiness in credit ratings. The consideration of stickiness
predicts better rating categories but less rating migrations. Thirdly, this research
provides explanation of credit rating deterioration from a stickiness perspective. Un-
der the stickiness framework, our study demonstrates that the absolute credit quality
surprisingly increases, the downgrade standard keeps at the similar level with slight
ascending, but the raising upper threshold makes upgrades very difficult. In addition,
this paper contributes to our comprehension of rating agencies’ behavioral pattern.
Agencies wait until the deviation of credit quality from its current rating range be-
comes sufficient and then decides migration. Finally, the estimation applied in this
study enriches the method of determinants study in credit ratings. Our estimation
method is a more general one, and it considers the stickiness in credit rating. This
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feature enables it to estimate the credit rating determination within the dynamic
framework.
This thesis provides some interesting insights to decision makers that are in-
volved in designing, implementing and assessing firm policies. Chapter 2 tests the
existence of the endogenous pattern predicted by double-barrier model in cash holding
management, that is cash refinancing is invoked by cash holding level being too high
or too low. Inversely, the empirical evidence consistent with the model prediction
supports the double-barrier policy as a suitable choice for cash refinancing behavior.
The existence of refinancing cost (e.g. debt or equity issuance cost, opportunity cost,
etc) further strengthens the link between theory and empirical test in our research.
Chapter 3 attempts to establish an unified framework of rating agency decision mak-
ing. The aggregate dynamic behavior model of rating agencies unifies the economic
determinants study into the endogenous behavior pattern, and hence it is possible
to estimate the effect of a variable on agencies’ rating migration decision. Also, this
study reconciles some stylized facts in existing empirical studies (e.g. slow respon-
dence, asymmetric migration, pro-cyclical or countercyclical, etc.) by revealing their
origin.
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